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After the introduction of the cargo container and related automation systems in
the late 1950s, the numbers of maritime laborers who worked along the piers and aboard
ship along American waterways steadily declined. In the late 1950s, tens of thousands of
longshoremen and merchant mariners plied their respective trades, but the process of
“containerization” reduced their numbers by nearly 70 percent by the late 1980s and early
1990s. The Department of Defense (DoD) similarly containerized and automated its
cargo handling during this era. The introduction of the container also had negative
consequences for defense maritime policy. Containerization of the National Security
Waterfront represented but one decision of many at the Department of Defense to replace
laborers and other personnel with automation and privatization. During the Cold War,
privatization evolved into contracting corporations for numerous aspects of government
operations, including at the DoD. Beginning in the early 1960s, the DoD investigated
how best to maximize budgets that were coming under strain from growing Cold War
military commitments. Over the course of the following three decades, the DoD adopted
containerization for nearly every aspect of its maritime logistics operations. By the

1990s, automation had decimated maritime communities and the DoD’s maritime
logistics network.
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INTRODUCTION
Unlike most weeks in the late twentieth century, the docks of Wilmington, North
Carolina, Savannah, Georgia, and other American military ports teemed with life during
early August, 1990. Since the introduction of the cargo container and related automation
systems in the late 1950s, the numbers of maritime laborers who worked along the piers
and aboard ship along American waterways steadily declined. In the late 1950s, tens of
thousands of longshoremen and merchant mariners plied their respective trades, but the
process of “containerization” reduced their numbers by nearly 70 percent by the late 1980
and early 1990s.1 The Department of Defense (DoD) similarly containerized and
automated its cargo handling during the same era. By 1990, the decline of the Soviet
Union removed a fifty-year threat to American security, but the need for longshoremen
and mariners in DoD operations did not cease.2
In August of that year, however, a new threat in the guise of economic
destabilization appeared. The Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein invaded neighboring

Marc Levinson, The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy
Bigger, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 232.

1

“This Aggression Will Not Stand,” New York Times, March 1, 1991; Andrew Rosenthal, “Bush Sends
U.S. Force to Saudi Arabia as Kingdom Agrees to Confront Iraq,” New York Times, August 8, 1990; Paul
Westermeyer, Liberating Kuwait: U.S. Marines in the Gulf War, 1990-1991 (Quantico, VA: History
Division, United States Marine Corps, 2014), 14-16; Salvatore Mercogliano, “Sealift: A History of
American Military Sea Transportation,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Alabama, 2004), 384.
2

1

petroleum rich Kuwait and threatened the oil fields of Saudi Arabia. Defense against the
threat of an Iraqi army invasion and the potential catastrophic economic effects of an oil
shock led the administration of President George H. W. Bush to initiate a massive United
States military buildup in Saudi Arabia.3 Getting military equipment, armored vehicles,
and ammunition to the Arabian Peninsula for such an operation proved to be much more
difficult than planned. When cargo ships arrived at military ocean terminals at
Wilmington, Delaware, and Savannah, Georgia, the vessels sat at empty piers. The
results of forty years of DoD containerization revealed itself when only a quarter of the
longshoremen needed to load materials were available. Thousands of retired
longshoremen summoned by their union and the DoD raced towards the two ports from
as far away as Texas, Florida, and New York to load the ships in time to stave off
disaster. The last vestiges of pre-automated and containerized workforce completed the
“miraculous” task of supporting the DoD operation in the Persian Gulf.4 In spite of
massive cutbacks in their numbers, the remaining longshoremen supported the operation.
The result of automating and containerization military logistics, however, became
apparent during the summer and fall of 1990.
Scholars of Cold War defense policy have addressed the effect of military
spending on new technology, but failed to discuss maritime logistics. The primary goal
of this study is to examine the effect of containerization along the docks of military ports

3

Mercogliano, “Sealift”, 394

Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, The General’s War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf
(New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 56-58. Gordon and Trainor described the rapid loading of
the ships at Sunny Point as “nothing less than miraculous.”

4

2

during the Cold War.

Shortly after the end of World War II, the United States retooled

its security mechanisms through legislation.5 The National Security Act of 1947 placed
the American government and economy on a permanent war footing.6 From the late
1940s through the early 1990s, military exigencies dictated nearly every aspect of
government spending. Author Marcus Raskin described the government’s overwhelming
focus on defense matters during the Cold War as the “National Security State.”7
Maritime logistics was no exception. No scholarship, however, has evaluated the results
of automation and privatization on military logistics along the National Security
Waterfront. Borrowing from Raskin, the “National Security Waterfront” was an
outgrowth of the Cold War era “National Security State.” Beginning in 1947, military
preparedness influenced the vast majority of national economic and policy decisions. The
“National Security Waterfront” describes the maritime logistics aspects of the Cold War
military buildup. The laborers and ships of the maritime sector populated the docks of
the National Security Waterfront during the Cold War. The cargo container, which
replaced workers, also became an instrument of automation and globalization.
Globalization, or the integration of international economic and trade systems, was
facilitated by the cargo container. According historian Marc Levinson, the “box made
the world smaller.”8 He noted that while “the container made shipping cheap” by

Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 19451954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 190-210.

5

Paul A.C. Koistinen, State of War: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1945-2011 (Lawrence,
KS: University Press of Kansas, 2012), 24-26.

6

Marcus G. Raskin, Essays of A Citizen: From National Security State to Democracy (New York:
Routledge, 1992), 2-4.

7

8

Levinson, The Box, 2.

3

automating the docks, “the armies of ill-paid, ill-treated workers who once made their
livings loading and unloading ships [were] no more.”9

The depopulated docks of

American port cities sat at the intersection of automation and Cold War era maritime
policy.
The triumph of automation and containerization contrasted with the tragedy of the
longshoremen’s fate. Historian Hayden White argued that historical studies and literary
works shared plot structures and story arcs for the subjects of the work. For the subjects
of what work? White argued that stories have a trajectory of changes for the subjects of
the story, also known as emplotments. Emplotments, or what White describes as
“archetypical story forms,” are embodied in relatively simple concepts such as romances,
comedies, and tragedies.10 For the subjects undergoing positive changes, White describes
this trajectory as a comedic emplotment. Story lines with negative outcomes for the
subjects, however, have a tragic emplotment.11 The tragic change for longshoremen and
maritime communities was the invention of the cargo container and its adoption by
commercial shippers and the DoD over the course of the Cold War. This paragraph is
confusing.
The introduction of the container similarly had negative consequences for defense
maritime policy. Containerization of the National Security Waterfront represented but
one decision of many at the Department of Defense to replace laborers and other

9

Ibid, 2.

Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 10-11.
10

11

Ibid, 38.
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personnel with automation and privatization. Privatization during the Cold War evolved
into contracting corporations for numerous aspects of government operations, including
at the DoD.12 Beginning in the early 1960s, the DoD investigated how best to maximize
budgets under strain from numerous Cold War era military commitments. Over the
course of the following three decades, the DoD adopted containerization for nearly every
aspect of maritime logistics operations. By the 1990s, automation decimated maritime
communities and the DoD’s maritime logistics network. This study’s core argument is
that the DoD’s blind adherence to privatization in the latter stages of the Cold War and
adoption of the cargo container decimated maritime employment and the military’s
logistics capabilities.
An additional goal of this study beyond investigating containerization is to create
an interpretative lens for U.S. maritime defense policy and government-labor relations
during the Cold War. In Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis,
Graham Allison’s investigation of American and Soviet officials during the Cuban
Missile Crisis offered an interpretation of government behavior and decision making
processes. Allison’s models included the Organizational Process Model explaining both
individual and group behavior for investigating government actions. 13 First,
organizations exist in order to produce a “systematic and harmonious or united action.”14
Furthermore, organizations are charged with missions based on the capabilities and task

Peter Warren Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2003), 63-67.
12

Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New
York: Longman, 1999), 143. Allison wrote the original text. Zelikow expanded and edited the text in the
late 1990s.
14
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at hand. Finally, such an agency develops an organizational culture based on its
designated capabilities. Individuals employed by such an agency conform to the
leadership’s policies, practices, and standards.15 While Allison applied his model to the
short term crisis over thirteen days in 1962, this study aims to expand the temporal scope
of this model to several decades. From the 1960s through the 1990s, civilian policy
makers and managers, such as Robert McNamara and David Packard, introduced various
private sector reforms to defense planning. The reforms and new programs ultimately
represented the early stages of a new organizational culture and process in the DoD. The
new culture at the DoD favored scientific management principles and financial reforms
over other considerations, especially those of human capital.16
Using the modified Organizational Process model, this study offers a four-stage
process by which to view the DoD’s embrace of private sector methods, including the
cargo container. Chapter II analyzes military logistics and labor issues before the
introduction of the cargo container. The first stage of the process of the military adopting
private business methods is covered in Chapter III’s discussion of the DoD under Robert
McNamara and David Packard from 1961 to 1971. Policy changes during the John F.
Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson administrations altered procurement and budgeting
guidance to match to methods of the private sector.17 In no small part, McNamara’s and

15

Ibid, 143.

Transcript, David Packard, November 9, 1987, interviewed by Albert Goldberg and Maurice Matloff,
12, Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_PackardDavid%2011-9-1987.pdf
16

Charles J. Hitch, Decision Making for Defense (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1970), 2527.
17

6

Packard’s respective embrace of what the latter termed “proper management methods,”
derived from their experiences at major consumer product corporations.18 Over the
course of a forty year period, the organizational culture at the DoD conformed to the
example of commercial shippers who pioneering efficient, cost-effective means for
logistics with the container. Following suit, McNamara and staff introduced
containerization to military logistics. With DoD planners such as McNamara, Cyrus
Vance, and others demanding containerized shipping from an increasingly automated
maritime industry, military procurement only accelerated the process of containerization
by the early 1970s. 19
As a solution to dependence on a potentially unruly labor force and inject
predictability, privatization and deregulation combined with the DoD’s second stage of
embracing containerization in the 1970s. Chapter IV discusses how the Richard M.
Nixon, Gerald R. Ford, and Jimmy Carter administrations continued the DoD’s
implementation of containerization. From 1969 onward, Deputy Secretary of Defense
David Packard and his successors at the DoD, including Donald Rumsfeld and Harold
Brown, implemented accounting regimens and purchasing policies drawn directly from

Transcript, David Packard, November 9, 1987, interviewed by Albert Goldberg and Maurice Matloff,
Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 23.
http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_PackardDavid%2011-91987.pdf.; Transcript, George Anderson, interview by Maurice Matloff, May 17, 1984, Historical Office,
Office of the Secretary of Defense,
http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_AndersonGeorge5-17-1984.pdf.
This doesn’t make sense.
18

Walter Poole, Adapting to Flexible Response, 1960-1968 (Washington, DC: Historical Office of the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013), 21-23; Richard A. Hunt, Melvin Laird and the Foundation of the
Post-Vietnam Military, 1969-1973 (Washington, DC: Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, 2015), 8-11.

19
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the private sector.20 Post-Vietnam era defense spending cuts accelerated the amenability
of political appointees and military officers to the increased automation of logistics.21
The 1970s also witnessed a steep decline in the maritime labor force as a result of
containerization. Government officials embraced transportation industry initiatives
considered essential to efficiency. Taking cues from contemporary economists and
popular support for deregulation, transportation firms lobbied for the removal of federal
commercial regulations. Politicians harnessed the popularity of the deregulation
movement during late 1970s to address the U.S. flagged shipping industry’s decline
during contemporary energy and economic crises. In doing so, planners and legislation
incrementally removed safety and employment protections for maritime workers.22
Chapter V investigates maritime reforms during the administration of Ronald Reagan.
The third stage of automation and globalization of the National Security Waterfront
coupled deregulation with a commitment to restoring naval and commercial maritime
primacy.23 . Specifically, the administration touted the “600 ship” navy. Rapid

Packard founded computer firm Hewlett-Packard and served as the company’s President and CEO before
his nomination for Deputy Secretary of Defense by President Nixon.
20

Benjamin Holland (President, International Longshoreman’s Association, Beaumont, TX), Telephone
interview with the author, September 2, 2014.
21

Transcript, David Packard, November 9, 1987, interviewed by Albert Goldberg and Maurice Matloff,
14, Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_PackardDavid%2011-9-1987.pdf.
21

Shane Hamilton, Trucking Country: The Road to America’s Walmart Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2008), 2.

22

Blaine Harden, “The Editor Who Claims to Think Like a President,” Washington Post, July 11, 1982;
Jude Wanniski, The Way The World Works: How Economies Fail-and Succeed (New York: Basic Books,
1978), 129-132. Wanniski is most often credited with inventing the term “supply-side” economics, but the
concept was developed by economist Milton Friedman and Nixon advisor Herbert Stein. For more, see
Robert Bartley, The Seven Fat Years: And How To Do It Again (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 13-22.
23

8

expansion of defense budgets aimed at deterring the Soviet Union, however, failed to
include enough funds for the preservation of the maritime labor base.24 Promised reforms
of the maritime industry instead focused on furthering deregulation or privatization of
federal responsibilities. Maritime labor similarly suffered under the weight of sweeping
federal prosecutions for the age old allegation of mob ties and racketeering. In spite of
repeated and well-publicized episodes of military contractor abuses, only labor unions
suffered under the weight of Department of Justice investigations.25 By the mid-1980s,
defense contractor abuses and inefficiencies in the budgeting process led to another call
for reforms. Led by David Packard and similar champions of privatization, the reform
movement at the DoD in the mid and late 1980s resulted in further deregulation and
automation.26
Chapter VI discusses the final stage of defense containerization and automation
during the late 1980s and 1990s. Managerial reforms during the late 1980s cemented an
organizational culture at the DoD in favor of privatization. Apart from repeated attempts
to circumvent the use of U.S. flagged shipping by the DoD, civilian leadership of the
military explored contracting defense logistics to private corporations during the term of
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney. 27 The deeply ingrained privatization impulse at the

24

Thomas A. Schaff, “Six Years of Maritime Decline,” Journal of Commerce (New York), April 8, 1987.

25
James Jacobs, Mobsters, Unions and Feds: The Mafia and the American Labor Movement (New York:
New York University Press, 2006), 56.

Bill Keller, “A Familiar Face, a Familiar Problem,” New York Times, June 20, 1985.
http://www.nytimes.com/1985/06/20/us/a-familiar-face-a-familiar-problem.html Accessed March 22,
2016.
26

“Dick Cheney-A Heartbeat Away,” YouTube video, 1:27:00, televised by Wyoming Public Television
on November 13, 2015, posted by “Wyoming PBS,”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=16NqFviGvvE(accessed May 14, 2016); Lawrence Schwartz, Alfred
27

9

DoD accelerated use of private sector logistics methods. The DoD exercises preparing
for a late Cold War conflict with the Soviet Union, such as the Reforger operations,
featured heavy reliance on containerization.28 Resultantly, the ordinal steps which set the
DoD down the path of automation in the late 1950s and early 1960s precipitated the Gulf
War sealift debacle of 1990. Insufficient numbers of longshoremen, a lack of U.S.
flagged shipping, and an overemphasis on contingency planning based upon
containerization caught the DoD unprepared.29
In spite of the overwhelming dependence upon longshoremen in the summer and
autumn of 1990, the DoD failed to learn from this example. Rather, defense planners and
military officers maintained further automation and containerization could handle DoD
logistics concerns.30 The trade agenda of the Bush and Bill Clinton administrations
abetted the DoD’s post-Cold War transition to globalized logistics networks. Legislation
attuned the American economy to free trade by the mid-1990s. Congressional approval
of free trade agreements facilitated deeper federal commitment to globalization, the cargo
container, and its destructive effect on maritime and shore side labor.31

H. Beyer, Frederick M. McNamee, Click D. Smith, Review of DoD’s Strategic Mobility Programs:
Commercial Sealift Support, (Washington, DC: Logistics Management Institute, 1992), 2.
Simon Duke, United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1989), 24.; Lt. Col. Martyn Morford and Captain Greg Jones, “Sustaining A Cold War Army”,
Millrinder, No. 2, (2011), 21-22.

28

Benjamin Holland (President, International Longshoreman’s Association, Beaumont, TX), telephone
interview with the author, September 2, 2014.; William DiBenedetto and Bruce Vail, “Military Sealift to
Gulf Underway”, Journal of Commerce, (New York), August 10, 1990.
29

30

Lawrence Schwartz, et al., Review of DoD’s Strategic Mobility Programs, 2.

31

Levinson, The Box, 1-6.

10

This study also aims to bridge the disparate historiographies military, maritime,
and labor affairs. A secondary goal of this study is to contribute to the growing field of
maritime history. According to historian John Hattendorf, maritime history, or a
“multidimensional study of human interactions with the world’s water covered regions,”
has witnessed a recent resurgence.32 Hattendorf explained that throughout the latter
decades of the twentieth century, maritime studies lost popularity as they were primarily
studies of naval operations, exploration, or the biographies of military commanders.
Only when maritime scholars embraced social and cultural studies, he argued, did the
field enjoy renewed relevance.33 An exemplar of the “new” maritime history was
maritime journalist and historian Marc Levinson’s The Box: How the Shipping Container
Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger. No study of workers on the
waterfront covers as much ground as The Box and the text remains the seminal work on
the invention and proliferation of the cargo container.34 Levinson focused the majority of
his work on the positive economic and industrial effects of containerization, such as
increased profitability for shippers and rapidity of shipment of products that
containerization facilitated.35 While Levinson occasionally references cultural
representations of the waterfront and unemployed workers, containerization and
economic growth are his primary concern. Moreover, The Box fails to discuss the DoD’s

32
John B. Hattendorf, “Maritime History Today,” Perspectives on History 50, no. 2 (2012), accessed June
6, 2016, https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/february2012/maritime-history-today.
33

Ibid.

34

Levinson, The Box, 240.

35

Ibid, 2-5.
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embrace of containerization in the 1970s and 1980s. This study aims to expand upon
Levinson’s work and focus on fields and workers he bypassed.
A significant historiographical intervention by this study is the discussion of
longshoremen who lost their livelihoods and continued to suffer negative stereotyping.
British social historian E.P. Thompson intended to “rescue the poor stockinger, the
Luddite cropper, the ‘obsolete’ hand-loom weaver…from the enormous condescension of
posterity.”36 This study, on the other hand, aims to rescue longshoremen and maritime
workers from the enormous suspicion of posterity. The longshoreman was depicted in
popular culture throughout the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries as a
shadowy figure often involved in nefarious activities. According to historian James T.
Fisher, negative movie and television depictions of longshoremen became “the definitive
account” for the general public.37

Films such as On the Waterfront (1954) and The

French Connection (1971) depicted longshoremen and seamen as the dock agents of
organized crime and drug kingpins.38 Similarly, popular television, shows such as The
Sopranos and The Wire, featured season-long story arcs of longshoremen as facilitators
of theft and human trafficking. The Wire’s example is particularly egregious, as the
show’s creator was David Simon, the former maritime editor and homicide reporter for
The Baltimore Sun. Simon pedaled his knowledge of maritime affairs and crime to

36

E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1964), 12.

James T. Fisher, On the Irish Waterfront: The Crusader, the Movie, and the Soul of the Port of New
York, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 295.
37

38

Ibid, 295-296.

12

promote his show as an authentic view of American urban, economic, and political life.39
An unforgivable sin in the American discourse was the persistent reinforcement of
negative stereotypes. Obviously this was not the case when it came to popular culture’s
depiction of the American worker. The disservice done to longshoremen and other
maritime workers in the popular media is this study’s raison d’être.
The historiography on subjects involving waterfront workers, economics, and
defense policy throughout the twentieth century is relatively thin. Earlier studies
featuring longshoremen or maritime workers have depicted them as either heroic radicals
or proxies for organized crime. Bruce Nelson and Howard Kilmildorf are among the very
few authors who have focused on maritime workers in the United States. Their studies
were constrained by the fact that they selectively discussed workers from limited
locations and populations. Both detailed the pre-World War II split between the
International Longshoreman’s Association (ILA) and the International Longshore and
Warehouse Union (ILWU). Both works depicted the ILA as merely a tool of shipping
company owners or as a conduit for mobsters.40 Similarly, former federal prosecutor
James Jacobs claimed only federal purging of criminal elements within unions offered
workers legitimate representation. Jacobs, a former U.S. District Attorney, prosecuted

Margaret Talbot, “Stealing Life: The Crusader Behind ‘The Wire’”, The New Yorker, October 22, 2007,
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/10/22/stealing-life

39

Bruce Nelson, Workers on the Waterfront: Seamen, Longshoremen, and Unionism in the 1930s
(Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 7-12; Howard Kilmindorf, Reds or Rackets?: The
Making of Radical and Conservative Unions on the Waterfront (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1988), 2-4. In both cases, the authors champion the cause of the radical or class-conscious longshoremen
in the ILWU over the conservative workers in the ILA. Much of this material and era will be discussed in
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ILA officials during the 1980s and 1990s.41 The glaring omission in most of these works
is the role of civilian labor in military logistics. Furthermore, the characterization of the
longshoreman as a mafia tool, a Communist, or a heroic champion of radical activism is
and was an incomplete picture.42
Scholars such as Jefferson Cowie or David Noble noted the steady decline of
organized labor in the 1960s and 1970s during the heyday of automation. Cowie’s
Stayin’ Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class discussed the
beginnings of industrial decline and economic stagnation during the late 1960s and early
1970s. Cowie argued that the broad debasement of organized labor occurred after the
rise of anti-labor sentiments in the electorate by the late 1960s. Cowie’s sweeping
discussion of the working class, however, concentrates on larger populations of workers
in the automobile plants, mining, or other heavy manufacturing industries, not maritime
workers.43

According to Cowie, “the turbulent waters of the 1970s, (for unions) roared

with a vengeance during the 1980s.”44 Cowie, however, treats the 1970s and early 1980s
as a prologue to a larger story of labor’s collapse in later decades without further
explanation. Major deindustrialization did not take place until later in the 1980s and
1990s. Beyond a few anecdotes, Cowie failed to integrate his story into trends such as
outsourcing or automation.
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Studies of automation rarely discussed maritime workers, but covered important
trends such as productivity and the role of labor during increased mechanization. David
Noble devoted several monographs to the concept of “technological unemployment” in
heavy industries. Borrowing from John Maynard Keynes’ definition of unemployed
workers because of technological innovations or automation, Noble’s approach to
industry differs from Keynes. Keynes argued that technological unemployment was an
unintended consequence of technology. In Forces of Production: A History of Industrial
Automation and Progress Without People: New Technology, Unemployment, and the
Message and Resistance, Noble offered the argument that engineers designed machines
to reduce labor at the behest of their employers. Employers invested in more technology
and laid off workers in order to maximize their profit margins.45 Noble’s texts discussed
worker resistance, such as sabotage, and provided an interesting framework for how
mechanization destroys communities. Noble’s discussion of workers sabotaging
machines as a form of resistance misses the mark for most maritime laborers in the
United States during the Cold War. They voted, contributed to political parties, attended
church, and eschewed radical tactics other than strikes in their negotiations over wages or
working conditions.46
Recent studies have illustrated links between economic and budget austerity, and
the decline of maritime labor resulting from automation, deregulation, and privatization.
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In The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics, Bruce
Schulman discussed the decline of the pro-labor consensus, which had guided policy and
elections in the immediate post-war period. Schulman’s argument is that the 1970s
witnessed a transition from faith in the federal government’s ability to solve social ills to
a belief in private sector solutions as a treatment for economic decline. The downsizing
of the federal budget left enormous gaps in the economy previously reserved for the
government. According to Schulman, the mid-1970s witnessed a “diverting of resources
and initiative from the public to the private sector.” 47 Similarly, Thomas Borstelmann’s
The 1970s: A New Global History from Civil Rights to Economic Inequality discussed the
oil shocks of 1970s and the internationalization of manufacturing markets. The study
connected the decline of the Keynesian programs during the 1970s to rising individualism
and a rejection of collective improvement through government. Borstelmann illustrated
an interconnected global marketplace to the rise of a 1970s-era rejection of community.
Simultaneously, a development of foreign produced consumer goods catered to the
individual self-improvement, not the group or reliance on the state. Succinctly,
Borstelmann noted that “confidence in the mechanisms of supply and demand replace
confidence in the government.” 48
Recent scholarship about the transportation industry identified broad-based
support for private management of the market in the 1970s. Shane Hamilton’s Trucking
Country: The Road to America’s Wal-Mart Economy discusses a rebellion by truckers
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against road transportation regulations during what he dubs a “free market revolution”
during the Nixon, Ford, Carter, and early Reagan administrations. Hamilton notes that a
belief in allowing the private sector to manage the economy permeated the public
discourse of the 1970s regardless of political affiliation.49 Hamilton argues that the
collapse of the Keynesian consensus during the late 1960s and 1970s marked the
transition from a state-centric, well-regulated economy to a lower-priced privatization
movement. By default, any individual employed in the transportation economy
ultimately became another cost to be minimized by what Hamilton calls “lean and mean”
business strategies.50 Hamilton, however, neglects to examine international market
forces such as energy and the maritime transportation economy.
As with labor and economic studies, commercial maritime policy during the Cold
War has received little attention by historians. The historiography of defense policy of
the 1960s failed to discuss sealift or organized labor. Studies of the DoD in the 1960s
note the influence of Robert McNamara and events related to the Vietnam Conflict. Allan
R. Millett and Peter Maslowski’s For the Common Defense: A Military History of the
United States provided a broad overview of the formation and implementation of
McNamara’s organizational changes at the Pentagon during the 1960s. Perhaps no
previous study captures the minds of planners and appointees during the 1960s better
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than H.R. McMaster’s Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam. According to McMaster, the
entire national security structure overestimated U.S. capabilities based on flawed
statistical models and outright fabrications. McMaster blames commanders on the
ground, in the Pentagon, and civilian appointees such as Robert McNamara and W. W.
Rostow for the titular “dereliction of duty.”51 Especially useful in any discussion of the
Department of Defense are the collections of official histories from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense’s Historical Division. Their completed biographies of Robert
McNamara and Melvin Laird provide a total view of defense policy. Any peripheral
events, political trends, or economic developments, however, fail to receive as much a
focus as the intricate methods of defense appropriation or personnel management at the
Pentagon.52
Maritime defense procurement and operations received little notice in studies of
privatization at the DoD during the 1970 and 1980s. Defense contracts and solutions for
potential security concerns in the future guided expenditures from the early days of the
Cold War into the 1980s. Paul A.C. Koistinen’s multi-volume history of the militaryindustrial complex culminated with his study State of War: The Political Economy of
American Warfare, 1945-2011. Koistinen discussed the growth of the defense
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contracting sector throughout the 1950s and 1960s.53 In separate sections of his
monograph, Koistinen argued that budgeting trended toward privatized defense research
and development. This trend towards privatization contributed to growth in large
consulting and contracting firms.54 Organizations such as the RAND Corporation and
similar think tanks or federally sponsored conferences conceived of or argued in favor of
private sector solutions to public sector issues. Congressional appropriators or political
appointees trusted expert opinions from the private sector. In turn, Congress provided
more funds for private sector contracts.55 Contracting with private firms for traditional
internal DoD functions, however, took off during the Nixon, Ford, and Carter
administrations of the 1970s. In particular, Koistinen described the defense industry of
the 1970s as one of consolidation where fewer corporations obtained the vast majority of
defense contracts.56 Even in the era of lower defense budgets during the 1970s, Koistinen
stated the DoD awarded Fortune 500 companies seventy-five percent of defense contracts
related to ammunition, food, and other defense products. Conglomeration and limited
contract distribution only intensified during the defense buildup of the later 1970s.57
Koistinen failed to include logistics or transportation defense contracts. With an industry
and funding reservoir as vast as the defense establishment, one could hardly fault
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Koistinen for concentrating on large scale contracts related to aerospace, tanks, or naval
weaponry.58
Koistinen’s conclusion explains the complex interplay between Cold War military
necessities, contractor interests, and the vast sums of money devoted to defense spending.
Koistinen paid particular attention to the symbiotic relationship between the DoD and
large defense contractors, which he argues, became too cozy by the mid-1980s.59
Moreover, Koistinen illustrates the way that dependence on expensive technology and
automation resulted in substantially higher defense budgets. Finally, Koistinen
characterizes the relationships between contractors and DoD officials as a form of
corruption and criminality. Koistinen states that no corruption charges came as a result
of improper relationships, wasted spending on inoperable military systems, or graft in
defense contracting. By contrast, maritime workers and unions in the same era suffered
under the burden of perpetual federal investigation.60
Similarly, Andrew Bacevich argued in Washington Rules: America’s Path to
Permanent War that a defense spending “consensus” developed in the Defense
establishment during the Cold War. Bacevich discussed the restoration of the
“consensus” with renewed vigor and vast budget increases after comparatively low levels
of spending in the 1970s. The “consensus” Bacevich described resulted in major defense
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appropriations by members of Congress regardless of political party. This “consensus”
included collusion between government and private sector figures in order to channel
funding into technologically sophisticated and profoundly expensive weapons systems. 61
Koistinen and Bacevich focused entirely upon the financial and political origins of
increased spending in the 1980s. Rather than offering a detailed critique of individual
policies or aspects of the military economy, however, both Koistinen and Bacevich
discussed broad themes, such as political ideology or contracting corruption or
boondoggles, in their criticisms of defense budgets or policy makers in the Reagan
administration.
Scholars of early 1980s political history highlight the economic ideology of the
Reagan administration with varying degrees of success. Sean Wilentz in The Age of
Reagan: 1974-2008 detailed the environment in which the supply-side and deregulatory
ideologies dominated in the early 1980s. Wilentz did not wish to “add to the copious
literature of either hagiography or vilification” about various political leaders. While
Wilentz is fair in his analysis of the Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Bush administrations, he
also added little discussion of economic conditions, which factored into decisions or
events.62 Daniel Rodgers, on the other hand, enumerates economic reforms by the
Reagan administration in detail in his Age of Fracture. Rodgers illustrated policy and
legislative initiatives during the first Reagan term that deregulated the transportation
industry. Rodgers offers a nuanced and well-informed approach when noting that
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“deregulation was a radical project before it became a conservative one.”63 Deregulation
as a governing philosophy grew out of the “stagflation” era of the 1970s. Conservative
writers such as Robert Bartley, William F. Buckley, and economist Milton Friedman,
favored “unleashing of private enterprise” to solve the problems government created or
could not solve. Removing government regulations became the political solution for an
anemic transportation industry racked by economic slowdown and energy crises. The
principle of the “the best government is that which governs least” became a plank in
Reagan’s platform in the election of 1980 and for much of his administration. 64 Rodgers
overwhelmingly focused on deregulation of the airline and ground transportation
industries. His study disregarded the focus of this work, the maritime economy. Ships
carried nearly ninety-five percent of cargo in the 1980s, far more than the relatively small
scale road and rail industries.65
Government reform became a frequent method of addressing allegations of waste,
graft, and corruption in federal spending. Alan I. Marcus, in his article “’Would You
Like Fries With That, Sir?’: The Evolution of Management Theories and the Rise and
Fall of Total Quality Management Within the American Federal Government,” noted the
popularity of a variety of scientific management theories in the federal and defense
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sectors, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. The purpose of the wide array of management
theories, according to Marcus, was to correct unproductive or inefficient behaviors in
federal workers. Marcus’s article covers events in the later 1980s and 1990s, including
government adoption of the organizational reform program known as Total Quality
Management (TQM). Advocates for TQM claimed that it would improve the
productivity of workers using statistical modeling and privatization.

According to

Marcus, no agency “embraced the managerial ethos more passionately than the Defense
Department.”66 Rather than a late 1980s development, this work dates the privatization
of defense logistics to the early in the 1980s.
Scholars of maritime history have done the most work of combining and
analyzing the distinct fields intersecting on the waterfront. Andrew Gibson and Arthur
Donovan’s The Abandoned Ocean: A History of United States Maritime Policy is a rare
example of a history of American maritime affairs. The authors trace in broad strokes of
the long decline from American dominance of the world’s shipping economy to what
they described as “the approaching end” of U.S. maritime relevance by the 1970s and
1980s.67 In spite of spending increases during the 1980s “strongly linked to military
readiness,” Gibson and Donovan argued that automation decimated the maritime labor
pool by the late 1980s.68 The two countervailing trends, an expansion of military
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spending and decreased maritime employment, only widened in disparity during the late
Cold War. Gibson’s and Donovan’s work is a rare example of a well-informed text.
Ocean terminology, events, and economics are clearly defined and accessible for scholars
unfamiliar with the maritime world. Their text, however, rarely discussed important
details such as individual pieces of legislation, or decision makers who shaped policy
beyond notable elected officials. Moreover, Gibson and Donovan avoided a critical
analysis of deregulation.69 Salvatore Mercogliano’s “Sealift: A History of American
Military Sea Transportation,” a study of merchant mariners, naval officers, and logistics
during the Cold War, is similarly sophisticated in its discussion of defense logistics.
Mercogliano, a former merchant mariner himself, enumerates maritime policies and
military operations throughout the twentieth century in engrossing detail. Much of this
work, however, was a day-by-day chronicle of military operations. Rather than critically
evaluating maritime policy, Mercogliano’s study was an implicit argument in favor of
expanding of the dwindling military sealift fleet. Civilian workers and the broader
maritime economy figured little in his work.70
This study aims to fill the aforementioned gaps in the historiography of maritime
workers in military logistics during the Cold War with heavy use of archival sources and
oral histories. The papers of political figures are a rich vein of materials for researching
policy. Archival holdings of the papers of Senator John C. Stennis, Representative Helen
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Delich Bentley, and former Secretary of Defense Elliot Richardson proved especially
fruitful in illustrating maritime defense policy during the Cold War.71 In addition, when
not classified, the papers of agencies held by the National Archives and Records
Administration, such as the U.S. Army’s Military Traffic Management Command, the
U.S. Department of Commerce, and the Federal Maritime Commission, were similarly
illuminating.72 As this is a study of select Cold War military operations and policies,
many documents are classified or unavailable to scholars without a security clearance.
Moreover, military archives such as those of the Naval History and Heritage Command
are located at Department of Defense locations now closed to the general or scholarly
public. In order to overcome such barriers to research, this study relies on oral histories
as well. Interviews conducted by the author with retired military officers, experts in
maritime policy, and longshoremen proved to be extraordinarily useful.73 In addition,
transcripts of interviews conducted by the Historical Office in the Office of the Secretary
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of Defense and other sources provide motivations from policy makers, such as David
Packard, Richard Cheney, and retired military officers.74
In its examination of containerization along the National Security Waterfront, this
study ultimately provides a fuller understanding of the results of automation and
globalization. According to New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, globalization
is and was a “complex international system,” which transformed economics, modes of
production, and lifestyles in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.75 Typical
studies of defense procurement do not delve into labor-management relations or the role
of the transportation industry in shaping military policy. Beginning in the late 1950s, the
cargo container’s introduction replaced workers deemed criminals, radicals, or obsolete.
George Wyatt, a longshoreman at the Norfolk Naval Station in Virginia simply stated,
“…back then, when you were a longshoreman, you were the scum of the earth.”76 The
container’s development was welcomed by private corporations seeking to replace
seemingly unsavory and unreliable maritime workers with automated, predictable
machinery. In the following six chapters, the consequences of the defense establishment
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attuned to currents of globalization and automation act as a cautionary tale for the
military, workers, and the general public.
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“ILA MEANS I LOVE AMERICA”: ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE FORMATION
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE, 1900-1960
Samuel Eliot Morison’s lengthy History of United States Naval Operations in
World War II reflected not only his first-hand knowledge of wartime events, but also his
views and suspicions regarding workers during the war. In his discussion of civilian
workers in wartime, Morison criticized merchant mariners as troublesome and over paid.
Morison explained that by comparison to naval seamen or “bluejackets,” merchant
seamen were accustomed to “loafing half the year.”77 Furthermore, Morison stated that
“any ship in which a bluejacket serves is his ship, his country’s ship, to be defended with
his life if need be.”78

By contrast, Morison argued that “to the union-indoctrinated

seamen the ship is the owner’s ship, his class enemies’ship, to whom he owes nothing,
and from which he is morally entitled to squeeze all he can. The Navy principle ‘Don’t
Give Up The Ship’ did not appeal to merchant seamen.”79 Morison’s 1947 allusion to
civilian labor as class conscious Marxists or disloyal troublemakers shared a similar tone
to newspaper investigations of rumors of criminality on the docks of wartime ports of
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embarkation. The New York Sun ran a series of sensationalized articles in 1947 and 1948
enumerating the mafia connections of longshoremen on the piers of Brooklyn and the
west side of Manhattan. Sun writer Malcolm Johnson won the Pulitzer Prize for his series
describing the infiltration of the International Longshoreman’s Association (ILA) by the
mafia. The Sun articles linked the ILA with well-known underworld figures, such as
Charles “Lucky” Luciano or the Anastasia crime family during the war.80 While the
Sun’s series offered retrospectives of the failures and even crimes of New York’s civilian
longshoremen during wartime, media from other ports illustrated a completely different
story. In contrast to the stories of Marxists and mobsters on wartime docks, the Norfolk,
VA, Journal and Guide reminded their readers that the “longshoremen were
indispensable during the war, they kept the supply lines open.”81
Retrospective opinions of the “last war” and the civilian contribution to the supply
effort continued into the later 1940s and 1950s as the next strategic challenge arose. As
the United States assumed a position of primacy in the immediate aftermath of the
Second World War, fractures in the wartime alliance developed into a schism between
the American-dominated West and the Soviet-dominated East. From the mid-1950s
onward, planning for defense against the Soviets in Eastern Europe called for a trans-
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Atlantic supply chain similar to that of the World Wars.82 Beyond planning for the
emergency resupply of Europe, the U.S. military needed control of sea lanes and civilian
maritime workers for operations. Large U.S. occupation forces in Europe and Asia
received regular resupply from the Continental United States (CONUS).83
Maritime operations during the early Cold War were influenced by variety of
security and commercial trends and concerns from the previous fifty years. Private
shipping and military operations merged shortly after the turn of century. Shipping
interests, military necessity, and maritime workers occupied the same space in support of
American entry into the First World War.84

The wartime connection between these

three incongruent groups and their respective interests often intersected from as early as
World War I until the end of the Cold War. Beginning with the history of shipping and
US economic strategy before World War II, this chapter discusses the strategic,
technological, and labor concerns of maritime logistics planners from the First World
War to the late 1960s. This chapter will also enumerate the sealift plans and capabilities
of the Navy in the early 1950s and the role of longshoremen in the early Cold War. In
addition, this chapter will then pivot to the disposition of the longshoremen at the end of
the war, their roles in the Korean Conflict, and the dual allegations of criminality and
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communism.85 The easily maligned longshoremen and overblown fears of their negative
impact on shipping in peace or war led to new technologies designed to limit their
involvement in logistical support. The backlash against McCarthyism removed the fears
of “Reds” on the piers, but the fear of criminality persisted after federal investigations,
such as the Kefauver and McClennan Hearings.86 The interests of workers, private
shipping concerns, and military operations intersected during the early years of the Cold
War.
Beginning in the late 1950s, lower tariffs and expansion of global trade coupled
with fears of maritime labor to drive technological innovations in transportation. The
development of the standardized, modular cargo container for cheaper shipping costs
resulted in the partial automation of docks by the late 1950s. The inventor of the “box”
claimed that the container’s steel construction deterred theft and that uncooperative labor
would become a distant memory in the shipping industry.87 This chapter argues that
overblown fears of criminal and radical maritime workers coupled with lower shipping
costs accelerated adoption of the cargo container by military shippers.
Studies featuring longshoremen or maritime workers before the Cold War
depicted these workers as either villains, heroes, or proxies for organized crime. Apart
85
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from Samuel Eliot Morison’s lengthy discussion of how the Pacific War was won, few
military historians discussed maritime labor. Salvatore Mercogliano’s “Sealift” offers a
rare discussion of merchant mariners in military operations.88 Studies that did feature
longshoremen, such as Bruce Nelson’s Workers on the Waterfront or Howard
Kimildorf’s Reds or Rackets, follow the older line offered by Samuel Morison, that
maritime workers were either truly radicals or thieves. Both works detailed the East
Coast-West Coast schism between the International Longshoreman’s Association (ILA)
and the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) in the 1930s and 1950s.
Rather than offering a nuanced approach, both works painted the ILA as merely a tool of
shipping company owners, too conservative to make any headway in negotiations, or as
merely a conduit for mobsters.89 Both texts, in essence, championed the ILWU as the
legitimate voice of dock workers, but rarely discussed their role in wartime operations.
Similarly, former federal prosecutor James Jacobs’ Mobsters, Unions, and Feds further
delegitimized the ILA with a scholarly approach. Jacobs, a former U.S. District
Attorney, prosecuted the ILA in New York and New Jersey during the 1980s and 1990s.
Far from a detached academician offering critical viewpoints, Jacobs highlighted only the
successful prosecutions of longshoremen and other laborers. Rather than a balanced
approach, Jacobs regurgitates his case files and cites select judgments against the ILA
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and other unions.90 Bruce Levinson, the former journalist-turned-historian, composed
the seminal works on the automation of the piers and the coming of Malcom McLean’s
standardized cargo container. In Levinson’s The Box and his dissertation, he illustrates
the total history of the conception of the cargo container and subsequent social and
economic changes from the late nineteenth century until present day.91 The glaring
omission in most of these works is the role of civilian labor in military logistics.
Furthermore, the characterization of the longshoreman as a mafia tool, a Communist, a
heroic champion for the CIO or, as Samuel Morison explained, “entitled to squeeze all he
can” is and was an incomplete picture.92 This chapter aims to assess the longshoreman’s
role in military logistics in the first half of the twentieth century rather than repeat the
discussions in previous studies. By contextualizing the work along the piers during
military conflicts and at times of technological innovation, this study illustrates a deeper
understanding of both the indispensability and the expendability of these civilian
workers.
Prior to technological innovations of the twentieth century, such as the cargo
container, maritime logistics depended heavily on manual labor. Historian Bruce Nelson
described the longshoremen or stevedoring populations as “legendarily rootless and
transient.” Ordinarily, dock workers were seamen and sailors who settled, married, or
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were physically unfit for ocean-going lives beyond the age of 35.93 Upon settling,
seamen resided in large port cities and still had jobs in the maritime industry, but usually
as longshoremen. Irregular working opportunities and dangerous working environments
characterized the lives of a nineteenth or early twentieth century longshoreman.
Dangerous conditions included foul weather, hazards of large ships docking, or while
loading or unloading of cargo holds aboard ships. Longshoremen manually carried goods
to cargo nets, which in turn were loaded in the open holds of ships at dock. Severe
injury or death was not uncommon, and the physical demands of the work usually meant
that careers were short-lived.94
Brutal working conditions and low wages prompted workers to organize for
collective bargaining purposes. Frequent uprisings or work stoppages in the late
nineteenth century had limited effect on the maritime economy, especially as transient
populations of seamen could be recruited to break strikes in port cities. In turn, workers
began to organize various, competing waterfront labor unions. By the 1910s, a schism
developed between longshoremen affiliated with the more radical Industrial Workers of
the World (IWW) and the moderate American Federation of Labor (AFL) union, the
International Longshoreman’s Association (ILA).95 The IWW, known as the
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“Wobblies”, frequently turned to radical behavior during labor negotiations. American
involvement in the First World War and the confrontational and occasionally violent
methods of the “Wobblie” union alienated a large number of workers. Government and
employer interdictions of radical labor ultimately spelled the end of the IWW as a
presence on the waterfront. The image, however, of the longshoreman as a potential
radical remained. Novels, films, and sensational newspaper stories described the docks
as nests of communism in an era when both political officials and employers feared a
radicalized labor class.96
Most longshoremen came from immigrant groups feared by the political and
economic elite, which exacerbated mistrust of workers on the docks. In the ports of New
York, Philadelphia, and New Orleans, Italian and Irish-Americans comprised the vast
majority of maritime workers. In Baltimore and the Great Lakes, newly arrived Eastern
Europeans made up the majority of workers.97 With longshoremen coming from largely
ethnic communities, stereotypes common in the era contributed to the already low
opinion of maritime labor. The fear of Irish workers harboring anti-British sympathies
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or Italians as thieves or radicals frequently graced the pages of newspapers, books, and
cartoons. Italians faced similarly these discriminatory assumptions. For example, the
rise of the Italian criminal syndicate, commonly known as the mafia or La Cosa Nostra,
in the early twentieth century conflated Italian workers in the view of the public and
media with theft, graft, and corruption.98
Mafia figures were ILA members, but, as with most working class communities,
the criminality of a few cast the whole population as problematic. Day to day
longshoreman hiring in some cases was controlled by an agent of organized crime. For
example, a union representative hired longshoremen in gangs of workers for the loading
of particular ships. In the case of locals in New York and New Jersey from the 1910s
onward, ILA hirers maintained dual union and crime family membership. In addition,
theft, while not uncommon on the docks, often became a negotiating tactic for employers.
Shipping companies frequently overstated missing cargo statistics in order to drive down
wage or benefit demands from workers.99 While it became easy to depict the
longshoreman as a thief or as part of a “subversive” and/or “criminal” group, labor
shortages in the 1910s meant that any workers available to load ships remained
employed. The tight labor market prior to American entry into the First World War only
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highlighted the need for longshoremen. The overabundance of jobs and a limited supply
of workers for the industrial buildup prior to the declaration of war affected maritime
trades.100
The declaration of war by the United States in April 1917 demanded an
unprecedented logistical capability both at sea and on shore. Atlantic ports lacked the
physical and human infrastructure to support the military’s mission. With defense plants
hiring workers at unprecedented levels, maritime laborers were in short supply along the
waterfronts of important ports of embarkation, such as New York and Philadelphia. In the
summer of 1917, the U.S. government took drastic measures in order to support the
transportation of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) and its materials to France.
The U.S. Shipping Board, a civilian agency created by the federal government in 1917 to
manage wartime maritime transportation needs, seized total control of all shipyards,
including hundreds of commercial ships then under construction. The federal government
also seized any German ships in American waters. Federal intervention quickly provided
the United States with a physical infrastructure for transit of the AEF across the
Atlantic.101
Similarly, federal intervention also meant federal agents scrutinizing workers
along the docks and piers of the major East Coast ports of embarkation. At the two
largest wartime ports, New York and Norfolk, the pervasive fear of saboteurs, and
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potentially troublesome workers lurking in the midst of the civilian workforce during
World War I led to the exclusion of labor organizations deemed untrustworthy by the
Shipping Board. Shipping Board agents and maritime firms arbitrarily added workers to
lists of “unhireables” on political or ethnic grounds.102 The radical language and
organizing activities by the IWW drew the attention of federal investigators. Any worker
or group suspected of potential radical ties, such as the IWW, became excluded from
wartime work. In the vacuum left by the decline of the IWW, the International
Longshoreman’s Association filled the void and accepted membership of thousands of
unrepresented workers. The ILA became the largest waterfront union during the First
World War.103 In order to differentiate themselves from their radical competitors and to
maintain their position as the primary waterfront union, ILA organizers used the slogan
“ILA means I love America.” This slogan, while a rhetorical tactic, became a core
principle for the ILA and a defense against criticism in subsequent decades. With
unacceptable labor unions excluded from wartime hiring, the ILA’s status as the last
waterfront union standing ensured their presence on the postwar docks as well.104
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Shortly after the end of the war, the federal government dismantled much of its
sealift infrastructure by targeting union labor. Defense work provided high wages for all
workers on the home front, which was one of the first components dismantled following
the war. Post-war downsizing similarly affected the merchant fleet assembled to supply
the war effort in Europe. The rapid expansion of U.S. flagged shipping in order to
maintain sea lanes glutted the market when wartime operations ended. The federal
government saw no immediate need to maintain any sealift apparatus in place following
the First World War. Few planners foresaw any need to supply a long-term expeditionary
force overseas.105 While the war ended and the government dismantled large parts of the
sealift fleet, ship owners continued to pay wartime wages to workers, both at sea and on
shore. On average, mariner wages rose 20 percent from 1914 to 1919. In order to adjust
to peacetime budgets, Wartime Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William Benson,
retired in 1919 and led the postwar remnant of the Shipping Board. Admiral Benson
argued for a 15 percent across the board wage cut. Benson stated that the high wages
“[have] been subject to such notorious abuses…it [the wage increases] should be virtually
eliminated.”106 The Shipping Board and Benson colluded with ship owners to drive
down wages, with Benson stating that higher wages or better conditions were tantamount
to “graft.”107 Legislative or administrative initiatives targeting wages or conditions
became a frequently used tool to attack workers in subsequent decades.
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The Jones Act, however, provided a pro-labor regulatory counterpoint to wage
reductions and preserved at least a core of sealift infrastructure. The Merchant Marine
Act of 1920, commonly known as the Jones Act because of progressive congressman
Wesley Jones’ sponsorship, specified that only American-flagged ships could operate
inside the coastal boundaries of the United States. 108 Both protection of organized labor
and nativism informed this specification. A fear of foreign labor undercutting wages, as
well as a resurgent fear of newly arrived immigrants inspired Jones’ Merchant Marine
Act.109 The registration of ships to a country and flying a national flag meant that the ship
operated under the laws of that particular country. The Jones Act compelled commercial
shipping firms doing business in U.S. waters to register their ships as American-flagged,
but also required at least 75% of the crews be U.S. citizens.110 The legal and citizenship
provisos meant crews who worked on ships in U.S. waters belonged to labor unions or
were at least under U.S. legal protections. Once Admiral Benson and the Shipping Board
proposed cutting wages for these crews, 40,000 seamen and hundreds of thousands of
longshoremen struck simultaneously. In response to the collective action of the nation’s
maritime workers, the Shipping Board recanted its suggested wage cuts. In addition, the
pressure brought to bear by way of strikes or other labor stoppages by the collected

The internal waters of the United States meant ships travelling from American port to American port.
This trade, known as cabotage, included outlying islands owned by the United States, such as Puerto Rico
and Hawaii.
108

109

Public Law 66-261, 44 Stat. 88 (1920).

110
Robert Force and A.N. Yiannopoulos, Admiralty and Maritime Law, Volume II, (Washington: Beard
Books, 2006), 139-141.

40

maritime workers ensured that both union seamen and longshoremen survived into the
1920s and beyond.111
Strikes and high wages provided the spark for innovation with new technologies,
but most maritime commerce still depended on longshoremen. Manufacturing expanded
greatly during the 1920s and, in turn, drove innovations. New inventions included the
New York Central and Pennsylvania Railroad’s steel cargo containers, which could be
loaded by forklift onto flat railroad cars at railroad hubs. Developed to minimize pilferage
and increase the speed of loading, the small crate-sized containers did neither. In
addition, boxes differed greatly from company to company, and standardization proved
elusive for competing rail lines.112 The maritime shipping industry, on the other hand,
did not develop metal containers for durability, speed, or theft-prevention until after
World War II. The docks maintained the practice of small boxes loaded into cargo nets
and lifted into ships for loading by manual laborers. As a result, during the interwar
years, the numbers of workers on the waterfront grew with the burgeoning shipping
economy. Exports from the United States greatly increased during the 1920s, which
similarly expanded the requirements for maritime workers on the docks and aboard ships.
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By 1927, the ILA counted nearly 125,000 longshoremen as members, doubling its
numbers from earlier in the decade.113
The unsustainable economics of the 1920s led to collapse and the Great
Depression, and the docks turned into a battlefield between union officials and activists.
The ILA staged strikes, boycotts, and fought with harbor commissions for employment as
the economy worsened into 1932 and 1933. In spite of the hard-fought battles by the
ILA’s leadership, a large number of rank and file members rejected the union’s approach
to negotiation. Most felt the leadership failed to win important concessions on wages.
The disaffected members also viewed the union’s conservative approach to merely
preserve jobs as unacceptable.114 In 1934, West Coast ILA locals, under the leadership of
ILA Portland local president Harry Bridges engaged in a “Wildcat” strike independent of
the national leadership. What started as merely a strike ended in a full schism, which
marked Atlantic and Pacific coast workers long after the 1930s.115 The ILA fired Bridges,
and he established a competing union, the International Longshoreman’s and Warehouse
Union (ILWU). The ILWU, more confrontational, but also more successful in terms of
gaining meaningful concessions than the ILA, aligned with the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (CIO).116 Separately, as a result of the Pacific Coast ILWU’s “Wobblie”style negotiating and strike tactics, the Great Lakes, Atlantic, and Gulf Coast’s ILA came
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under increased scrutiny by the government and employers for potential Communist ties
by the late 1930s.117
The intensity of the battle for control of the dock highlighted individual financial
opportunities available along the waterfront. As economic progress was stunted by the
Depression, federal investment in port cities through defense programs drew workers in
search of economic opportunities. Beginning in 1940, the Roosevelt administration’s
conversion of the United States into a wartime economy began with the construction and
expansion at pre-existing military and port facilities. The opportunities available for high
paying jobs lured rural populations to cities in search of work.118 As the embodiment of
those who found work along the docks of the national security waterfront, Earl Gardner
was once such worker lured to port cities for the high wages of wartime jobs.119 Born in
rural Alabama, Gardner found work as an ILA longshoreman at the docks of the naval
base in Norfolk, Virginia. As his son put it, “the war and the ILA provided my family a
living wage. That was much more than what any other profession could provide at the
time.”120
Gardner’s work as a longshoreman during the Second World War mirrored the
stories of others called into civilian service at ports nationwide. Realization by defense
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planners that a second global conflict was coming and would likely require the movement
of men and materials led to a mass-mobilization of maritime resources by early 1941.
The Roosevelt administration, concerned about the logistical difficulties of previous
military efforts, created several non-military agencies to ensure that materials made their
way to the front. In creating agencies such as the War Shipping Administration (WSA),
the government merged private enterprise into the military’s logistical and material
operations.121 As part of the Roosevelt administration’s larger framework for fighting the
Second World War, the government fostered a partnership between private shipping
firms and organized labor due to military necessity. Private industry as well as the
maritime working class profited financially for compliance with Federal directives and
military contracts. Workers won wage and working condition concessions to make sure
that war materials made their way to the front.122 As both manufacturers and shipping
firms ensured the flow of military goods to U.S. bases overseas, speed and security
became the watchwords for the logistical mission of World War II.123
Wartime necessities led the government to look past older allegations of
radicalism and theft by members of maritime unions. The daunting threats of enemy
agents or U-Boats interdicting supply convoys to Europe inspired cooperation between
federal agencies and unions. The threat of German agents and sabotage on the docks of
major ports, including New York, Baltimore, and Norfolk, led to a closer relationship
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between the military and the ILA.124 Concerns regarding sabotage and the placement of
the docks on a wartime-footing meant government cooperation with previously unlikely
allies. The Office of Naval Intelligence, aware that the ILA had some connections with
the criminal underworld, turned the union into an asset and a conduit to mafia leaders.
Leaders, such as Charles “Lucky” Luciano and his allies in the Anastasia crime family of
New York, provided intelligence and assurances of security on the waterfront. In doing
so, the government also empowered the criminal elements within the union.125
The fear of sabotage similar to the Black Tom incident of World War I heightened
after the destruction of the French luxury liner Normandie in 1942 126 In 1916, Black
Tom Island in New York harbor served as a depot for munitions sold to the British and
French during the First World War. Close to Liberty Island and its statue, Black Tom
and its munitions stockpile became a target of German agents. Using small fires to ignite
the weapons, the German agents triggered a series of massive explosions, which rocked
most of New York harbor, killed seven, and engendered a fear of sabotage, which lasted
generations.127 Stranded in New York after the German invasion and occupation of
France, the Normandie was appropriated by the U.S. Navy for conversion into a supply
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and troop ship. The Normandie, rechristened USS Lafayette, burned and sank at its berth
on the west side of Manhattan in February, 1942. The fear of sabotage gripped the port
of New York following the destruction of the Normandie/Lafayette. The government
saw a need for ensuring the physical security of supply and troop ships. As a result, the
Navy and mafia struck a deal to secure the docks.128
With the docks secured by labor and the mafia, the Navy and U.S. Merchant
Marine used Atlantic coast ports as a conduit to resupply the American war machine in
the European Theater of Operations. Terms of moving the physical materials,
longshoremen at the docks operated the cranes, supervised the loading of the ships, and,
for the most part, prevented black market pilferage of war materials.129 <dms. The mass
movement of supplies, machinery, and munitions for the troops and allies of the United
States proved an indispensable component for wartime success by 1945. After action
reports, studies, and statements by wartime leaders such as Dwight Eisenhower and
others argued that the logistical superiority of the United States resulted in victory.130
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Maritime logistical support aside, the U.S. achieved victory over distant enemies
through land warfare rather than strategic sea power. Apart from the battles of Coral Sea
and Leyte Gulf, the massing of naval arms with a climactic fleet to fleet engagement
rarely occurred in the Second World War. The importance of a major fleet battle, argued
by Alfred Thayer Mahan, as well as German, British, and Japanese naval officers who
adopted Mahan’s perspective, ultimately mattered little in the outcome of the war.131
The German U-boat strategy to strangle supply lines to Allied positions in Britain, North
Africa, and Europe failed to prevent the collapse of the Third Reich.132 Japan’s failure in
the Pacific came in spite of destroying the majority of the capital ships in the American
Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor. Harnessing tremendous natural resources, manufacturing
potential, and the labor of soldiers and workers ultimately defeated the Axis and placed
the United States in a position of global primacy in 1945.133 Sea lanes, for supplies and
to support amphibious landings, ultimately proved the raison d’etre for naval forces in
the Pacific or Atlantic. By war’s end, naval planners and members of the officer corps
as a factor in the Allied victory. Coakley and Leighton’s study was an official history of the war
commissioned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1955.
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feared the function of the Navy in future conflicts would become secondary to land and
air forces, as well as nuclear weapons.134 In spite of the depreciation of naval power
during the war, the United States maintained its supply ships in peacetime. While the
country demobilized and 12 million men and women ceased wearing uniforms, the
technological developments, logistical methods, and ships remained active. Instead of
complete dismantlement of wartime shipping methods, the United States retained both
war ships and cargo vessels. The National Defense Reserve Fleet, the remnant of
demobilized wartime shipping, consisted of nearly 2300 ships of all varieties.
Maintenance of the reserve fleet, as well as the construction of new ships in 1946 and
1947, represented the uncertainty of what U.S. maritime strategy would be in the late
1940s and into the 1950s. 135
While maritime strategy remained unchanged, the war’s aftermath remade the
global economic order. Political elites such as John Maynard Keynes, Henry Morgenthau,
and other advisors to the Roosevelt administration proposed new economic institutions to
govern the post-war world. Codification of the rules and metrics of production occurred
during an economic summit of the Allied powers at Bretton Woods in 1944. The
institutions created by Bretton Woods participants included the International Monetary
Fund, the World Bank and, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). GATT
ultimately evolved into a series of separate rounds of talks and agreements. For Henry
Morgenthau, GATT’s removal of tariffs, import duties, and other barriers for
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development ended economic nationalism.136 In short, the financial architects at Bretton
Woods intended for the postwar economic order to ensure stable growth at all costs.
The outcome of the Bretton Woods conference was ultimately a global economic
order created in the liberal, capitalist American image. Rather than a state-centric
economic system, the liberal, capitalist marketplace and commodity prices determined
the value of products and informed the making of policy. The idealized version of
economics without nationalism espoused by Henry Morgenthau at Bretton Woods ran
counter to his own words regarding post-war planning. While Roosevelt’s Secretary of
the Treasury, Morgenthau’s wartime rhetoric in favor of an interdependent economic
order failed to match his actions in the aftermath of World War II. Morgenthau’s midwar statements argued for a restoration of the pre-war global order. At Bretton Woods,
however, Morgenthau proposed the United States parlay its overwhelming military might
into a secure economic hegemony after the war.137 Shortly after the end of hostilities,
the Bretton Woods system spread through the reconstituted economies of Europe.
Initially appearing as a variety of humanitarian assistance programs, the Bretton Woods
institutions carried with them favorable trade deals for American goods, finished
products, and financial influence. Western European economic and physical security
concerns during occupation led to a dependency on the United States was an inextricable
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matter for any exchequer or treasurer wanting to do business following World War II.138
As the Iron Curtain descended, a more salient point from Churchill’s famed “Iron
Curtain” speech illustrated the post-war power of economic interdependency. Officially
titled the “Sinews of Peace,” Churchill’s speech proposed an intertwined destiny for both
sides of the Atlantic alliance. According to Henry Morgenthau, the “sinews of modern
war” were the economic connections of the entire world to the United States. For
Morgenthau, the economic stability and interconnectedness of the post-Bretton Woods
world ensured security.139
After the restructuring of global economics, domestic economics within the
United States after World War II benefitted employers over workers. The wartime wage
and employment gains achieved by longshoremen, however, failed to continue in
peacetime, and labor lost most of the gains acquired during the war. The passage of the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act,
functioned as the largest contributor to worsening labor conditions. Taft-Hartley stripped
labor protections stemming from the Depression-era Wagner Act and National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRB protected basic worker rights against unfair
practices by employers. Taft-Hartley, on the other hand, prevented workers and unions
from engaging in wildcat strikes, restricted “closed shops,” and allowed states to pass
“right to work” laws outlawing the organization of workers.140
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represented not only a rebalancing of the ledger in terms of labor-management relations,
but also a tipping of the scales in favor of management. The act represented a first strike
of the post-war battle pitting management and business allies in the government against
labor. President Truman vetoed Taft-Hartley, but Democratic members of the House and
Senate, who ordinarily supported labor, voted to override Truman’s veto. The betrayal
of labor by their alleged allies signaled that any gains in economic growth or corporate
profits in the post-war economy came at the workers’ expense. Taft-Hartley’s passage
also caused serious consequences within labor unions nationwide. Schisms formed in
labor unions on matters of protest or strikes and only harmed the image and solidarity of
organized workers. 141
Even with American manufacturing at an all-time high and an almost wartime
pace of exports, fractures in labor solidarity appeared on the docks.142 The reduction of
available jobs for longshoremen radicalized those recently thrown out of work and
created a fissure within the ILA. The ILA’s comparatively conservative leadership
bristled at attempts by more radical elements within the union to stage walkouts and
strikes for a restoration of wartime gains. By 1949, the ILA’s internal union elections
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split members into two camps. . The leadership-aligned electors described themselves as
the “blue slate” and named their radical competitors the “red slate.”143
The implication of “red” tendencies in the late 1940s and early 1950s did not fall
on deaf ears, especially in light of the “Red Scare” and a renewed potential for armed
conflict during the early days of the Cold War. The breakdown in U.S.-Soviet relations
and the specter of Soviet aggression in Europe led the United States to rearm in the late
1940s. For a potential war with the Soviets, the U.S. developed contingency plans to
supply Western European allies with the arms and resources to repel a hypothetical
Soviet invasion. The defense plants, shipbuilders, and associated industries remained
intact following the war. With a restored emphasis on national security, they resumed
production. The fear of conflict and a revival of wartime transoceanic supply lines meant
boom times for ILA longshoremen and a return to improved employment and wages. 144
Speed and efficiency mattered for a hypothetical third European war. American military
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policy planners began investigating new methods for fighting and supplying a
conventional war across the Atlantic.145
Folding the formerly autonomous Department of the Navy into the newly created
Department of Defense, the U.S. reorganized its war making apparatuses under the
National Security Act of 1947. The lion’s share of early Cold War financial
appropriations went toward the equally new U.S. Air Force and the development of more
powerful nuclear weapons. The disparity between naval funding and the newly
christened Air Force led to fears by naval officers that their mission and interests would
be subsumed by the Air Force if the trend of air power expansion continued.146 In order
to maintain the Navy’s share of defense funding and the Army’s ability to transport the
heavy weapons that aircraft could not handle, the two branches joined forces and
established the Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) in 1949. Nominally under
the control of the Navy and its organizational structure, the MSTS combined military
preparedness with organizational efficiency. During the Second World War, dozens of
agencies had their own command structure, with military commanders often issuing
countermanding orders. The formation of the MSTS pooled the ships, materials, and
other resources for potential overseas military operations and streamlined command
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structures. The creation of the MSTS and the strategic challenges of the early Cold War
maintained the permanence of maritime logistics in defense planning.147
The colossal effort involved in the Berlin Airlift became the first test for
movement of materials during the Cold War. The daily flights to resupply the besieged
West Berlin highlighted both the security and practical requirements for airlift and sealift
capability. The Soviet closure of roads and rail lines into West Berlin prompted the
Truman administration to convey the food, fuel, and medical supplies by air from U.S.
airbases in West Germany. Hundreds of flights delivered nearly 13,000 tons of supplies
on a daily basis for months. The limited payload of the ubiquitous C-47 transport plane
meant transportation methods other than aircraft would be required for a broader support
mission. More importantly, the Soviet closure of transportation conduits with the
intention of starving the West out of Berlin could have forced the U.S. and Soviets into a
shooting war.148 In the case of Berlin, only aircraft could maintain supply lines to the city
and that was on a limited scale. Sea lanes and merchant shipping would be required for a
long term mission of supporting European positions if the Cold War devolved into a
military conflict.149
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While MSTS ships, crews, and ports along the Atlantic coast prepared for a rapid
resupply of Western Europe in 1949 and into late 1950, North Korea invaded South
Korea. Instead of readying U.S. Atlantic ports for resupplying Europe with tanks and
fuel in the case of a potential conflict with the Soviets in Germany, the Pacific became
the focal point of resupply. The newly created MSTS also assimilated several
commands, dozens of ships, and hundreds of merchant mariners into its organizational
responsibilities during the Korean sealift.150 While the North Koreans overran Allied
positions on the Korean peninsula, the MSTS overcame the incorporation of older
commands while resupplying a quickly disappearing South Korea. The West Coast ports
of the United States became as important in military terms as Atlantic ports when the
Korean conflict illustrated the need for a Pacific-basin oriented strategy for sealift
capabilities and rapid replenishment of munitions and other war materials.151
In Korea, the MSTS relied heavily on the vestigial remnants of the U.S.’s Pacific
military supply framework of the Second World War and developed new methods for the
purposes of speed and efficiency. As thousands of soldiers, tanks, and palates of
ammunition arrived at U.S. bases in Japan and the South Korean port of Pusan, the MSTS
realized that any resupply mission in the future needed to overcome the backup that
developed along the docks in South Korea. Slow discharges from the MSTS fleet at
Pusan created a bottle neck of ships at the piers, sapping forces fending off the North
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Koreans. The items shipped to Pusan in flimsy wooden crates could not withstand the
violent seas of the North Pacific and arrived damaged. In addition, longshoremen
brought in from the U.S. to handle the materials in Korea damaged the contents of these
crates, slowed the process of offloading due to union rules, or allegedly stole military
items at the port. Why did the longshoremen damage the contents of the crates? While
there was rarely proof of theft, allegations persisted. 152
Meanwhile, domestic longshoremen came under scrutiny by federal officials. The
ILWU, affiliated with the CIO, came under investigation by the Federal government for
“radical activities” on the West Coast waterfront. While most CIO affiliates used
confrontational tactics by comparison to the AFL, they avoided investigations for
radicalism or communist sympathies. Longshoremen, however, failed to escape these
investigations. In the 1930s, ILWU officers held dual membership with Communist
Party USA (CPUSA), but by the early 1950s, former party members ceased their
affiliation. The president of the ILWU, Harry Bridges, occasionally spoke in favor of the
CPUSA on the West Coast, but only broadly as a civil liberties concern. Perceived
connections to communists in the early 1950s led to mistrust of the ILWU and their
radicalism damaged the image of the national CIO.153
The investigative apparatuses of the government and elected officials used
allegations of communist sympathies to great political effect in the early 1950s. In light
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of maritime contingency plans supporting European allies or in Korea, the Senate
Judiciary Committee turned its investigative attention to the docks because of allegations
of communist infiltration. Senator Pat McCarran of Nevada and Internal Security
subcommittee member James Eastland of Mississippi held hearings on the longshoremen
of the ILA, the ILWU, and members of dozens of other maritime unions. According to
McCarran, the committee sought to determine the “nature and intent of Communist
influence in the maritime industry and its significance as far as our present and future
national security.”154
The Internal Security subcommittee’s investigation on the waterfronts of major
cities used Army intelligence officers on the ground as the eyes and ears of the federal
anti-communist offensive. In New York, New Orleans, and dozens of other cities, Army
intelligence agents interrogated witnesses and collected evidence against alleged “Red”
infiltration of the docks. Benjamin Mandel, widely known as a key figure in the Alger
Hiss case, also acted as the Internal Security committee’s liaison to union leadership.155
With a high-profile communist hunter trolling the waterfront in person and in writing,
newspapers began to renew old allegations of radicals on the docks. Public exposure and
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fear compelled various unions and individuals to offer their support to the Internal
Security investigation. Mandel noted that “union officials have asked me to secure a
letter from the [committee] formally asking for help and cooperation.” Mandel’s list of
cooperating unions included the ILA and the other AFL-aligned waterfront unions.156
The subcommittee also held highly publicized hearings in port cities as part of their
investigation. Senator Eastland’s committee hearings in New Orleans in the mid-1950s
highlighted every crank letter, allegation of Communist infiltration of the docks, and even
a completely unsubstantiated mafia-Soviet alliance using longshoremen as agents. The
ILA alone represented the longshoremen in New Orleans. Even in light of the ILA’s
cooperation with the subcommittee’s investigation, hearings regarding every
unsubstantiated lead and false report promoted the image of the duplicitous
longshoremen. 157
The Internal Security committee’s investigation took place concurrent with
another anti-labor investigation by the Senate Committee to Investigate Crime in
Interstate Commerce. Estes Kefauver, the chair of the committee and a notoriously
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media-sensitive senator from Tennessee, used subpoena power to call high-ranking
organized crime figures to testify before televised hearings. Apart from the testimony of
well-known racketeers such as Meyer Lansky and Frank Costello, the inquiries focused
on the influence of organized crime in politics and business.158 Costello, the heir to
Charles Luciano’s organization in New York, also controlled the Democratic Party’s
machine known as Tammany Hall. Kefauver, using rhetorical questions and
grandstanding during Costello’s testimony, implied that the combined influence of
Tammany Hall and the muscle of the Luciano family controlled all aspects of New York
society.159

The presence of television cameras cemented a popular perception of direct

connections of the mafia syndicate to workers on the docks along the Hudson and East
Rivers. This perception only grew when the committee called the president of the largest
ILA local in Brooklyn, Anthony Anastasia, to testify. Anastasia simultaneously held the
presidency of ILA local and membership in the crime family of his brother, the founder
of “Murder, Incorporated.”160
By the mid-1950s, the popularity of investigations into the New York underworld
sullied the reputation of legitimate unions and workers and perpetuated the myth that all
dock workers had questionable loyalties. While New York accounted for a large share
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of the national shipping economy, the dozens of other ports along the Atlantic coast
remained relatively free of corruption and radicalism. The primacy of New York,
however, as the most powerful media transmission point of the era ultimately created a
national image that criminality existed on every pier.161 The popular image of the
longshoreman in 1950s as a radical or criminal ultimately led to the AFL’s ejection of the
ILA as a member union in the mid-1950s. George Meany, the president of the AFL,
stated that the perception of the union as an extension of the mafia and the longshoreman
union’s failure to “clean up” their image or membership rolls led to national
decertification of the ILA.162

ILA members, now without a national union, clung to

their locals while the AFL organized a competing union, the International Brotherhood of
Longshoremen (IBL), with little success. The combined forces of Senate investigation,
national decertification, and a persistent image of the sinister longshoreman lingered into
the late 1950s. One longshoreman simply stated, “…back then, when you were a
longshoreman, you were the scum of the earth.”163
Proceeding concurrent to developments in the Senate and on the waterfront,
public intellectuals began to debate the role of organized labor in the struggle between the
United States and the Soviet Union. Writing in 1953, American theologian Reinhold
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Niebuhr noted that compared to other industrial economies, the United States featured a
relatively stable relationship between capital and labor. As a member of the Department
of State’s planning committee and a titan of American intellectual currents, Niebuhr
carried tremendous weight and ultimately shaped policy in the early days of the Cold
War. The architect of America’s policy of containment, George Kennan, even noted that
Niebuhr’s influence was so profound that he was “the father of us all.”164 In light of
competition with the Soviet Union, Niebuhr argued that organized labor needed a role in
the national security of the United States. The policy applications for Niebuhr’s vision
meant “conceiving a domestic policy which managed to strike a fairly tolerable balance
between the perils of injustice in an unregulated economy, and the perils of tyranny…in
foreign affairs.”165 Niebuhr’s argument was tactically and strategically sound, as
organized labor was at the peak of its power and members of unions accounted for a
quarter of the nation’s workforce in the early 1950s. Indeed, Niebuhr’s arguments
illustrated that the integral role of organized labor in national security meant jobs in the
construction of weapons systems and heavy machinery and in the logistical support of the
U.S. military.166
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Labor’s importance in national security has as much to do with their percentage of
the general population. Consequently, any changes in labor’s leadership and organization
had major effects in domestic politics. In 1955, the more conservative AFL merged with
the CIO to form the AFL-CIO. The AFL had twice the membership of the CIO, and CIO
leaders lost to conservative AFL president George Meany’s slate in elections for the new
organization. Moreover, the AFL-CIO’s new, Meany-aligned leadership shaped the
manner in which political statements, electoral support, and even strikes took place in the
future.167
In spite of the conservative approach to politics and protest represented by Meany
and the newly formed AFL-CIO, the old charges of radicalism lingered, especially on the
waterfront. With allegations of pilferage by mafioso coupled with a fear of Marxist
radicals shutting down supply chains, the maritime shipping economy looked for
alternatives for the sake of safety, efficient management, and profitability in
transportation. The corporate world’s method of more productivity through cheaper and
faster technological innovations was adopted by transportation firms in the late 1950s.
Productivity experts such as Frederick Taylor introduced efficient productivity methods
by way of repetition or automation as early as the 1890s. By the late 1950s, similar
methods of “efficiency” expert W. Edwards Deming set the tone in terms of corporate
management.168 Deming’s initial work, which used statistical models to track and
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increase productivity in defense plants during World War II, found global adherents
looking to duplicate the industrial capacity of wartime production. As a statistician
tracking the output of factories, Deming’s methodology resulted in maximum
productivity and quality of output in a short period of time.169
Adopting Deming’s methods, the commercial shipping industry’s concerns
regarding labor led to technological innovations designed to minimize human input.
Malcom McLean, a trucking magnate from North Carolina, created his empire by
shipping cigarettes from factories in Raleigh and Winston-Salem to distribution centers in
New York. McLean’s awareness of profit maximization led him to seek alternatives to
costs accrued by his trucking fleet. Cigarette cartons or any other boxed item fit neatly
into trailers. McLean began using cargo containers of a uniform size, made of steel and
placed atop truck trailers. The modular, intermodal capability of shipping items or
objects found popularity as the interstate highway system slowly opened over the course
of the mid-1950s. 170 The reason for the ascent of the container was a simple numbers
game; more product shipped at a lower cost meant higher profits and increased efficiency
for one’s customers.171 McLean’s growing company then opened distribution centers in
port cities along the Atlantic coast. In 1955, a strike hit the ports of the East Coast, which
in turn led to work stoppages along the piers and on the roads leading away from the
piers. In response, McLean purchased two MSTS surplus ships and converted them into
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what he called “trailer ships.” McLean’s company, SeaLand, managed his new ships and
designed terminals along the East Coast to handle the newly modularized cargoes. In
1956, amid protests by the AFL’s International Brotherhood of Longshoremen and the
independent ILA, McLean’s new ship, the Ideal-X, departed Port Newark, New Jersey,
bound for SeaLand’s terminal in Houston, Texas.172
The birth of McLean’s “trailer ship” and the containers storing cargo on-board
ushered in the beginnings of automation and the removal of laborers from the shipment of
goods. Loading a break-bulk ship in the 1950s cost $5.83 a ton. Loading the Ideal-X cost
15.8 cents a ton. Modular containers and their cost advantages alone indicated that
McLean’s experiment worked.173 In 1956, however, the lack of technological
innovations regarding transportation both inspired the creation and also limited the
efficacy of the new container.

Cranes for rapidly loading and unloading containers had

yet to be developed. The cranes at Port Newark loaded the Ideal-X took nearly nine
minutes to load every container, nearly the same amount of time as loading break bulk
cargo. Failing to alter the speed of ship loading, the container’s anti-pilferage features
became the reason for its proliferation. Rapid loading, promised by McLean’s
development, ultimately fell by the wayside. Theft prevention became the reason for the
proliferation of the container into the late 1950s. Profit margins rose and made
McLean’s personal fortune. Building on the momentum of the container’s revolutionary
automation potential, he touted “unstealable” transportation of goods any consumer good.
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Shortly thereafter, consumer products companies in both the U.S. and internationally
noticed the positive aspects of the container. 174
By the early 1960s, McLean’s method of shipping attracted the attention of the
largest mover of goods and supplies in the world, the MSTS. The military’s experiments
in standardized cargo during the Korean Conflict, which amounted to little more than
metal boxes without the intermodality of McLean’s innovation, failed and led to future
adoption of the “box”. The military’s experiment, the Container Express (CONEX)
cargo container program, initially shipped several hundred containers to the Korean port
of Pusan during the war. CONEX failed due to prohibitive costs related to developing a
standardized container infrastructure.175 Once McLean’s Ideal-X proved the efficiency of
a standardized and modular system for shipping, the Navy began to rethink the failures of
the past. The Navy developed a prototype ship of their own, a roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO)
ship. The RO/RO, named for large roll on or roll off ramps connecting the holds of the
ship to the pier, carried tanks, trucks, and other large vehicles. The MSTS’s first RO/RO,
the Comet, was intended to become the first in a new fleet of sealift ships capable of
transporting a complete division’s equipment at nearly 18 knots to the location of a Cold
War flashpoint.176 Upfront cost concerns for construction of a new fleet and new cargo
terminals again ended the MSTS’s experiment in building a fleet of RO/ROs or
furthering their own container experiments. For the rest of the 1950s and much of the
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1960s, the MSTS relied on private shipping firms for break-bulk, or non-containerized
method of shipping their materials. The majority of the sealift contingency fleet after the
failed MSTS containerization experiment remained obsolete relics.177
Conventional sealift planning, even without the cargo container, found limited
support in the government following the development of larger, more powerful nuclear
weapons. Costs associated with building arms, training troops, and constructing fleets for
a potential conventional Third World War occupied nearly half the Federal budget by
1955.178 Nuclear weapons, on the other hand, required little construction and
maintenance costs beyond the initial investment. According to Defense Secretary
Charles Wilson, nuclear weapons provided “more bang for the buck.”179 By the mid1950s, the Eisenhower Administration’s building of arms for use against the Soviet
Union included the “New Look” and “Massive Retaliation”-based deterrence policies.
Air power and the strategic nuclear arsenal received the lion’s share of the defense
budget. The buildup of larger, more powerful nuclear weapons not only dominated
defense budgets, but also strategic planning for American confrontation with the Soviets.
The focus on fleets of strategic bombers and early missile systems for the delivery of
nuclear warheads to Soviet strategic targets overruled spending on logistics or other
conventional systems.180
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With logistics and warfare altered by the container and nuclear weapons in the
mid-1950s, the fundamentals of labor organization similarly changed by the late 1950s.
The AFL-CIO’s alternative union for longshoremen during the 1950s, the IBL, ultimately
failed to replace the ILA on the Atlantic coast. The AFL-CIO approved the readmission
of the ILA as a full member of the broader labor community in the summer of 1959.181
Only with the proviso that the ILA purge its less-savory members, especially in the Port
of New York/New Jersey, did the AFL-CIO readmit the union. Legislators similarly
wanted to purge criminal elements from labor. Senator John McClellan, chairman of the
Senate Committee on Investigations, chaired the similar but specific Committee on
Improper Activities in Labor. Ostensibly following up allegations of labor corruption,
McClellan’s investigation instead repeatedly called colorful labor leaders, organized
crime “rats,” and various other figures to testify before the television audience.182
McClellan’s influence on Capitol Hill allowed him to shape legislation. The new
legislative initiative revived the familiar allegations labor’s underworld connections.
McClellan indicated that while he lacked “expertise on issues of labor and management,”
he nevertheless crusaded against the “rotten core of unions” in his committee.183
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Shortly after McClellan railed against the “bad apples” on the floor of the Senate,
he co-sponsored a new bi-partisan legislative initiative led by Democrat Phil Landrum
and Republican Robert Griffin. The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,
commonly known as the Landrum-Griffin Act, ultimately codified the assertions and
legislative attacks by Kefauver, McClellan, and numerous other politicians regarding
organized labor. Landrum-Griffin’s passage required all unions to report their individual
local incomes and expenses to the Department of Labor. The key tenet of the act banned
officials with radical or criminal ties from holding office in unions.184 According to the
AFL-CIO, Landrum-Griffin undermined the legitimacy of unions, not only because all
financial transactions became traceable, but also because unions viewed the legislation as
a weapon against labor. The official press release from the AFL-CIO following the
passage of the act stated that “this measure was designed to destroy organized labor.”185
The New York Times cheered passage of the Landrum Griffin Act, which reflected “the
growing demand throughout the country for action, and strong action, to curb labor union
abuses.”186 The broad, sweeping stroke of power against organized crime in labor did
little to purge mafia elements. Landrum-Griffin’s promised panacea, transparency in
organized labor, ultimately failed to drive organized crime out of the union halls.187
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Moreover, publicity related to the legislative and investigative initiatives launched by
anti-labor members of Congress had the effect of further degrading the image of labor,
especially that of the longshoremen.188 Even with the rollback of New Deal-era labor
gains perpetrated by acts of Congress in the late 1940s and into the 1950s, unions still
dominated the working class population in the United States. By 1960, nearly 34% of
American workers paid membership dues to labor unions. As a result of Taft-Hartley and
Landrum-Griffin, this peak in union membership would never be surpassed.189
By the end of the 1950s, alterations in labor practices and shipping mirrored the
changes in the global political and military order. In the fifteen short years following the
end of World War II, pre-war multipolar statecraft gave way to the bipolarity of a U.S.
dominated West versus the Soviet-dominated East. The struggle between the United
States and the Soviet Union placed the globe on the precipice of a catastrophic Third
World War and continued well beyond the conclusion of the decade. U.S. planners,
trained to fight conventional wars, grappled with the rapidly changing technologies and
implements of warfare during the 1950s. Once U.S. planners developed policies such as
the “New Look” or “Massive Retaliation”, the conventional forces of the United States
shrank in favor of bombers and missile systems designed to deliver nuclear warheads to
Soviet targets. The days of large armies, fleets, and large populations of service members
was over.190 The commercial shipping industry also discovered new methods of
188
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delivering products from manufacturers to market in a faster and less labor-intensive
process. Malcom McLean’s cargo container became an ideal innovation for the
proliferation of global trade, yet the ports and facilities to reduce human labor failed to
develop as quickly. In terms of military shipping, antiquated fleets of cargo ships and the
remnant of World War II’s sealift plan formed the core of U.S. strategic maritime
planning and capabilities well into the 1960s.191 The early attempts at automation
introduced by the 1958 launch of the Ideal-X represented the first steps towards a
technologically sophisticated method of reducing labor and increasing efficiency on the
waterfront. While episodes of sealift support in the 1960s proved the value of longshore
work in the military sector, the use of new technology over human capital ultimately
found much more popularity in subsequent decades.
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FAILURE TO APPRECIATE: ORGANIZED LABOR IN DEFENSE LOGISTICS
DURING AND AFTER THE MCNAMARA ERA, 1961-1971
Following the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1964, the United States committed to
supporting the South Vietnamese government. By the summer of 1966, the expansion of
the American commitment to South Vietnam called for hundreds of thousands of troops
and materials to support them. Da Nang harbor and its piers proved incapable of
handling the influx of cargo ships until a massive construction project dredged the bottom
of the port and expanded its dock capacity.192 Even with the expansion of capacity, a
lack of available merchant shipping led to a bottle neck of the supply chain from Naval
Support Activity (NSA) Da Nang to supply depots at U.S. naval bases in the Philippines
and South Korea. The Department of Defense requested International Longshoremen’s
Association (ILA) president Thomas Gleason’s advice for overcoming the logistical
difficulties faced by the U.S. mission in Vietnam. According to Gleason’s report, the
root of the problems at NSA Da Nang stemmed from both the lack of U.S. flagged
shipping and “the fact that certain government agencies do not appreciate the important
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part that shipping and organized labor must play in any sustained military operation.”193
Shortly thereafter, the Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) contracted Malcom
McLean’s Sea-Land Corporation to ship ammunition to Vietnam by cargo container.
ILA workers travelled to Da Nang to train local longshoremen. The long term use of the
container and automation, however, bypassed the workers Gleason noted as a solution to
the logistical difficulties in a prolonged conventional war.194
The Department of Defense (DoD)’s lack of “appreciation” for maritime labor or
U.S.-flagged shipping in the mid-1960s related to the overwhelming influence of nuclear
weapons in strategic contingency planning.195 Following the election of John F. Kennedy
in 1960, his administration planned for less reliance on nuclear weapons compared to
President Eisenhower’s “New Look.” The Kennedy administration’s reorientation of
weaponry and methods of potential conflict away from nuclear weapons failed to alter
American strategy. Even with the conventional arms buildup related to Vietnam, the
Kennedy and Johnson administration’s policies for the strategic threats posed by the
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Soviet Union remained nuclear.196 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s assumption
that airlift could handle the majority of logistical support for the U.S. intervention in
Vietnam mirrored broader incorrect assumptions made by the defense establishment
regarding weaponry and strategy.
By 1966, “Newport,” the Navy’s docks located near Saigon, and the newly
automated terminal at DaNang received nearly 800,000 tons of ocean shipping a month
from the United States. In spite of the flood of materials and support to Vietnam, both the
MSTS and its parent commands within the Navy and the DoD failed to heed Thomas
Gleason’s advice. Private shipping’s share of wartime trade to South Vietnam only
increased after 1966, and the U.S. Navy’s improvements to Da Nang and “Newport” in
1967 included the installation of cranes designed to handle cargo containers.197 Rather
than choosing trained longshoremen, the Navy chose to rely on automation.
The balance between technological innovation to remove labor from the National
Security Waterfront and union support of military missions tipped in favor of the
container and privatization during the 1960s and early 1970s.198 In the era of anti-labor
legislation and mafia investigations of the 1950s, longshoremen still handled the majority
of cargoes to support the broader normal operations of the MSTS.199 The shift from
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breakbulk to containerized shipping in the private sector preceded and justified the
military’s use of the box and corporate methods of handling cargo and laborers.200 Ocean
shipping of consumer goods from East Asian manufacturing plants greatly altered trade
routes and the transportation industry during the 1960s. As a result, the MSTS attempted
and failed to catchup with the new economics of automation and containerization. By
1971, the MSTS ceased to exist and its assets transferred to the newly created Military
Sealift Command (MSC). The re-organization of the MSTS marked a transition within
the Navy to cope with a rapidly changing ocean economy.201
The reorganization of the MSTS into the MSC reflected both a change in methods
of shipping and a new American defense strategy. In tracing the transition from the early
1960s to the formation of the MSC, this chapter provides a fuller understanding how the
commercial maritime economy changed and the military responded. While nuclear
weapons dominated planning and expenditures at the Department of Defense, new
methods of organizational and financial management altered policy and execution of
Kennedy and Johnson administration directives.202 New methods of quantitative
management, borne out of business schools during the 1950s, evolved into the sole
determinate of which systems and weapons received funding. The intellectual offspring
of the management theories of W. Edwards Deming, metrics of analyses such as the
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“Planning, Programming, Budgeting System” (PPBS) derailed a restoration of
conventional abilities of the DoD after the nuclear emphasis of DoD planning in the
1950s. Instead of building up strategic conventional forces in Europe, the United States
fought the non-traditional armies of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong during the
1960s.203
Deeper conventional commitments aside from Vietnam similarly altered maritime
strategy. Rather than updating maritime contingency planning to reflect a transition
from the nuclear plans of the 1950s to the conventional emphasis of the Kennedy
administration, the defense establishment created a new strategy out of the vestiges of
sealift ships and plans, which had remained unchanged since World War II. New
technology, including the cargo container, failed to reformulate maritime strategic
planning in the navy. The brief upsurge of conventional planning and force deployment
during the Vietnam era did not translate into broader, global commitments beyond the
late 1960s.204 This chapter also discusses the beginning of the long decline in maritime
labor and U.S. oceanic supremacy. At the point of the container’s introduction to military
service in the mid-1960s, maritime unions lost a negligible amount of work and jobs. By
decade’s end, waterfront jobs began a long decline extending into the 1970s and 1980s.
Maritime union membership fell, and worker solidarity within the broad spectrum of
maritime unions similarly suffered.205
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Reorganization failed to maintain a highly efficient strategic sealift ability. The
historiographies about maritime defense policy and labor of the 1960s illustrated
examples of failures of coping with organizational change or new norms on the national
security waterfront. Andrew Gibson and Arthur Donovan argued in the The Abandoned
Ocean: A History of United States Maritime Policy that the United States failed to
develop a cohesive, flexible maritime strategy after World War II. Gibson and Donovan
noted that the Kennedy Administration and Johnson Administration neglected to take into
account rapid changes in ocean shipping. These changes, in trade routes, new commercial
technologies, and the resultant decline in the population of merchant seamen and
longshoremen illustrated the broader decline of American maritime policy by the late
1960s.206 Marc Levinson’s discussion of the introduction of the cargo container to
broader commercial use in the 1960s supported his thesis that the cargo container
facilitated trade and the beginnings of “globalization.”207 The “Box,” however, enabled
globalization because it facilitated lower costs in trade across national borders. Lower
costs led to a near-universal adoption of containerized trade globally during the 1960s,
which in turn further increased the rate and volume of international trade.208
Labor and social historians discussions of the 1960s as the high water mark of
union membership similarly discussed the role of automation and globalization in the
decline of organized labor, but usually failed to include maritime workers. Jefferson
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Cowie’s prologue in Stayin’ Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class
broadly covers the improvement of workers’ wages and rights, from the aftermath of the
Taft-Hartley Act to the end of the 1960s. Cowie discusses the beginnings of industrial
decline and economic stagnation coupled the broad debasement of organized labor with
the rise of anti-labor sentiments in the electorate by the late 1960s. Cowie indicates that
the Faustian pact made by the working class in their support of Richard Nixon in the
elections of 1968 and 1972 ultimately paved the way for their own extinction. Cowie’s
broad discussion of the working class, however, concentrated on larger populations of
workers in the automobile plants, mining, or other heavy manufacturing industries and
not on maritime workers.209
Studies of automation rarely discussed maritime workers, but have covered
important trends such as philosophies of productivity and organized labor’s role in the
broader society. The late David Noble devoted several monographs to the concept of
“technological unemployment” in heavy industries. Borrowing from John Maynard
Keynes’ definition of workers unemployed by technological innovations or automation,
Noble’s approach to evaluating industry differs from Keynes. Noble’s Marxist
perspective in both Forces of Production: A History of Industrial Automation and
Progress Without People: New Technology, Unemployment, and the Message and
Resistance offers a rather straight forward argument that engineers designed machines to
reduce labor at the behest of their employers. In turn, employers began layoffs or
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investing in more technology in order to maximize their profit margins.210 Noble includes
discussions of worker resistance and his texts provide an interesting framework for the
consequences of automation on workers communities. Noble’s discussion of workers
sabotaging machines as a form of resistance by the laboring classes was far from the
minds of the average maritime laborers of the 1960s. They voted, contributed to political
parties, attended church, and eschewed radical tactics in their negotiations with shipping
associations or the government.211
Longshoremen and other maritime workers appeared in monographs such as Earl
Lewis’ In Their Own Interests: Race, Class, and Power in Twentieth Century Norfolk and
Bruce Nelson’s Workers on the Waterfront: Seamen, Longshoremen, and Unionism in the
1930s. Both texts highlight the activism of radical workers in places such as Norfolk,
Virginia, Mobile, Alabama, and New Orleans, Louisiana.212 These works and much of
the labor historiography emphasize outlier radical workers rather than the majority of
mariners. For the most part, members of seamen’s unions or the ILA did not engage in
sabotage, nor did they use the language of Marxist or socialist organizers.213 The
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longshoremen this chapter and this study bought into the post-war consensus of
consumerism and remained comparatively conservative in their language and tactics
throughout the Cold War. In the case of workers on the national security waterfront, this
was especially true.
Political appointees of the 1960s informed changes in conventional sealift
planning, both in terms of potential North Atlantic contingencies and in Vietnam. The
historiography in defense policy of the 1960s failed to discuss sealift or organized labor.
Studies of the DoD in the 1960s note the influence of Robert McNamara and events
related to the Vietnam Conflict. Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski’s For the Common
Defense: A Military History of the United States provides the broad strokes of
McNamara’s organizational changes at the Pentagon during the 1960s. Perhaps no
previous study examines planners and appointees during the 1960s more than H.R.
McMaster’s Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam. According to McMaster, the entire national
security structure overestimated U.S. capabilities based on flawed statistical models and
outright fabrications. McMaster indicated commanders on the ground and in the
Pentagon and civilian appointees such as Robert McNamara and W.W. Rostow were
guilty of the titular “dereliction of duty”. 214 Especially useful in any discussion of the
Department of Defense are the collection of official histories from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense’s Historical Division. The Historical Divisions biographies of
Robert McNamara and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird provide a total view of defense
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policy. Any peripheral events, political trends, or economic developments, however, fail
to receive as much a focus as the intricate methods of defense appropriation or personnel
management at the Pentagon.215 With the above stated, the intervention this chapter
seeks to make in the historiography is a broad discussion of federal and the DoD policies
that sought to adopt private sector methods of logistics. The DoD’s introduction of
private sector methods included automation and removing civilian laborers as must as
possible.
An additional goal of this chapter is to offer an interpretative lens of U.S.
maritime defense policy and government/labor relations during the 1960s. In Essence of
Decision, Graham Allison’s examination of American and Soviet officials during the
Cuban Missile Crisis interpreted government behavior and decision making processes.
Among Allison’s models, the Organizational Process Model, with ordinal steps
explaining both individual and group behavior proves useful for investigating
government actions. 216 First, organizations exist in order to produce a “systematic and
harmonious or united action.”217 Furthermore, organizations are charged with missions
based on the capabilities and task at hand. Finally, an agency develops an organizational
culture based on its designated capabilities. Individuals employed by such an agency
conform to the leadership’s policies, practices, and standards.218 While Allison applied
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his model to the short term Cuban Missile Crisis over thirteen days in 1962, this chapter
aims to expand the temporal scope of this model to several years. With the expanded
model, this chapter will argue that from the early 1960s to 1971, defense officials with
corporate backgrounds introduced private sector methods into maritime logistics. An
alignment with corporate methodology in defense planning furthered the anti-labor stance
within sectors of the defense economy. Various political figures of the 1960s pledged to
renew or refocus national policy in favor of maritime preparedness and labor.219 The
implementers of policy and managers of budgets, however, came from corporate
backgrounds and ultimately failed to meet these promises. Committed to quantitative
rubrics for weapons systems and defense spending in general, civilian policy makers and
managers, such as Robert McNamara, Charles Hitch, Alain Enthoven, and David
Packard, introduced various private sector reforms to defense planning. The reforms and
new programs ultimately represented the early stages of a new organizational culture and
process in the DoD, which favored scientific management principles and financial
reforms over other considerations, especially human capital.220 This use of the
Organizational Process model will ultimately illustrate the effect of quantitative
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management and technologies such as the cargo container on defense maritime policy
during the 1960s.
Robert McNamara’s arrival at the Pentagon in 1961 started the long term shift in
the Department of Defense’s (DoD) organizational culture. McNamara’s background of
applying statistical analysis to predict outcomes of Army Air Corps missions over
Germany in World War II found popularity in the post-war corporate world. Following
his success at Ford Motor Company using systems analysis, his ascent to leadership of
the automobile manufacturer led to fame.221 According to BusinessWeek, the corporate
world and politicians viewed McNamara as a “prized specimen of a remarkable breed in
U.S. industry-the trained specialist in the science of business management who is also a
generalist moving from one technical area to another.”222
By 1960, McNamara’s leadership at Ford attracted the attention of President-elect
John Kennedy for his plan to bring large-scale changes in American defense planning.
The “New Look” and “Massive Retaliation,” cornerstones of the Eisenhower
administration’s deterrence policy ceased to exist in the Kennedy administration. Rather
than adding nuclear weapons to saturate targets inside the Soviet Union, Kennedy’s
program of “Flexible Response” shifted to other means of strategic confrontation.
“Flexible Response” focused on using conventional weapons, targeted smaller conflicts,
and not an “all or nothing” response to the Soviet Union. In addition, the Kennedy
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administration’s national security team believed revolutions in the developing world
would be the focal point of conflict in the 1960s.223
Pursuant to a plan for smaller wars, Kennedy and McNamara offered a similar
pivot in terms of redirecting defense spending from strategic weapons to conventional
weapons. Kennedy’s agenda included a reevaluation of budgeting and particular focus on
emphasizing the “efficiency and economy” of defense spending.224 Arguing for
meaningful reductions in military expenditures in step with “flexible response,” Kennedy
stated that the “first step most clearly needed” was a reformation in logistics for a new
type of American warfare. This reformation called for by Kennedy, however, would be
an expansion of American airlift capacity only. “Obtaining additional air transport
mobility—and obtaining it now—will better assure the ability of our conventional forces
to respond, with discrimination and speed…”225 Kennedy’s opinion that new aircraft as a
solution to logistics influenced defense decisions throughout his term.
Influences for Kennedy’s planned reform of logistics and defense spending came
from numerous sources, but especially from the private sector. Leaders in the defense
establishment, such as General Maxwell Taylor and Senator Stuart Symington, argued for
reform and centralized management of the Department of Defense.226 The style and
implements of management, however, depended greatly McNamara’s choice of
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subordinates. Following his confirmation, McNamara appointed individuals from
consulting firms for daily management and reform of the military establishment.
McNamara filled positions of Assistant or Under Secretaries of Defense at the Pentagon
with individuals, such as Charles Hitch and Alain Enthoven, both RAND Corporation
economists.227
Hitch and Enthoven formed the core of the financial reform staff at the DoD and
introduced new methods and metrics for planning expenditures. McNamara’s directives
included the introduction of a new metric of measuring budgetary efficiency, the
“Planning Programming Budgeting System” (PPBS). PPBS came from a series of
similar proposals by Hitch and Enthoven, which were known as “systems analysis.”
Proponents of systems analysis, in essence the entire McNamara team, argued that
modeling projected likely costs and benefits of any product or effort.228 In the case of
defense spending and purchasing weapons during “Flexible Response,” systems analysis
determined where newly appropriated funds would be spent and the potential outcome of
these expenditures.229 In his justification of systems analysis and other mathematical
metrics, McNamara conceded “that no significant military problem will ever be wholly
susceptible to purely quantitative analysis.” He continued, however, “but every piece of
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the total problem that can be quantitatively analyzed removes on more piece of
uncertainty from our process of making a choice.”230
PPBS and systems analysis failed to account for all components necessary for
military operations or appropriations and required the creation of new paradigms in
defense planning. Systems analysis treated manpower or human capital, both military
and civilian, as superfluous variables in McNamara’s new approach to spending. Rather,
these new metrics measured and projected the “cost effectiveness” of weapons systems,
aircraft, and ships, and nuclear weapons under the auspices of systems analysis.231
McNamara’s new approach, known as the Five Year Defense Plan, formed the core of
policy and fiduciary decisions over the course of the 1960s and 1970s. Practitioners of
systems analysis and other organizational management techniques occupied the majority
of appointed accounting positions at the DoD.232
Implementation of “Flexible Response” and its aim to provide a comprehensive,
ubiquitous defense plan ultimately proved difficult and fool-hardy. “Flexible Response”
lacked concrete principles beyond the administration’s desire to pivot away from nuclear
weapons and introduce more conventional weapons. The actual implementation of the
plan developed over 1961 and 1962 with new budgetary tools such as PPBS. Planning
for strategic contingencies in the 1960s, however, also occurred in the inescapable
shadow of the thousands of warheads stockpiled in the 1950s. McNamara’s wishes to
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decrease the chances of a catastrophic nuclear exchange with the Soviets ultimately found
their way into the planning process.233 NATO treaty obligations and defense of Europe
occupied most of American post-war concerns regarding Soviet intentions and
capabilities. Preparing for smaller wars and conventional responses along with
maintaining a viable nuclear arsenal meant “Flexible Response” evolved into an
amorphous, poorly defined program to defend the United States.234
With a business-oriented and conventional revolution underway within the
Department of Defense, appointees applied “Flexible Response” to defense logistics. The
Kennedy administration’s early management of the DoD brought major changes to
defense preparations and operations. Supply and logistics became one of the first
components of the DoD’s conventional forces to undergo the scrutiny of system analysis.
As “flexible response” and systems analysis transformed the Department of Defense,
similar revolutions occurred in the maritime transportation sector. The fleet of USflagged shipping, still dominated by World War II-era Liberty and Victory ships, drifted
towards obsolescence. Break bulk cargo Liberty and Victory ships, built in the thousands
during World War II, were all at least 20 years old by the mid-1960s. Technological and
engineering innovations in air and road travel in the 1950s failed to translate into new
ships on the oceans. While shipping tonnage increased, as did imports and exports at
American docks, investment in new technologies or infrastructure in the maritime sector
failed to follow.235
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With a renewed commitment to conventional warfare planning in the early 1960s,
procurement reform became part of McNamara’s agenda at the DoD. Equipping the
service branches under the DoD for “flexible response” proved a costly venture, even
under the auspices of McNamara’s efficient and economic management. Appropriations
for expensive new technologies came with new costs and problems. For example,
McNamara’s demands for cost-concerns as a central determinant for new weapons
systems led to the development of new hybrid fighter-conventional bomber aircraft
beyond the larger, nuclear-armed B-52 bomber. The F-111, conceived as a catchall
attack aircraft intended for use by the Air Force, the Navy, and in numerous combat roles,
proved deficient because procuring a common aircraft over-rode functionality. As multicapability fighter/bomber, the F-111 failed to do either task well.236 New technology also
became a mainstay of the McNamara era. Modernization of existing weapons systems,
such as tanks for Europe’s defense and new targeting systems of lower-yield nuclear
weapons for tactical purposes, came to the forefront of defense policy. With new
technology, however, came enormous cost-overruns and operations foibles that marred
the cost standards set by the McNamara team.237 McNamara’s concept of
standardization guided the formation of shared methods and platforms for the disparate
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armed services.

According to Chief of Naval Operations Admiral George Anderson,

standardization became a watchword in the McNamara Pentagon. In the first months of
1961, subordinates to McNamara, including Alain Enthoven, created a uniform method
of supplying food to the various services. One measure of standardization included the
choice of beans supplied to the services.238 Anderson’s recollection of the matter noted
that “with all the big problems they [DoD] had, that was their first standardization…”239
The Systems Analysis and standardization programs literally led to bean counting,
according to Anderson, that detracted from the overall purpose of the DoD.
Similarly, the revival of non-nuclear planning coupled with enormous cost
overruns in the early 1960s extended into American sea power. The Eisenhower years
featured a focus on delivering strategic nuclear weapons into the Soviet Union, U.S.
naval power comparatively fell by the wayside. That is not to say that the Navy ceased to
exist or failed to build new ships and new weapons systems, but those expenses were
limited to nuclear delivery systems aboard submarines and aircraft carriers. The Kennedy
administration’s plan, however, went beyond a solely-nuclear weapons presence at for
the Navy. New maritime appropriations during the Kennedy years included aircraft
carriers, new escort vessels for convoy duty across the Atlantic, and aircraft armed with
conventional and nuclear weapons.240 While new shipbuilding became a cornerstone of
Flexible Response’s conventional orientation, cost overruns in nuclear propulsion
Transcript, George Anderson, interview by Maurice Matloff, 12, May 17, 1984, Historical Office,
Office of the Secretary of Defense,
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occupied a large portion of defense budgets. Vice Admiral Hyman Rickover, known as
the “father” of the nuclear Navy, persistently reminded colleagues and officials in private
and in the press that only nuclear propulsion could provide a strategic advantage for the
United States.241 The extraordinary cost of developing new reactors for surface ships,
especially the large super carriers, only compounded budgetary issues involved in
creating a total, comprehensive defense under the auspices of “Flexible Response.” In
order to provide for unexpected cost overruns, Systems Analysis became a catchall
measure to identify which projects received full funding while other programs fell by the
wayside.242
While budgets for conventional naval arms increased, financial support for the
merchant and cargo fleet failed to match the military fleet. The slow decline of the
American merchant fleet started in the mid-1950s and reached a critical point by the early
1960s. Part of this decline was the simultaneous growth of highway systems and air
travel for passengers and smaller cargoes. The maritime industry lost traffic to other
modes of transportation. Moreover, military planning under the leadership of McNamara
at the DoD focused heavily on airlift rather than sealift. As “Flexible Response” required
rapidity in deploying conventional forces, cargo aircraft became a top priority.
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Development of enormous new cargo planes, such as the C-5 Galaxy or the smaller C130 Hercules, supplanted sealift improvements. The C-5, however, could not be
constructed in the numbers required to support even a short-term mission in totality. The
U.S. military could not do without access to a large sealift-oriented fleet for the majority
of its logistical support needs.243
Changes due to innovations such as the cargo container and related automation
caused a crisis in American maritime policy by 1964. An obsolete fleet of U.S.-flagged
ships and increasing competition from overseas led the Johnson administration to address
the disarray in maritime affairs. The Johnson administration created the Maritime
Advisory Committee (MAC). The MAC’s composition reflected the broad range of
agencies involved in maritime affairs, including the Secretaries of Labor and Commerce,
shipping and harbor interests, and representatives of the largest maritime labor unions,
including the ILA and the ILWU.244 The MAC’s mission, to study and recommend
appropriate changes to federal regulations and policies related to maritime affairs,
amounted to little actual effect on government policy. Competition between labor and
industrial interests, as well disinterest within the Johnson administration mitigated any
progress or suggestions offered by the MAC.245
The presence of labor interests on the MAC failed to stem the assault on workers
by changes in maritime technology or a benign neglect by the Johnson administration.
Shannon Brown, Providing the Means, (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historical
Office, 2015), 95. Brown provides a comprehensive, if uncritical, discussion of weapons procurement
during the McNamara years.
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As a measure to address the new technologies and economics of the mid-1960s, the
Johnson administration created a federal department of transportation. The creation of the
new Department of Transportation (DOT) in 1966 included the installation of its first
secretary, Alan Boyd. Boyd, as the Undersecretary of Commerce for Transportation in
1964, attempted to end the federal government’s US-flagged cargo preference
requirement and bypass the Jones Act by allowing foreign flagged ships to serve in the
coastwise trade.246 As the first Secretary of Transportation, Boyd proposed ending the
federal operating subsidy, which supported Jones Act shipping with government funding.
Boyd’s actions at DOT so enraged organized labor that on May 21, 1965, workers from
the National Maritime Union (NMU) gathered in front of the White House to protest the
total failure of the Johnson administration to either enumerate a cohesive maritime policy
or defend against the decline of U.S. flagged shipping. The NMU, the AFL-CIO’s
umbrella for all seafaring unions, included the ILA, as well as merchant mariners aboard
U.S.-flagged shipping. In a symbolic act of defiance, NMU protestors heaved two
coffins over the fence and onto the White House lawn.247 The unions viewed the Johnson
administration’s cure for maritime ills to be worse than the illness. The Johnson
administration failed to fill appointed positions related to maritime affairs within the new
DOT. The position of Maritime Administrator was charged with coordinating federal
maritime policy and the civilian and military maritime assets of the government. The
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office sat empty from 1966 until Johnson’s departure from the White House in 1969.248
The Johnson administration had no maritime policy and allowed the industry to go adrift
during the mid-1960s.
Government inaction on technological changes such as the development of the
cargo container compounded the woes of the maritime industry. By 1961, Malcom
McLean’s intermodal container transformed shipping routes as consumer goods from
within the United States traveled the coast wise trade.249 The “Box” also transported
goods from the rebuilding economies of Europe and Asia into American ports. U.S.flagged shipping firms began to refit their ships for the use of the cargo container. Due to
the wave of conversions for containers, the number of break bulk and tanker ships fell
precipitously by the late 1960s. Attempting to keep pace with the innovation of the
“box,” longshoremen initially welcomed the transformation of the waterfront. The
Pacific coast’s International Longshore and Warehouse Union’s (ILWU) president Harry
Bridges not only welcomed the cargo container, but stated its arrival would herald a new
era that would be safer for workers and lead to higher wages.250
Meanwhile, on the Atlantic coast, the workers and leadership of the International
Longshoreman’s Association (ILA) failed to display the same enthusiasm as their
western brethren. After the construction of the first containership, the Ideal-X in 1958,
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the ILA protested or went on strike repeatedly against the steady increase in
containerization and automation.251 By the mid-1960s, the ILA began to soften its
protests against what they saw as an inevitable march towards the automation of their
docks. Their demands for concessions on wages and benefits from shipping associations
did not soften, however. By 1965, the strikes had their effect and agreements between
the ILA and port shipping associations created a precedent known as the Guaranteed
Annual Income (GAI). As automation threatened the number of hours longshoremen
could work an incoming ship, the shipping associations pooled funds in order to pay ILA
member’s the GAI to supplement work shortfalls due to automation.252 The GAI blunted
the fear of mass unemployment and wage cuts, but failed to end worker apprehension
regarding the future of automation. When polled, two thirds of labor leaders in the mid1960s described automation as the largest threat to their workers, and even President
Kennedy conceded that automation and resulting mass-unemployment was “the major
domestic challenge of the [19]60s.”253
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The concessions of shipping associations did not end strikes, however.
Waterfront industrial areas, especially on the Atlantic coast in the 1960s, were the last
economic strongholds for maritime workers during the age of automation. Shipbuilding
and longshore work provided high wages, and stable working-class neighborhoods
thrived surrounding the waterfront. High wages available on the docks for the
longshoremen, who rarely had educations beyond 9th or 10th grade, allowed for a
comfortable lifestyle.254 Longshore and other maritime unions, especially the ILA,
persisted as the loudest voice of labor’s activities within port cities. As the union’s
leadership began to gain concessions from employers, the national ILA leadership
brokered agreements for the GAI and pooled resources to support political candidates and
causes important for worker survival.255 With financial and political clout, the ILA’s
leadership and members ensured off duty longshoremen remained outside of polling
places as poll watchers, while other longshoremen campaigned for the pro-labor
candidates on the ballot.256 In retrospect, the children of ILA rank and file members saw
their fathers’ financial and political gains in the 1960s as “giving us a seat on a
desperately needed lifeboat” amidst potentially adverse economic conditions.257 Rather
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than the lazy or criminal longshoremen looking to engage in graft, the ILA members’
side of the story complicated this common perception. Moreover, strikes or a lack of
cooperation with shipping associations over automation was a desperate battle to
maintain a precarious financial position.258
Episodes, which complicated the narrative of uncooperative longshoremen in
support of military missions, came during the longshoreman strikes of 1965 and 1966.
Contract disputes with various port authorities on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts resulted
in strikes along the waterfront nationwide. The gridlock halted nearly every port in the
United States as both the ILA and ILWU refused to unload hundreds of ships waiting at
anchor nationwide.259 The only discharges during the strikes had been from ships owned
or contracted by the Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS). According to the ILA
and the ILWU, agreements with the MSTS for the orderly flow of military cargo trumped
the temporary disputes over wages and working conditions. MSTS ships on both the east
and west coasts arrived and departed regularly while the commercial cargo liners affected
by the strike remained at anchor. 260 The MSTS maintained contracts with the ILA and
ILWU separate from the shipping associations of each port. Wages were usually higher
than what private industry paid when military ships needed loading or unloading. This
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higher wage difference became a point of contention, especially in the mid-1960s, as the
United States began its major sealift for Vietnam.
Costs beyond labor coupled with merchant ships operating in a warzone posed
financial and insurance liabilities for the DoD as the United States fully intervened in
Vietnam. Since the First World War, the U.S. government insured ships conducting
operations on behalf of the War and Defense Departments. If an American merchant ship
sank under contract with the DoD, the U.S. government not only covered the liability of
lost cargoes, but also the lives of the mariners aboard ship.261 In the midst of deepening
American involvement in Vietnam, the Department of Commerce’s National Shipping
Authority began to issue orders related to contracts and bidding for military shipping.
After April 1, 1965, all ships contracted by the MSTS, ostensibly a DoD agency
committed to supplying the intervention in Vietnam, fell under the liability insurance
regulations of the National Shipping Authority. Insurance adjusters for the Authority
and subcontractors, in compliance with a Department of Commerce order related to
marine insurance, began to regulate ships landing at Da Nang and thus added greatly to
demurrage on contracts of ships waiting to discharge.262
Similar complexities in the bureaucracy and regulatory framework of American
maritime affairs added to the bottleneck of both military and civilian shipping. The
buildup and rapid delivery of materials ashore at Da Nang also had war risk insurance
Leslie Buglass, Marine Insurance Claims: American Law and Practice, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Maritime
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consequences. Once merchant ships arrived at Da Nang, supplies were transferred from
ship to shallow draft, privately-owned craft called Landing Ship Tanks (LST). The
majority of the LSTs were built during World War II, transferred to the Maritime
Administration during the late 1940s and early 1950s, but were then purchased by private
shipping firms or reactivated by the Navy for wartime use.263 The World War II-vintage
LSTs, numbering close to 1000, represented the bulk of the post-war U.S. flagged
merchant fleet. 264 The LSTs were among the most frequently used vessels for delivering
supplies from staging points in the Philippines and Japan. The LST captains, using ramps
and large doors at the bow, grounded the ships on the beaches or enormous concrete
ramps. LSTs, designed for repeated grounding and reloading, fell under private
commercial marine insurance rules. As the ships technically ran aground in a time of war
and delivered weapons and other military materials, the government insured vessels
required a lengthy inspection for damage, seaworthiness, and assessment of any potential
insurance claims. In turn, inspection times lengthened discharge of cargo at Da Nang and
backed up supply lines to staging points in the Philippines and Japan. At the peak of the
bottleneck in November 1965, nearly 125 MSTS-contracted ships waited at anchorage
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near Saigon and Da Nang to off-load materials. The need for rapid discharge of
equipment led to the waiver of insurance rules.265
The bottleneck led the DoD to consult with the experts in cargo loading, the
International Longshoreman’s Association. Realizing that the port issues jeopardized
aspects of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam conflict, the DoD asked ILA president
Thomas Gleason to serve as an advisor for improving throughput at Da Nang and Saigon.
Gleason, one of the few labor leaders who held membership on the Maritime Advisory
Committee, provided a comprehensive report on operations both at sea and on the docks
in the Vietnamese ports.266 Apart from his observation that the Navy and the DoD failed
to “appreciate” organized labor, Gleason suggested that ammunition and other modular
materials could be moved by cargo container. Similar to the ILA and ILWU’s
acquiescence to containerization in the United States as a negotiating tool, Gleason’s
recommendation to increase the pace of automation in military missions ultimately
removed more workers from the docks in Vietnam.267
The decline of US-flagged shipping compelled the military to consider developing
a maritime policy. Vice Admiral Glynn Donaho, commander of the MSTS, testified
before Congress in February 1966 that the nucleus fleet of the service could
hypothetically supply positions in Vietnam as well as for other national emergencies.
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Donaho’s testimony also highlighted the age of the 967 ships of the National Defense
Reserve Fleet. Most consisted of obsolete and slow World War II vintage Victory and
Liberty ships, and the steady decline in U.S.-flagged shipping, according to Donaho,
could prove “costly in the future.”268 Vice Admiral John McCain, Jr., the commander of
Atlantic Fleet’s amphibious force, agreed with Donaho by arguing that the United States
and the Soviets were already involved in a “total ‘wet war”. McCain’s evidence of a
undeclared naval arms race and a maritime conflict he dubbed a “wet war” included
“intense competition in the field of merchant shipping…as well as between navies.”269
<dms. McCain highlighted the security risks to losing the merchant fleet advantage, both
in terms of military power and economic security at home and abroad. Linking merchant
shipping and the use of U.S.-flagged ships to the totality of security, McCain closed with
a warning from Alfred Thayer Mahan, “The United States must have a national merchant
shipping industry to remain strong…”270
The “lack of appreciation” for U.S.-flagged shipping or mariners rarely came
from military officers in the 1960s, but from civilian bureaucrats and managers at DoD.
The only use of foreign-flagged shipping, according to both McCain and Donaho, should
be if there were no U.S.-flagged ships available. The National Maritime Union, the AFLCIO’s umbrella organization for all maritime trades, argued that the MSTS had lied
regarding its position on foreign flagged ships in 1965. The National Maritime Union
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alleged that both the MSTS and the DoD awarded several contracts to Japanese and
South Korean shipping firms without justification.271 By October 1967, longshoreman
strikes in the United States and inability of U.S. flagged shipping to shoulder the burden
of the sealift commitment in Vietnam led the MSTS to contract with shipping firms
employing Japanese and Filipino mariners. The ILA, the National Maritime Union, and
other maritime labor organizations protested this practice. The unions argued against
subcontracting in order to preserve their livelihoods.272 Noting that the largest Japanese
mariner’s union publically announced its opposition to the American intervention in
Vietnam, the ILA argued against relying upon potential “enemies” of the U.S. mission.273
The contracting impulse within the DoD coupled with containerization and strengthened
in the later 1960s and into 1970s.
The desire for rapid discharge and throughput and the ILA’s recommendation of
containerization accelerated the MSTS’s use of automation in Vietnam. On August 1,
1967, the SS Bienville, a containership owned by Malcom McLean’s Sea-Land
Corporation, arrived at Da Nang with 225 boxes aboard from staging points in Okinawa
and the Philippines. The public affairs office for the MSTS and NSA Da Nang heralded
the Bienville’s inaugural arrival as the beginning of a “new era” of cooperation between
private shippers and the DoD for mission support.274 According to the commander of the
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Freight Terminal at Da Nang, the benefits of the new service using Sea-Land containers
would “reduce pilferage, loss and damage, and lower transportation costs.”275 The old
specter of civilians pilfering military supplies continued to influence administrators and
members of Congress pro-containerization perspective. Robert H.B. Baldwin, a
McNamara era Undersecretary of the Navy, argued that containerization of materials
going to Da Nang “greatly reduced the risk of pilferage and stevedoring (longshore work)
requirements.”276 Baldwin, a graduate of Princeton and a director at Morgan Stanley
with “excellent blue-blood credentials” according to the New York Times, asserted that
standardization of cargo management based on the private sector’s example would
“facilitate an economy of operation” for military logistics needs.277 The container’s
heralded arrival in Vietnam only increased the desire for more automation throughout the
DoD.
1968 became a watershed year for containerization, in the commercial
marketplace through government intervention and new regulations. By March 1968, the
federal government cemented its use of the cargo container under Public Law 90-268.
The statute, which amended the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, required federal and
military agencies to standardize the size of containers either purchased or leased. The
measure of standardization in the code conformed to dimensions Sea-Land Corporation
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developed in the late 1950s. In addition, the law encouraged “the development and
implementation of new concepts for the carriage of cargo in the domestic and foreign
commerce of the United States.278 Federal Maritime Administrator J.W. Gulick argued
in favor of the law’s cargo standardization specifications. Gulick stated that
“standardization of intermodal containers has been widely recognized throughout
industry…for many years.”279 The private sector method of standardization and the
buzzword of “intermodality” appeared frequently in congressional testimony. Gulick
argued further that “uniformity is the basic requirement for the development and use of
automatic techniques in an efficient transportation or production system.”280
The Johnson administration’s endorsement of container uniformity included
placing the private sector’s model for efficiency above all else. The law’s government
aid provision required compliance in order for a shipping firm to receive federal subsidies
for purchasing newly constructed cargo ships. These subsidies included large, lowinterest federal loans guaranteeing U.S. flagged ship construction. Unless a cargo or
container ship complied with containerization specifications, however, federal subsidies
for new U.S.-flagged ships would not be available.281 With a shipping industry
emboldened by containerization’s effect on civilian federal policy by the late 1960s, the
§U.S. Code 90-268; V.F. Caputo to E.L. Bartlett, Memorandum on DoD Standardization of Cargo
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DoD became the lone sector of the federal government allowed an exception to standard
cargo containers. The final section of the Merchant Marine Act’s amendment stated that
the DoD’s exemption came in “a case where the Secretary of Defense determines that
military requirements necessitate the specification of container sizes.”282 Officials at
DoD argued that standardization of government container usage could prove to be
foolhardy for military uses. Captain Robert Wrzesinski, director of Legislative Affairs for
the Department of the Navy, argued for broader latitude in terms of military shipping “to
meet military needs in times of peace or war.”283 The expansion of containerization at Da
Nang and throughout the Vietnam conflict, however, proved otherwise. The amendment
of the Merchant Marine Act ultimately allowed DoD more choices in transportation and
container use, but the overall federal stance in favor of standardization remained in the
bill.284
By 1968, longshoremen argued that the entire economy’s drift towards
standardization of intermodal cargo amounted to a dangerous trend called “container
fever.” Anthony Scotto, president of ILA Local 1814 in Brooklyn, New York, warned
against “adverse effects of containerization on the shipping industry or the cities whose
economies are dependent on port commerce.”285 Scotto continued to warn against
included a promised 50 percent containerization of all traffic coming into the Port of New
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York. Scotto reasoned that more containerization could only lead to steep decline in
longshoreman employment. A large, highly specialized and trained maritime population,
both aboard ships and along the waterfronts, began to whither after the trend Scotto
termed “container fever” overtook all sectors of the transportation economy.286
“Container fever” extended into the shipbuilding industry as subsidies attached to
container usage ultimately guided attempts to keep the U.S.-flagged fleet alive beyond
the 1960s. Widespread adoption of the cargo container by U.S.-flagged shipping firms
was dubbed “the great containership race” by Navy Magazine in 1966.287 Federal
subsidies related to standardization, however, altered how U.S.-flagged shipping
attempted to compete in an industry undergoing a paradigm shift. United States Lines,
one of the largest completely U.S.-flagged shipping firms, ceased passenger operations in
1968 and became only a cargo and container service. Later that year, United States Lines
commissioned its first fully containerized ships, the American Victory and the American
Liberty. Federal subsidies under the new container law paid for the ships’
construction.288 Heralding the “a revolutionary new epoch”, United States Lines’
promoted their new fleet as an instrument for salvaging an American maritime industry
that carried less than 10 percent of U.S. imports and exports. As part of the heralded
innovations from this fully containerized fleet, United States Lines promised to cut labor
costs “in half” while warning that full automation would “cause a ripple effect of mass
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disemployment” at ports nationwide.289 Jesse Simons, the director of labor relations for
United States Lines, warned longshoremen and merchant seamen of the changes coming
with containerization. “The tumultuous state of maritime labor-management relations,
with its correlative sky-rocketing of labor costs, has caused the government to become
more reluctant to continue support of an active merchant marine.” Continuing his
foreboding tone, Simons closed by stating that “Washington is increasingly weary of
lending assistance to resolve the industry’s industrial relations problems.”290
Increasingly automated docks and subsidization compelled U.S.-flagged shippers
to adopt containerships as a means of surviving in an increasingly competitive global
marketplace. By mid-1968, US-flagged shippers ordered or accepted delivery of 48 new
container ships, all subsidized by the Maritime Administration due to amendments to the
Merchant Marine Act.291 The rapid expansion of containership construction reflected the
first steps toward port automation. By the late 1960s, the container trade carried the
majority of cargo handled at the largest transshipment points in East Asia, at both sides of
the Panama Canal, and at other economic and strategically important ports. Rotterdam,
then the largest port in Europe, similarly began its transition to a mostly automated
terminal. 292
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Rotterdam’s largest customer, the U.S. Military, began to containerize its cargo as
well. As Rotterdam’s piers handled the majority of durable and consumer goods bound
for U.S. and other NATO bases in Europe, the MSTS began to use the container to
supply the hundreds of thousands of troops and airmen stationed in West Germany.
According to Undersecretary of the Navy Robert H.B. Baldwin, the financial benefits of
the cargo container made sealift “economical…by providing a quicker response and
reducing pilferage” 293
The changes introduced by the private sector and the cargo container prompted
the defense establishment to hasten its streamlining of military ocean transportation. As
the private sector fully adopted the cargo container, the federal government, as one
longshoreman described, “followed the lead of the private sector.”294 Beginning in
March 1966, McNamara and Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance planned for a
general reorganization of maritime logistics as a result of automation in the ocean
transportation environment. Extensive planning and analysis within the DoD produced a
series of new memoranda and edicts related to new organizational structures designed to
manage DoD’s logistics.295 Vance enumerated the most important components of
defense maritime affairs, including contracted ships, the various commands related to
Ibid, pg 2.; Mercogliano, “Sealift”, 423. One of the MSTS’s largest responsibilities during the 1960s
was the regular resupply of commissaries at U.S. bases in Europe with everyday consumer goods available
at stores in the United States. The MSTS regularly used Rotterdam, Antwerp, and Hamburg to land
containerized goods.
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ocean transportation, and cargos. Missing from Vance’s list of required components for
future military logistics was labor.296
With “container fever” catching on in all sectors of the maritime economy and the
assumption that conventional logistical challenges of the past went away with the
container and automation, the federal government reevaluated its transportation needs.
The MSTS and DoD attempted to support the Vietnam mission with conventional sealift
while the costs of maintaining a conventional U.S. presence in Europe complicated the
American strategic defense posture. Succeeding administrations after World War II grew
concerned of a conventional battle between NATO forces and the Soviet Union’s
Warsaw Pact. The geographic focus of the feared confrontation was along the East and
West German border or elsewhere in central Europe. The maintenance of nearly ten
Army divisions, or nearly 300,000 troops, in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands
strained defense budgets.297 This strained other global MSTS commitments, included
supplying positions in Vietnam, and routinely shipped supplies, weapons, and other
materials to U.S. overseas military posts.298 The expense of maintaining conventional
positions in Europe and Asia, as well as an air, naval, and nuclear arsenal, began to weigh
heavily on budgets. The deployment of hundreds of thousands of troops to Vietnam
strained the defense budget to the breaking point by 1967. In order to maintain the
Johnson administration’s commitment to South Vietnam, DoD withdrew two divisions of
296
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U.S. troops from Europe.299 The transfer constituted 28,000 troops and their equipment,
accounting for less than ten percent of the overall U.S. conventional force supporting
NATO. The movement of these divisions highlighted the strain that the Vietnam
conflict created in the overall U.S. strategy. Similarly, the DoD assumed that a
combination of equipment pre-positioning and Atlantic sealift capabilities could handle a
rapidly escalating emergency in Europe.300
The withdrawal of conventional troops from Europe alarmed members of
Congress because it signaled weakness as a result of deepening commitments in Vietnam.
In response to the withdrawal of troops from Europe, Senator John Stennis of Mississippi
requested information regarding the time, expense, and requirements for reinforcing
NATO positions in continental Europe. According to Assistant Secretary of Defense
Frederick Wyle, it would take “several months” to bolster NATO positions in a
hypothetical, non-nuclear crisis in Europe. Ten extra Army divisions, the totality of the
Atlantic fleet, and nearly 800 combat aircraft could be moved into position in the
timeframe enumerated in Wyle’s estimates.301 The timeframe of “several months” used
by Assistant Secretary Wyle neglected to mention alternatives for rapid relief in a
potential conflict.302
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The American maritime crisis worsened by 1968 in spite of innovations on the
waterfront. Increased competition from overseas ocean carriers, improvements in
domestic highway construction, and the intermodality of the cargo container led to a
collapse in U.S-flagged shipping and maritime employment. By September 1968, U.S.
flagged shipping carried 5.6 percent of imports and exports, the lowest level since the
First World War.303 The post-war nadir of American maritime capabilities paralleled the
military’s experience in Vietnam. A fervent belief in quantified metrics and efficient
processes failed to deliver an assured victory in Southeast Asia. Robert McNamara and
his team’s assumptions of overwhelming airpower and escalation fell short of their
objectives. Even after McNamara’s departure from the DoD in early 1968, the core
administrators and managers who guided policy remained in positions throughout DoD.
The oracles of systems analysis, such as Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, remained
at the Pentagon for the rest of the Johnson term.304 Management theoreticians or
statisticians as policy makers outlived presidential terms or individual political
appointees. According to historians Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, systems
analysts became “the most powerful knights of ‘Camelot’, the civilian and military
officers who marched under McNamara’s banner” deep into the 1970s.305
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The specter of failed Johnson/McNamara initiatives loomed over the 1968
presidential campaign, both in military and maritime terms. Persistent promises of more
troops and spending as a panacea during the Vietnam Conflict proved futile, especially
following the Tet Offensive. With CBS News anchor Walter Cronkite declaring the war
“unwinnable” after Tet, large portions of the electorate concurred.306 Unfulfilled
promises of victory and the high cost of American lives seemingly squandered in
Southeast Asia prompted a loss of confidence in the once wildly popular Johnson
administration. Candidate and former Vice President Richard Nixon pledged to bring
about a total reform of a bloated, inefficient federal government as part of a “new
American revolution.” Linking domestic inefficiency with a weak strategic image
abroad, Nixon argued in favor of a “new revolution” meant to streamline and, in some
cases, privatize elements of the federal government’s responsibilities.307
Following his acceptance of the Republican nomination, Nixon pledged to reform
maritime security and adjust to industrial challenges. As a method of fracturing the
already strained Democratic coalition, Nixon targeted organized labor as a potential
source of political support and votes. Fissures over Vietnam and the Johnson
administration’s efforts in a broader campaign for Civil Rights alienated blue-collar
voters from their traditional Democratic voting patterns. As part of the broader “Silent
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Majority” appeal to mostly white, working-class voters or “hardhats,” Nixon’s campaign
sought to build what one historian described as a “new majority.”308
Hoping to syphon off maritime workers from the Democratic coalition, Nixon’s
campaign included an appeal to the “hardhats” of the waterfront. In a speech delivered to
maritime trade groups in Seattle, Nixon first defined seapower as the totality of maritime
interests “in either trade or defense,” which included the “navy, the merchant marine, and
port facilities.”309 According to Nixon, the U.S. merchant fleet, which carried 52 percent
of U.S. imports or exports following World War II, carried less than “5.6 percent of U.S.
trade” by 1968. U.S. flagged ships carried an even smaller fraction of global trade.310 As
part of his security platform, Nixon’s platform of revitalization of the American maritime
economy included a plank warning of strategic competition from the Soviet Union.
While U.S. shipping withered, Soviet-flagged shipping picked up the slack in global
shipping demands. Beginning in the early 1960s, Soviet state-owned shipping increased
its share of the world shipping marketplace, supplanting anemic U.S.-flagged
counterparts.311 Nixon pledged to wrestle control of the trade routes from “foreign
competition” by working with industrial and labor interests to reform a U.S. maritime
industry attuned global trends including containerization.312 Following a narrow victory
Robert Mason, Richard Nixon and the Quest for the New Majority, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of
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in November 1968 and assuming office, Nixon attempted to reverse the decline in the
domestic maritime industry.313 Broadly speaking, Nixon’s maritime policy sought to
correct the neglect and unfilled administrative positions of the last two years of Lyndon
Johnson’s term. For example, the position of Maritime Administrator, one of two federal
officials responsible for all ocean-going matters, sat empty from 1966 until after Nixon’s
inauguration in 1969.314
Rather than neglect or allow the private sector to downsize for the sake of
efficiency, the Nixon administration relied on heavy federal intervention to reverse
declining numbers of U.S. flagged ships and maritime laborers. Helen Bentley, former
maritime reporter for the Baltimore Sun, served as the Nixon administration’s Federal
Maritime Commissioner. Andrew Gibson, a career merchant mariner, was appointed
Federal Maritime Administrator charged with day to day operations of the Maritime
Administration.315 The complexities of federal power and the broad scope of the
maritime continuum required a delineation of responsibilities between the Federal
Maritime Commission (FMC) and the Maritime Administration (MARAD). The FMC
regulated the docks and rates of cargo carriers, while MARAD maintained the National
Reserve Defense Fleet and promoted the construction of more U.S.-flagged ships.316
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Both ardent supporters of organized labor, Gibson and Bentley attempted to reverse the
deep decline of American maritime employment in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Their
efforts found little support in other federal offices.317
After nearly a decade of professional managers making or implementing federal
policy, attempts to re-center policy to include labor and less-private sector methods
encountered opposition. Bentley’s task of facilitating Nixon’s maritime policy and new
regulations included a reliance on advice from numerous perspectives, including
industrial interests, labor unions, and the National Research Council (NRC). The NRC, a
research arm of the government-sponsored National Academies, ultimately developed a
reputation for reliable and informed opinions regarding matters of policy and future
planning.318 By 1970, conferences and symposia sponsored by the NRC discussed the
ambiguous future of maritime communities and the workers who relied on the waterfront
for their livelihoods. The majority of papers or discussions at these NRC maritime
conferences came from industry leaders and business management professors affiliated
with major research universities or government officials. From the standpoint of Joseph
Carrabino, professor of Business Management at UCLA, the methodology of addressing
the crisis at American ports wouldn’t originate from academia or the government, but
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from the private sector. According to Carrabino, the solution for the future of port
management came from the private sector. “The large laboratories where new
technology and new methods are developing are out in the vast corporate structures.”319
<check this quotation for mistakes. Similar papers delivered at NRC symposia reinforced
the concept that only the private sector had the capability to develop the correct methods
for managing the future of ocean transportation. Moreover, leaders in the field of
management theory argued that more automation and the removal of expensive workers
from the waterfront could solve the ills of the nation’s ports.320
Another measure developed to combat the overreliance on automation and foreign
shipping came with passage of the Merchant Marine Act of 1970. Described by maritime
writers Jeffrey Cruikshank and Chloe Klein as “aggressive” and “innovative,” Nixon’s
promises to promote the American maritime industry came to fruition.321 The nearunanimous passage of the Act by both houses of Congress reflected a pragmatic appeal to
politicians concerned with a growing Soviet-flagged presence in the sea lanes. The Act
also reflected the collapse of the domestic maritime industry. According to
Undersecretary of Commerce for Maritime Affairs Robert Blackwell, the merchant fleet
that numbered nearly 1200 ships at the end of World War II declined to less than 700 all-
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purpose craft, including military ships converted into merchant vessels. Moreover,
Blackwell stated that the majority of these ships were at least 25 years old by 1970 and
failed to compete with newer foreign shipping.322 The Act provided for shipbuilding
subsidies above and beyond the previous subsidies. Under Title XI of the Merchant
Marine Act of 1936, shipbuilding subsidies administered by the Maritime Administration
provided loans to offset construction costs. After the passage of the 1970 act, subsidized
loans covered up to 87 percent of construction costs for US ships in American
shipyards.323 The massive expansion of federal loans appeared to save a dying domestic
maritime industry. Demand for shipping collapsed in the mid-1970s, however, and loans
intended for large cargo ships ultimately built more riverine and harbor craft.324 In spite
of an appropriation and intervention designed to save the domestic shipping industry and
the broader maritime economy, the Merchant Marine Act ultimately did little to prevent
the ongoing decay along the American waterfront.
Limited changes in maritime policy from previous administrations mirrored
continuity in Nixon’s defense policy from his predecessors. Unbridled defense spending
during the first years of the Cold War, coupled with steadily increasing outlays for the
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Vietnam Conflict, proved unsustainable by 1969. Meanwhile, Nixon’s Defense
Secretary, Melvin Laird, found notoriety during the mid-1960s as a congressional critic
of McNamara era management principles.325 Upon assuming office, Laird continued to
use systems analysis and other McNamara era metrics. Laird acknowledged the
inevitability of defense cuts and attempted to reduce costs where possible. Continued
escalation in Vietnam during the first years of Nixon’s term prompted Laird to propose
further reductions to NATO’s conventional force in continental Europe. Laird’s calculus
in conventional reductions was intended to forestall demands for substantial cuts in
spending coming from members of Congress and the general public.326 Laird’s attempts
to avoid reduced spending ran counter to President Nixon’s demand to maintain a large
conventional force in Europe. Nixon intended to calm NATO allies, such as West
Germany. Moreover, Nixon’s idea of maintaining a large conventional force in Europe
was part of a larger strategy to signal the Soviets that Vietnam had not become too much
of a distraction for the United States.327
With countervailing opinions regarding spending cuts and conventional forces in
Europe, Laird delegated responsibility for maintaining the budget to Deputy Secretary of
Defense David Packard. By appointing Hewlett-Packard’s cofounder and a corporate
executive who advocated new technology and human performance management, Laird
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hoped Packard would streamline the DoD while maintaining defense commitments.328
The emphasis placed on finding private sector solutions to public sector issues with the
installation of Packard at DoD mimicked the selection of McNamara and his staff of
analysts. Later in life, Packard recollected that the reason for his selection as Deputy
Secretary was his interest and specialization in “management…I thought that some of my
management ideas were good and we could apply them to the Defense Department.”329
Packard’s determination to reform defense procurement meant adapting the pre-existing
framework of systems analysis for a new administration. Rather than doing away with the
quantified measurement of spending and human performance that had been criticized
throughout the McNamara years, Packard’s reform of systems analysis and the
McNamara-era PPBS system ensured its permanence in defense spending.330
In addition to retaining systems analysis from the McNamara Pentagon, Packard’s
first budget provided for nearly every contingency, which was another holdover from the
previous administrations. Anticipated defense cuts, the reduction in NATO conventional
contributions, and Nixon’s demand for “all things to all” allies approach to defense needs
complicated planning for Fiscal Year (FY) 1970. As a result of so many demands for a
lower budget, Packard’s first budget chose which programs could be deferred to later
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fiscal years.331 Defense contracts awarded to districts with senior legislators remained
intact. Rather than reforming the system as claimed, the vast majority of pre-Nixon
defense programs continued unabated and fully funded.332 Recollecting his first DoD
budgeting process, Packard noted that his time in the private sector provided him the
vantage point and the tools to select deferrable programs. In his own words, Packard
noted that because of “lower budgets, we should get more military capability out of more
modern technology.” 333
Packard’s belief in technological and corporate innovation informed his approach
to defense maritime policy during his reform of DoD budgets. Of all the programs left
untouched in Packard’s FY 1970 budget, the first two programs deferred were
shipbuilding programs and sealift requirements.

In addition, in order to support new

technological innovations or research and development, Packard stated that civilian
workers employed by the DoD or under contract could also face layoffs.334 Rather than
cancelling large and expensive programs, naval and sealift improvements scheduled to
occur in 1970 took place in FY 1971 and in later years instead.
Similarly in 1970, and in spite of Nixon pledges to preserve the maritime
industry, private sector solutions and innovations informed a massive reorganization of
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military ocean transportation. Started by the Johnson administration as a program to
attune sealift programs to technological innovations in the shipping industry,
implementation came about under David Packard’s management at DoD. The concepts
of consolidation, centralization, and standardization present at the onset of the McNamara
reforms in 1961 and 1962 survived well into the 1970s with the creation of single
manager assignments at DoD. Mostly related to supply and procurement matters, the
concept of the single manager assignment for logistics came from a commission chaired
by then-Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance. The Vance Commission’s
recommendations called for standardization and consolidation of all DoD logistics issues
in 1962.335 The logistics standardization effort, however, continued well after 1962. By
1967, Vance rose to Deputy Secretary of Defense and offered a plethora of suggestions
related to the centralization and standardization of ocean transportation. Combined with
a 1967 DoD order to standardize use of the cargo container, Vance’s reorganization of
the MSTS and ocean transportation in general came as a result of a directive from Robert
McNamara to “use the most effective utilization of strategic movement means and
transportation resources, both now and in the future.” According to systems analysts,
lowering costs with the cargo container became the most important factor in any
decision.336
1970 marked another watershed year in federal and defense maritime policy. The
MSTS, re-christened the Military Sealift Command (MSC) in August of 1970, became
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merely a supply agency. The name change of the command, a recommendation by the
commanding officer of the MSTS, Vice Admiral Arthur Gralla, reflected the broader
changes in ocean shipping.337 Along the docks of both commercial and military ports,
the tens of thousands of longshoremen contracted with the MSC and other shippers
feared their inevitable decline. In spite of warnings from ILA members on the
consequences of “Container Fever,” the private sector, shipping authorities, and even the
Department of Defense could not resist the charms of automation and lower financial
costs.338

The cost to the maritime industry, however, proved to be the beginning of the

end for U.S.-flagged shipping. The decline in shipping mirrored a decline in maritime
labor for national emergencies. The reason for the collapse in progress during the late
1960s and into the 1970s went beyond cost lowering measures and the allure of new
technology. Politicos and appointees became convinced that the private sector’s methods
of management and efficient use of resources could best combat out of control defense
budgets. This led to the installation of private sector figures such as Robert McNamara
and David Packard at the DoD. Metrics introduced during the McNamara years, such as
systems analysis, remained long after his departure. In spite of attempts to provide for
defense inclusive of all necessary components, such as new technology and labor, the
organizational culture at DoD and within the broader federal government became overly
aligned with private sector methods. In turn, the belief in efficient management and new
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technology, including automation and the cargo container, only grew stronger within the
government’s organizational culture into the 1970s, the 1980s, and beyond.

121

“ASSURING AN ORDERLY FLOW”: DEREGULATION, DEFENSE SPENDING,
AND THE AUTOMATION OF LOGISTICS, 1971-1980
In October 1971, another strike by the Atlantic and Gulf Coast chapters of the
International Longshoreman’s Association (ILA) prompted military officials to begin
discussing alternatives to relying on Atlantic and Gulf Coast ports. The ILA ordinarily
honored a preexisting commitment to keep working military terminals in spite of a
general strike against the private sector.339 Tasked with ensuring the regular shipment of
cargoes from military and commercial terminals to U.S. bases in Europe and Vietnam,
the Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service (MTMTS) coordinated the
continental United States (CONUS) positioning of outbound equipment. The MTMTS
coordinated with the newly formed Military Sealift Command (MSC) as well as with
several other agencies and commands involved in defense logistics. Rather than
sounding an alarm over the strike of 1971, Major General Clarence Lang, commander of
the MTMTS, saw “no immediate need to shift cargoes” from commercial terminals to
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military terminals in order to bypass the strike. 340 Lang’s lack of urgency for an Atlantic
coast strike included “ongoing supply operations in Southeast Asia” occupying the bulk
of the U.S. flagged fleet and no emergency need for the “transfer of ships to the Atlantic
theater.”341
In September 1977, a similar ILA strike prompted the renamed Military Traffic
Management Command (MTMC) to investigate alternatives to commercial ports. The
MTMC ’s commander, Major General H.R. Del Mar, promised “that impact of the strike
on DoD cargo would be minimal” because the MTMC had already arranged to remove
cargoes from private terminals and only use military terminals in the Atlantic and Gulf
ports of New York, Portsmouth, VA, and New Orleans.342 The reasoning for the
coordinated pre-strike movement of containers and break bulk cargo to military terminals
came from the Judge Advocate for the MTMC, Colonel William Vinet. Vinet argued that
“past history and extenuating circumstances” allowed for the command to bypass ports
under strike.343 In spite of no ongoing operations in the Vietnam War or an emergency in
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the Atlantic, the MTMC in 1977 purposefully relocated materials to “assure an orderly
flow of DoD [Department of Defense] containerized cargo.”344
The decision of the MTMC to bypass the ILA strike of 1977 reflected not only an
avoidance of a labor strike, but also a changing attitude towards workers during the
1970s. This chapter will trace the reinforcement of management theories as an ideology
transmitted within the DoD, but also as a justification for accelerating federal
participation in rapidly automating ocean shipping between 1971 and 1980. The
transition to a new defense posture during the twilight of U.S. involvement in the
Vietnam War did not represent a new strategic tack; instead, souring congressional and
public opinion on military spending during the 1960s led to steep declines in defense
budgets. As one of many methods to cope with a 38 percent reduction in military
spending between 1969 and 1975, the remedy of choice included metrics introduced
nearly a decade earlier.345 A series of mathematical probability studies, which measured
the effectiveness of defense spending known broadly as “systems analysis,” became a
popular instrument of budgeting during the tenure of Robert McNamara at DoD.
McNamara used quantitative analysis at Ford Motor Company and brought those
methods to the DoD. Once implemented by “efficiency experts” drawn from the
corporate sector, systems analysis factored nearly every potential financial cost in the
procurement of defense systems. Unforeseen costs or increases, such as for workers’
wages or benefits, were not included in the model and as a result cost overruns ran
rampant. Billions of dollars in unexpected costs and highly publicized expensive and un-
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deployed defense systems confounded the statistical models, especially during the
American involvement in the Vietnam War.346 Following McNamara’s departure and the
installation of new management at DoD during the presidencies of Lyndon Johnson,
Richard Nixon, and Gerald Ford, systems analysis remained ingrained in the approach to
defense budgetary matters.347
Continuity with McNamara era defense reforms came as a byproduct of what
political scientist Graham Allison described as the Organizational Process Model.
Allison argued that an organization, its methods, and its mission ultimately conformed to
the personnel who occupied its high offices.348 The DoD’s decisions during the
McNamara era and beyond represented an organization staffed by those who brought
their private sector skill sets to government work. DoD’s procurement and management
processes functioned more like a corporation than a federal department.349 In spite of
pledges from Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, his subordinates, and successors at DoD
to discontinue using statistical modelling, systems analysis remained regardless personnel
and policy.
Appointees and bureaucrats at DoD during the 1970s included practitioners of
systems analysis and managers from the private sector.350 Members of the Nixon, Ford,
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and even Carter administrations came from the private sector. During the decade, reform
efforts at DoD usually tackled procurement or budgeting reductions with more statistical
modelling or a popular corporate method of the era, “streamlining.” In the case of federal
agencies, DoD appointees from the private sector, such as David Packard, Barry Shillito,
and Lawrence Korb, proposed mergers of commands with seemingly fragmented or
duplicated responsibilities. With Streamlining, or eliminating superfluous functions of
merged agencies, administrators at DoD hoped to maximize budget woes due to
congressional cuts or inflation. 351 Among the first agencies targeted for reforms and
streamlining were the DoD’s maritime logistics commands, the Military Sealift
Command (MSC) and the Military Transportation Management Command (MTMC).
Both agencies existed as freestanding logistics commands, MSC for the Navy and the
MTMC for the Army. Historian Mason Schaefer described the separate commands as
“fragmented transportation empires” with duplicated efforts in terms of ship
procurement, chartering, and separate ocean terminals for outbound cargo.352 An interservice rivalry coupled with members of Congress seeking to preserve local jobs in their
districts ultimately preserved the duplicated, inefficient multiple commands. Rather than
merging the agencies and eliminating the bloated bureaucracies, the DoD deepened its
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commitment to containerization.353 By the end of the 1970s, each service depended on
automation, cargo containers, and private sectors methods of managing their resources.
Restructuring of the DoD’s transportation agencies in the 1970s mirrored a
management revolution within the broader defense establishment. Proper management,
however, became an amorphous instrument of maximizing available resources after postVietnam War reductions in defense budgets.354 According to Deputy Secretary of
Defense David Packard in 1970 and 1971, management meant a preservation of
McNamara era quantitative targeting of inefficiencies or “systems analysis.” Moreover,
Packard argued that because of “lower budgets, [the DoD] should get more military
capability out of more modern technology” through efficient “management of the federal
government.”355 To McNamara, Packard, and the members of the defense establishment
from the private sector, “proper management” meant using business models to reform
and streamline a bloated, inefficient DoD.356
According to Packard, “proper management” was really a system known as
“management by objective” (MBO). MBO was Packard’s preferred method of
conducting business while CEO at Hewlett-Packard and at the DoD. Packard defined

353

Ibid, 17.

U.S. Government, The Budget of the United States Government, 1969, (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1969), 122.; Lawrence Korb, The Fall and Rise of the Pentagon, (Westport, CT,
Greenwood Press, 1979), 26-29. Government spending inflation, which began in the mid-1960s, reached a
crescendo in the mid-1970s. The budget figures are in 1975 dollars.
354

David Packard, interviewed by Albert Goldberg and Maurice Matloff, transcript, November 9, 1987,
Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC, 12.
355

Ibid, 12. Definition of proper management, is to train subordinates to cutting expenses and
inefficiencies at all costs. According to Packard and to Peter Drucker, absolute ideological and team
conformity to the needs of the designated mission are required.
356

127

MBO as “a system where overall objectives are clearly stated and agreed upon and which
gives people the flexibility to work toward those goal in their own areas of responsibility.
It is the philosophy of decentralization in management and the essence of the free
enterprise system.”357 Packard’s methodology of reform drew primary inspiration from
the management theories of Peter Drucker. At the core of Drucker’s theories of
management, perhaps none was as important as “management by objective.” According
to Drucker, “management by objective” meant focusing on a goal by targeting areas of
inefficiency. During the McNamara era DoD, MBO was known as systems analysis.358
Packard’s belief in MBO and Drucker’s methods bordered on semi-religious fervor.
According to management expert Jim Collins, Packard’s devotion to and liberal use of
Drucker’s concepts “conjured an image of Packard giving management sermons with a
classic Drucker text in hand.”359 The “objective” for Packard was to transform the DoD
into an organization that ran more like a business.
Commitment to “proper management” methods as a tool for government reform
shaped implementation of budget reductions and the professional development of
uniformed personnel in the DoD. Naval officers’ public discussion of maritime policy in
the 1960s usually argued in favor of a maintaining a large merchant fleet in case of
emergency.360 Budget austerity during the 1970s, however, coupled with a DoD wide
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belief in proper management as a panacea for maximizing reduced funding levels
justified a reform of policy and personnel. Initiated by David Packard in 1971 and
continued in the subsequent decade, management theories such as MBO found new life in
government sector educational institutions. Within the DoD, Packard established several
new programs, including the Defense System Management School, which instructed
bureaucrats in management theories and applicability to acquisition reform.361 In
addition, Packard insisted that curriculum include management theory as core courses for
advanced officers attending post-graduate institutions such as the Naval War College
(NWC) in Newport, Rhode Island. Packard’s reasoning for reforming institutional
culture came from his observations of the organizational process within the DoD.
According to Packard, “…it is a big bureaucracy, and the services have a long tradition,
especially the Navy. You’re not going to revolutionize it overnight.”362 By 1972, the
NWC focused on management as a part of a larger “new approach to professional
education.”363 From these courses on management, military officers and planners
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acquired an appreciation for the private sector’s methods of budgetary control and worker
productivity.364
“Proper management” ultimately succeeded in altering not only doctrine within
the DoD, but also the totality of federal maritime policy in the 1970s. Between 1971 and
1980, the adoption of near total containerization by private shippers became a reality in
nearly every port in the continental United States. Concurrently, maritime labor both at
sea and along the docks faced rapid obsolescence as a result of automation. As an
example, the ILA’s membership in the port of New York in 1970 numbered nearly
50,000 longshoremen. By 1980, that number was under 15,000. The ILA suffered
similar job losses at ports along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts during the 1970s. According
to ILA Executive Vice President Benny Holland, “we lost more than half our men due to
automation.”365 Similar declines in laborers took place aboard the dwindling fleet of
U.S.-flagged ships. Beyond automation and containerization, Soviet merchant shipping’s
expansion into global sea-lanes contributing to the collapse of the U.S. flagged fleet.
Increased competition and automation accelerated American maritime industry’s decline
during the 1970s.
Historical studies of 1970s illustrated several links between economic malaise,
budget austerity, and the decline of maritime labor due to automation and deregulation.
Bruce Schulman’s The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and
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Politics discussed the decline of the pro-labor consensus, which guided policy and
elections in the post-war period. Schulman argued that the 1970s witnessed a transition
from faith in the federal government’s ability in solving social ills to a belief in private
sector solutions as the cure for economic decline. The downsizing of the federal budget
left enormous gaps in sectors of the economy previously reserved for the government
sector. According to Schulman, the mid-1970s witnessed a “diverting of resources and
initiative from the public to the private sector.” 366 Similar to Schulman, Jefferson Cowie
chronicled the twilight of organized labor during the era of “stagflation” and
deindustrialization in Staying Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class.
Cowie used the collapse of organized labor as an illustration of the American economy’s
declension in the 1970s and the ascent of pro-business and deregulatory legislative
initiatives. One glaring omission in Cowie’s analysis is the international causes of
economic growth or contraction in the era of globalization.367 Thomas Borstlemann’s
description of a global 1970s included aspects of international financial and economic
connections to American decline during the decade. Borstlemann’s discussion of the oil
shocks of 1973 and 1979, as well as the internationalization of manufacturing markets,
illustrated his story of widening economic inequality by the latter half of the decade and
into the 1980s. Borstlemann connected the decline of the Keynesian programs during
the 1970s to rising individualism and a rejection of collective improvement through
government. Similarly, a development of foreign produced consumer goods catered to
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the individual’s self-improvement, not the group or reliance on the state. Borstlemann
argued that “confidence in the mechanisms of supply and demand replace confidence in
the government.” 368
Several studies of the defense establishment similarly indicated the popularity
privatization within the government sector during the 1970s. Defense contracts and
solutions for potential security concerns in the future guided expenditures from the early
days of the Cold War into the 1970s. Paul A.C. Koistinen’s multi-volume history of the
military-industrial complex culminated with his study State of War: The Political
Economy of American Warfare, 1945-2011. Koistinen discussed the growth of the
defense contracting sector throughout the 1950s and 1960s.369 In separate sections of his
monograph, Koistinen argued that a budgeting trend toward privatized defense research
and development contributed to growth in large consulting and contracting firms.370
Organizations such as RAND Corporation and similar think tanks or federally sponsored
conferences conceived or argued in favor, of private sector solutions to public sector
issues. Trusting expert opinions from the private sector, congressional appropriators or
political appointees provided more funds for private sector contracts.371 <dms.
Contracting with private firms for traditional internal DoD roles, however, took
off during the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations of the 1970s. In particular,
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Koistinen described the defense industry of the 1970s as a consolidating field where few
corporations obtained the vast majority of defense contracts.372 Even in the era of
defense austerity during the 1970s, Koistinen argued that the DoD awarded Fortune 500
companies 75 percent of defense contracts related to ammunition, food, and other defense
products. Conglomeration and limited contract distribution only intensified during the
defense buildup of the later 1970s.373 Koistinen, however, failed to include logistics or
transportation defense contracts. With an industry and funding reservoir as vast as the
Military-Industrial Complex, one could hardly fault Koistinen for concentrating on large
scale contracts related to aerospace, tanks, or naval weaponry.374 The omission of
technology, logistics, and transportation related issues from the defense-oriented
historiography led Smithsonian historian Thomas C. Lassman to argue in favor of
broadening the discussion of the DoD and industry. Lassman called for deeper
investigation into direct and indirect results of military directed and funded innovation
during the Cold War.375 This study broadens the concept of direct and indirect
consequences following defense funding decisions from the 1960s through the 1990s.
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Recent scholarship of the transportation industry identified broad-based support in
favor of the private sector’s management of the market in the 1970s. Shane Hamilton’s
Trucking Country: The Road to America’s Wal-Mart Economy discussed a rebellion by
truckers against road transportation regulations during what he dubs a “free market
revolution” during the Nixon, Ford, Carter, and early Reagan administrations. Hamilton
noted that a belief in allowing the private sector to manage the economy permeated the
public discourse of the 1970s regardless of political affiliation.376 Hamilton argued that
the collapse of the Keynesian consensus during the late 1960s and 1970s marked the
transition from a state-centric, well-regulated economy to a lower-priced privatization
movement. By default, any individual employed in the transportation sector ultimately
became another cost to be minimized by what Hamilton calls “lean and mean” business
strategies.377

Similarly, the maritime transportation sector faced enormous upheaval in

the 1970s. According to Andrew Gibson and Arthur Donovan in The Abandoned Ocean:
A History of United States Maritime Strategy, the 1970’s was the “approaching end” of
the American dominance of ocean commerce.378 The U.S.-flagged fleet, which had
dominated the world’s oceans in decades past, accounted for only 5 percent of global
shipping by 1970 and continued to fall during the decade. Gibson and Donovan
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highlighted the steep decline of maritime workers and members of unions such as AFLCIO’s Seafarers Union and the International Longshoreman’s Association (ILA).
Missing from Gibson and Donovan’s work, however, is a critical analysis of
deregulation’s hand in decimating maritime labor and infrastructure.379
Deregulation and automation depopulated the ships and docks of the shipping
economy. Marc Levinson’s discussion of the 1970s in The Box: How the Shipping
Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger covers trends of
automation and unemployment along the docks. Waterfront workers suffered more than
most during the decade. Levinson quoted ILA President Teddy Gleason from 1959
when the union leader argued that automation could reduce “longshoreman employment
by 30 percent.”380 Levinson added that between 1963 and 1976, the real job losses were
closer to 75 percent.381 Levinson argued new technology and innovations supplanted the
need for some laborers. The myth of mariner criminality, however, accelerated the
replacement of even more workers with automation technologies. Rather than
management looking to alter worker behavior or productivity, automation replaced
alleged mobsters and thieves aboard ships and along the piers.
The goal of this chapter is twofold. The following illustrates popular trends of
privatization and deregulation as an ideology within the federal and defense maritime
sector. This chapter discusses the defense maritime sector during the 1970s as well as the
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cornerstones of legislation and policy decisions of the 1980s and early 1990s. Historians
of the 1970s, in their studies of the defense or maritime sectors, rarely acknowledge
private sector deregulation in their analyses. Similarly, scholars of deregulation rarely
discuss defense or maritime policy. This chapter aims to bridge the historiographic gap
between economic stagnation and deregulation’s effect on defense maritime sector. By
analyzing and deciphering statements and decisions of policy experts such as Packard,
Andrew Goodpaster, Jacques Gansler, and others, this chapter provides illustrations of
prevalent attitudes in the policy making circles in Washington and beyond. Through
examining the words and decisions of planners and politicos, one can decipher changes
related to spending, management, and technology, whether in the general government or
along the waterfront. Defense budget cuts led planners to conceive of new methods for
maximizing dwindling funding options during the 1970s. Automation and deregulation
became obvious alternatives with little consideration for the consequences.
The unbridled defense spending of the 1960s coupled with a souring
congressional opinion of the American involvement in the Vietnam War led to marked
reductions in military budgets by the early 1970s. Extraordinary stories of waste and
corruption in DoD and the broader defense industry became highly publicized in the early
1970s as well. During the Vietnam War, hundreds of thousands of troops and billions of
dollars in sophisticated equipment failed to end the North Vietnamese will to fight.
Instead of striking high-value targets or even cities, bombers saturated the jungles and
rural areas of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia with tens of thousands of tons of bombs.382
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<That implies that there were high-value targets to strike. What were they? The Navy
found little use for its expensive equipment. The fleet, designed to counter the Soviets
for control of the open ocean, operated off Vietnam throughout most of the war and
conducted little more than support operations. The nuclear powered super carrier
Enterprise was state of the art by every measure but only launched aircraft that bombed
small bridges. The majority of the non-carrier fleet had little to do beyond acting as
support ships.383 The totality of Cold War-era conventional weapons failed to topple the
agrarian North Vietnamese. The increasing death toll among American troops and local
civilians during the Vietnam War reduced domestic support for the war by 1968 and
1969. Moreover, the U.S. government’s errors, overestimations, and lies to the general
public became widely known with publication of the “Pentagon Papers” by the New York
Times in 1971. As a study commissioned by Robert McNamara in 1967, the leaked
documents from the DoD enumerated the insurmountable challenges of propping up the
South Vietnamese government and the ineffectiveness of nearly every American policy
in Southeast Asia.384
Budget cuts followed the political firestorm in the aftermath of Vietnam Warrelated revelations coupled with a severe economic downturn in 1970 and 1971. Defense
cuts and general federal austerity became one of the new realities planners dealt with in
the early 1970s. In 1969, the first year of Richard Nixon’s presidency, the defense
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budget was $118 billion. By 1974, DoD received the inflationary equivalent of $74
billion, a reduction of nearly 38 percent.385
In light of the reduced budgets, the DoD requested consultation from academic
and corporate experts for maintaining American defense commitments with less money.
Sponsored by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) at the Department of
State, professors of management, economics, public policy, and labor studies composed
articles advising on methods of budget reduction. From 1970 to 1973, these reports
argued for organizational and spending changes in order to blunt the negative
consequences of reduced spending on the overall economy.386 Graham Allison of
Harvard University was one of the more notable contributors to the conferences and
publications. Known for his “organizational process” model of policy analysis, Allison’s
influence sprang from his public policy classes at Harvard and his contributions to think
tank and organizational studies during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.387 Allison’s
examination of the organizational composition of the DoD’s bureaucracy prescribed how
best to acclimate both civilians and military personnel to changing financial winds. After
extolling the virtues of “systems analysis, cost analysis, operations research, PPBS
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(Planning-Programming-Budgeting-System) etc.,” as a metric of effective management,
Allison offered solutions to new defense spending reductions.388 Allison instructed the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to begin implementing a system of rewards and
education for DoD personnel to change the new organizational priorities of lower
budgets. Perhaps more importantly, Allison argued for the professional military
education institutions “testing the effectiveness of various [management] techniques with
soldiers of various backgrounds.”389 Much of Allison’s article called for the military to
find legitimacy in a post-Vietnam War era of decreased trust in government institutions.
Allison ultimately called for a transition within the DoD, which would foster an
organizational culture responsible for leaner, more effective spending. Allison’s new
paradigm for the DoD focused on “what outputs [government officials] are trying to
achieve, and how expenditures relate to these outputs.”390 In short, Allison called for a
greater emphasis on systems analysis and enforcing the proper use of similar
management methods through the military’s education system.391
Following Allison’s suggestions, professional education in the DoD focused
almost exclusively on amorphous “management” courses offered for advanced officers
and federal civilians employees. According to Nathan Brodsky, director for Education
Programs and Management Training at the DoD, the courses were developed to provide
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“specialized education and training which will assure skillful professional performance
for those personnel engaged in management functions.”392 The DoD management
training program included “Defense International Logistics Management” at Fort Lee,
Virginia. The course description states that students will “develop an appreciation for
planning, programming, and implementing international logistics activities.”393 The
course included “study, evaluation, and analysis of current problems in the program
management” of logistics issues.394 With an education built to instilling the cheapest and
most efficient way of supporting the DoD’s mission, logisticians became attuned to the
private sector’s meaning of “proper management” for the logistics of supply chains and
means of delivery.
U.S. and international logistics in the early 1970s, however, occupied a rapidly
changing ocean landscape and economic situation. The long post-World War II financial
and economic boom times, at least in the U.S. domestic marketplace, began to wind down
by the early 1970s. Inflation due to an overabundance of federal dollars in the broader
economy cut into the spending power of the average American consumer and
corporations. President Nixon and his administration attempted to stem the flow of
recessionary inflation, known as stagflation, with direct action. As a result, price controls
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and interest rate increases from the Federal Reserve board characterized the first years of
the 1970s.395
Perhaps no early 1970s policy decision affected the international market and the
Bretton Woods institutions more than the “Nixon shock.” The Bretton Woods system,
the U.S.-led arbiter of global financial markets, currency valuation, and international
credit, had been in crisis since the mid-1960s. The departures of European central banks
from the system due to perceived American economic imperialism fractured the power of
the system. A key attribute of the system, the convertibility of a currency to gold valued
in U.S. dollars, devalued international currencies by comparison and led to the departure
of France, West Germany, and other large economies.396 The Nixon administration,
looking to wrestle control of a dire economic situation and a rapidly devaluing dollar
from the clutches of the global market, ended gold convertibility. The economic ripples
on a global level from the “Nixon shock” led scholars, such as future chairman of the
Federal Reserve Paul Volker, to declare the Bretton Woods system dead.397
Coupled with the “Nixon shock”, supply issues in global commodities such as oil
cascaded into a negative effect on the American economy. The Nixon administration’s
support of Israel during the Yom Kippur War of 1973 led to an oil embargo by Arab
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petroleum exporters against the United States.398 Not only did the “oil shock” of 1973
and early 1974 harm an already slowing U.S. economy, but it also greatly affected the
transportation sector. In the United States, gas shortages contributed to the damage done
by inflation, recession, and an inflated currency after the “Nixon shock.” American
manufacturing, unable to export goods due to inflation, suffered further due to the oil
shock.399
Maritime transportation, which enjoyed a bit of a renaissance in the early 1970s,
suffered more than the rest of the economy after the dual shocks. The Merchant Marine
Act of 1970, which provided subsides to build ships in the United States, led to a
temporary construction boom and a rebalancing of the global merchant fleet.400 With the
twin shocks of 1971 and 1973, operating and construction subsidies could not keep up
with steep decreases during the economic crisis and the oil embargo. U.S. flagged
shipping firms were already reeling from currency imbalances cutting into profitability
for overseas voyages as well as rising competition from foreign flagged vessels. U.S.
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shipping firms retreated to Jones Act trade and mothballed the bulk of the U.S. flagged
ships in order to survive the disastrous early 1970s.401
The loss of capacity in U.S. flagged shipping posed a concern for defense and
civilian planners, even in an era of defense austerity. As early as 1971, Andrew Gibson,
Undersecretary of Commerce of Maritime Affairs and Federal Maritime Administrator,
warned of an insufficient merchant fleet for wartime operations. According to Gibson’s
testimony before the House Merchant Marine Committee, the “the entire dry-cargo (nonoil) fleet expected to be available in 1975 under the most optimistic assumptions
regarding fleet growth may not be able to sustain the full requirements of a major
contingency.”402 The Maritime Administration specified that it needed at least 500 ships
with a cargo capacity of nearly 25 million tons to support a long term sealift from the
Continental United States (CONUS) to European and Asian ports. The rosiest of
estimates for the 1975 target found that only 300 ships with a capacity of 17 million tons
could be fielded by the federal government.403 The twin shocks of 1973 only exacerbated
the problems of sustaining the U.S. flagged fleet for emergency operations. The oil
shock, which drove nearly half of the U.S. flagged cargo and oil fleet into storage yards,
also resulted in bankruptcy for American and European shipyards by the mid-1970s.404
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The security concerns related to the demise of U.S. flagged cargo fleet only
worsened with renewed shipping competition from the Soviet Union. From the mid1960s onward, the Soviet merchant fleet seized market share left by the demise of the
U.S. merchant fleet. By the early 1970s, the Soviets attempted parity with the United
States in the Atlantic as a merchant flag of preference. 405 Aside from merchant fleet
competition, the two powers cooperated on the high seas as well. Détente between the
U.S. and U.S.S.R. included grain shipments as a token of peace in the early 1970s. As an
aspect of the deal between the Soviets and the United States, grain shipments from U.S.
ports were loaded on both American and Soviet ships bound for Russian ports. After
acquiescence by the ILA, which refused to load “Red ships” during the Cold War, the
Soviet merchant fleet called at American ports once again.406 From the early 1970s
onward, the Soviets actively attempted to replace the U.S. fleet in the Atlantic by offering
cut rate service on the most heavily trafficked sea routes between North America and
Europe. The Soviet fleet, which had been an anemic imitation of the U.S. merchant fleet
in the early 1960s, became a fully capable competitor and challenger by the mid-1970s.
In 1971, Soviet merchant ships carried 260,000 tons of cargo from American ports. By
1976, this number jumped to nearly 5.1 million tons.407 The Soviet merchant marine
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intended to increase its market share at U.S. ports and compete with U.S. flagged
shipping.
The limited supply of U.S. flagged ships and defense budget cuts compelled
government officials to embrace automation and the container. Private shipping firms
surviving the U.S. flagged demise and the twin shocks of the 1970s did so by relying
upon automated container service. While container-majority shipping lines survived the
treacherous economic climate of the early 1970s, established U.S. flagged shipping firms
could not compete without heavy subsidization from the Maritime Administration or
federal contracts. Successful firms, such as container inventor Malcom McLean’s SeaLand Corporation, Mediterranean Shipping Company, and Evergreen Marine, all
operated without government subsidies. The majority of their business came from
containerized trade.408
As defense austerity caused a reevaluation of spending and surviving shipping
firms containerized, planners and politicos looked to similar means as a solution for
maritime transportation. The obvious financial benefits of containerization made
headlines in newspapers and popular magazines throughout the 1960s. Headlines
exclaiming “containership race is on!” and articles proclaiming the benefits of modular
intermodal cargo movement with little human input informed the public that the “future
of cargo movement is now.”409 Similarly, the newly established Military Sealift
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Command (MSC) and other defense logistics commands began evaluating the role of new
technologies related to the cargo container by the early 1970s. As one of the benefits of
the container included automated storage of either full or empty boxes, the MSC and the
Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) contracted for the construction of
automated cranes and container storage facilities. By 1970, popular knowledge of
automation in logistics found its way to the halls of Congress. John Stennis, chair of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, implored the MTMC to “continue to investigate
methods of automated container storage and loading.”410 While the construction of these
automated terminals proved to be too expensive in the early 1970’s era of defense cuts,
the MTMC still looked to private sector’s model of automation as a solution.
“Development of container facilities by private industry has far exceeded expectations,”
explained Captain J.T. Bishoff, the deputy commander of the MTMC. Following the
lead of the private sector, the MTMC modified berths at their military ocean terminals to
begin handling automated containerships. At Oakland, California, on the Pacific Coast,
and Sunny Point, North Carolina, on the Atlantic Coast, the Military Ocean Terminals
provided an outlet for supplies bound for U.S. missions overseas.411
Containerization and demand for privatization of the DoD’s cargo needs
continued to develop, especially for European contingencies. While the Pacific supply
chain for the DoD was already well developed as a result of the Vietnam War, the
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Atlantic remained relatively undeveloped. As Vietnam War or Pacific Rim resupply
missions occupied most ships under the control of the MSC, the imbalance in the U.S.
strategic position vis a vis maritime support became obvious. Andrew Goodpaster, the
commander of U.S. European Forces grew concerned about the lack of MSC ships in the
Atlantic, as well as the overall imbalance in strategic obligations. In correspondence with
Clarence Lang, the commander of the MTMC, Goodpaster favored automating the cargo
terminals under the control of the Army.412 More importantly, Goodpaster raised the
possibility of using foreign flagged or subcontracted ships in the Atlantic to move heavy
equipment such as tanks and other wheeled vehicles. Lang sympathized, but informed
Goodpaster that “there is no indication that DOD intends to lift the restriction on
government sponsorship of the shipment...”413 Lang noted that there was a backlog of
vehicles, both military and civilian, at Military Ocean Terminals in Philadelphia and
Bayonne, New Jersey, due to a “lack of U.S. flagged shipping available at either port.”414
The collapse of the U.S. maritime industry proved an obstacle that could, according to the
commanders of the MTMC and the U.S. Army in Europe, be overcome by automation or
removing regulatory obstacles.
Federal civilian maritime policy makers drew inspiration from new technology
and automation as a panacea for the declining U.S. presence in world shipping. The
Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) and the Maritime Administration (MARAD)
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facilitated infrastructure and legislative changes to correct American presence on the high
seas and for defense purposes.

New technology, such as nuclear-powered cargo ships,

failed with the NV Savannah experiment of the 1960s. Shipping profits could never
offset the high costs of nuclear reactors when basic steam propulsion offered similar
speeds for cargo ships.415 Similar failed innovations included the expensive one-off
construction of H.S. Dennison, a hydrofoil ship. Hydrofoil ships skimmed the surface of
the water allowed these vessels to travel at very high speed. MARAD paid for the H.S.
Dennison in order to test technologies for a “fast deployment logistics” fleet that was
never constructed.416
The government’s approach to the cargo container came from the pressure of the
private market innovations rather than investigations and experiments sponsored by
MARAD. According to transportation expert Herman Mertens, containerization
overtook “large scale federal initiative or sponsorship.”417 In order to get ahead of the
innovation curve, federal administrators attempted to smooth obstacles to growth in
“intermodality,” such as inefficient, unautomated terminals. According to Mertens, the
federal government began to subsidize financing for automated ocean terminals in key
ports.418
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As a result of transportation industry changes and innovations made by the early
1970s, the role of the federal regulations along the roads, rails, and seaways changed to
promote trade. Throughout the 1960s, the railroad industry suffered through anemic
profits and corporate consolidation. Loss of passenger revenue in both the railroad and
maritime industries caused waves of bankruptcies and mergers throughout the late 1960s
and early 1970s. The dire situation in the rail industry led to a government takeover and
heavy subsidization of passenger service in 1973.419 The U.S. maritime industry,
however, failed to receive such a bailout. Critics of federal subsidies, such as Secretary
of Transportation John Volpe, argued that containerization and international competition
from foreign flagged ships balanced the market. In short, Volpe viewed increased
shipping competition and innovations such as automation as beneficial to the broader
economy.420 Through most of the 1960s and into the 1970s, the Interstate Commerce
Commission and the Federal Maritime Commission regulated the rates of cargo transport
within the borders and seaways of the United States. In 1974, Chair of the Federal
Maritime Commission Helen Bentley, however, argued in favor of sweeping away dual
agency regulation on intermodal forms of freight or cargo.421 Citing the overwhelming
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regulatory burden on individual containers travelling by land, rail, and sea modes,
Bentley stated that deregulation could “cut through the quagmire which stifles the fast,
efficient, and unrestricted flow of cargo.”422 Bentley’s expertise in ocean transportation
as former maritime editor for the Baltimore Sun lent weight to her testimony before the
House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. While calling for a reduction of
regulatory authority, Bentley argued for simplified or reduced tariff rates on imported or
exported goods. The simplified procedure for regulations was designed to correct the
failing export economy. According to Bentley, “the tariff will be filed under one set of
regulatory standards…which are designed to promote U.S. foreign commerce.”423
In spite of an attempt by federal maritime officials to keep pace with
developments related to containerization, the ocean transportation agencies disagreed
with the rapidly globalizing approach to regulating trade. In 1974 at the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva, Chairwoman Bentley
reiterated a long held U.S. commitment to liberalizing global trade. Liberalized global
trade, a cornerstone of the Bretton Woods system, facilitated rapid economic growth in
the U.S. following the Second World War. By 1974, however, cheaper imports and
inflation-era expensive exports wrought havoc on American manufacturing.424
Nevertheless, Bentley reminded the delegates at UNCTAD that “artificial attempts to
manage shares of trade which ignore economic realities and the legitimate interests of
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shippers as well as ship owners run the risk of political confrontations on the one hand
and economic failure on the other.”425 A rapidly changing ocean economy compounded
the financial crises for American shippers.
Due to an overall crisis of confidence in the U.S. during the mid-1970s, belief in
free trade offered relief at a time of economic quagmire. Price controls and protective
tariffs on manufacturing prevailed during the Nixon administration as an attempt to
stabilize the economy and as a gesture to labor “hardhats” who supported Nixon
politically. Even in the midst of the gold shock, the oil shock, and the Watergate crisis,
the government attempted to jumpstart the economy using free trade. A bill introduced
by Congressman Al Ullman of Oregon in December 1973, known as the Trade Act of
1974, provided the president a free hand in crafting free trade agreements for the
purposes of economic promotion.426 Ultimately bearing fruit in subsequent decades,
Trade Act represented a codification of what automation embodied. The Trade Act
allowed a president to fast track trade agreements and ultimately removed legislative
negotiations and interest group protests from the process. The reduction of tariffs and
trade barriers liberalized trade, allowed for the flow of goods across borders, and
hastened American deindustrialization.427
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In the aftermath of the resignation of Richard Nixon, President Gerald Ford’s
administration continued much of the trade policy of the preceding six years. It was
President Ford who signed the Trade Act of 1974 into law in early 1975. After economic
crisis greeted him upon assuming office, Ford attempted to rectify the shrinking buying
power of the dollar and stagnant growth with his “Whip Inflation Now” program. Also
known as “WIN,” Ford’s plan included tax cuts, tighter monetary policy, and facilitating
new trade agreements through authority granted under the Trade Act.428
Continuity with previous administrations’ policies continued at the DoD as well.
Ford’s Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, took a much more active role than his
predecessors in the day to day operations and planning. The trend of reductions in
defense budgets begun under earlier administrations continued as Rumsfeld amplified the
use budgetary streamlining. Seeking to reverse the long decline of spending, Rumsfeld
cut logistical and conventional support missions in the DoD in favor of new weaponry.
In 1976, Rumsfeld informed the House Appropriations Committee that “since 1964, we
have reduced civilian strength [in logistics] by 30 percent…almost all of our reductions
in the past twelve years have occurred in the support area.”429 Rather than aggressively
pursuing cuts in government waste or interdicting contractor abuse, Rumsfeld and his
predecessors pursued reductions of civilian workers.
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Rumsfeld and his staff favored new technology as a solution to support missions,
such as logistics. In a review of the DoD’s capabilities in comparison to the Soviets’,
A.W. Marshall of the Office of Net Assessment at the DoD enumerated a litany of
strengths and weaknesses in U.S. capabilities. Marshall’s discussion of logistics stated,
“the U.S. came out of World War II with a strong Navy...and has also developed the
appropriate strategic airlift capabilities that together provide it with good capabilities to
deploy and supply substantial military forces at long distances from our shores.” 430
Marshall, writing in 1975 and 1976, estimated that airlift could maintain U.S. positions
during a conflict in Europe. A decade earlier, the DoD assumed airlift could support the
totality of U.S. positions in Vietnam, which proved to be incorrect.431
In spite of a belief in airlift as a cure-all, the DoD under Donald Rumsfeld did
make special arrangements for maritime logistics, but even these preparations proved
insufficient. In November 1976, the DoD and the Commerce Department added ships to
the National Defense Reserve Fleet in case of an emergency need. This augmented
portion of the fleet, known as the Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF), could put to sea within 72
hours.432 The failure of many U.S. flagged shipping lines provided an abundance of
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modern, capable, and unused ships for the RRF. Instead of drawing upon these available
hulls, the DoD, through the Navy’s Military Sealift Command, placed thirty World War
II-era Victory ships into the RRF’s storage facilities in Virginia, Texas, and California.433
Even in making special preparations for a “ready at a moment’s notice” squadron of
cargo ships, the DoD drew upon the least expensive and most readily available materials,
in spite of the Victory’s obsolescence.434
Economic vitality and regulatory changes came to the forefront of American
politics again during the election cycle of 1976. Democratic Presidential nominee James
Carter promised reforms of a moribund national economy and government. Carter’s
image as a political outsider proved popular in an era when the electorate lost confidence
in the country’s political leadership.435 Promising a liberation of “American people from
the burden of overregulation,” Carter defeated Ford at a moment when the general
population was undergoing what historian Shane Hamilton described as a revolution “all
in the name of lower consumer prices.”436

Inflationary effects on prices wrought havoc

on the average American’s ability to purchase consumer goods. A free market, preKeynsian economic ideology drove much of the “revolution” against regulations in the
latter half of the 1970s. Inspired by economists such as Milton Friedman, the concept of
a private sector unencumbered by government regulations or heavy taxation repudiated
much of the government management of the economy since the New Deal era.
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Friedman’s influence in political economy during the late 1970s cannot be understated.
Pamphlets and newspaper editorials liberally quoted Friedman’s anti-“big government”
perspectives. According to Friedman, only an embrace of a laissez-faire free market
could cure the ills of the economy in the late 1970s.437
The transportation industry, which had long been the exemplar of procedures and
costs that frustrated the market, became the Carter administration’s first target of
deregulation. In the administration’s first months in office, Carter appointees began to
evaluate the transportation industry for potential inefficiencies. Airlines were the first
companies freed from regulated price controls. The results of fare and price competition
led one administration official to note “we really effected a revolutionary change in the
relationship between government and business.”438 Deregulation also benefitted the
trucking and freight railroad industries, both of which suffered heavy regulation of costs
for vehicle operators’ licenses and costly labor, safety, and health expenses.439 The
electorate’s attitudes toward labor in the transportation industry also heavily influenced
the deregulatory agenda of the Carter administration and of the Democratic Party.
Democratic senators Edward Kennedy and Howard Cannon shepherded several
deregulatory laws through Congress in the late 1970s. The unpopularity of the Teamsters
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Union, and organized labor in general, led ambitious politicians to abandon workers for
the sake of positioning for future elections.440
While deregulation applied to much of the transportation sector in the late 1970s,
the new laws did not address the maritime industry or labor. Heavy subsidies for
shipbuilding and operating expenses for the dwindling U.S. flagged fleet remained intact
under the Merchant Marine Act of 1970. The Department of Commerce (DoC), the
regulatory body for maritime affairs in the late 1970s, acknowledged labor issues facing
the shipping industry on the eve of the Carter administration’s deregulatory campaign in
other transportation sectors. Arthur Friedberg, the DoC’s director of maritime
manpower, interviewed ship agents and pointedly asked whether there was “any lack of
cooperation by U.S. maritime labor (in comparison to foreign crews).”441 Friedberg’s
investigation revealed that by the late 1970s ship agents dealt with U.S. regulations
because labor “made special concessions in order to attract jobs” and that domestic
workers were of a “higher quality.”442 Concerns regarding the availability of U.S. labor
also came out in Friedberg’s investigations of the maritime industry. Insufficient
numbers of trained maritime engineers and longshoremen because of retirement or
automation concerned Friedberg and the DoC. Friedberg noted: “[J]ob opportunities
Hamilton, Trucking Country, 12. Kennedy challenged Carter for the Democratic nomination in 1980,
running as a “centrist” due to his deregulation stances. Hamilton described Kennedy’s behavior as “union
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along the water front have and will continue to decrease at significant rates. If conditions
are not altered in the foreseeable future, port costs will continue to rise associated with
the GAI, leading to increases in cargo diversions and unemployment.”443
On one hand, the maritime industry embraced automation and reliance on foreign
flagged vessels. The spirit of competition on the high seas from foreign flagged ships
and through reduction of costs associated with the cargo container began to drive U.S.
shipping and maritime trades out of business. As ship agents and the remaining U.S.
flagged ships owners realized, there were limits to what Milton Friedman described as the
“unleashing of free enterprise.”444 In the early 1960s, the U.S. merchant marine
employed some 48,000 sailors. By 1977, there were fewer than 21,000.445 The Navy’s
Military Sealift Command suffered similar proportional losses, with nearly 10,000
employed in 1965 and under 4,000 employed in 1975.446 The DoC’s attrition
investigations seemed to indicate that employment numbers would continue to fall if left
unattended.447
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Planners and influential leaders in the defense sector highlighted inefficient
business practices in defense procurement and spending and looked to deregulation or
free market solutions. Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander and U.S. European
Commander Andrew Goodpaster and co-author Samuel Huntington argued, in CivilMilitary Relations, that a gap in general knowledge and specialization developed between
defense officials and civilian organizations. Goodpaster and Huntington highlighted
troubles that DoD officials had in interactions with organized labor.448 The reason for the
chasm between civilian abilities to dispense with inefficient costs and the DoD, according
to Goodpaster and Huntington, was that “service efforts to reduce or eliminate less
productive facilities frequently clash with congressional committees.”449 When
assigning blame for the clash, Goodpaster and Huntington noted that frequently
“opposing interests” in “transportation and labor influenced key members of
congressional committees.”450
Goodpaster’s other text from 1977, For the Common Defense, enumerated ways
in which the U.S. military needed to reform itself following the Vietnam War and the
austere days of the early 1970s. Goodpaster’s topics included defense spending,
allocation of materials for emergencies, and, drawing on his expertise as former NATO
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Supreme Commander, a defense of Western Europe.451 Goodpaster’s recommendations
included a robust deterrent to Soviet land, air, and strategic nuclear forces. Goodpaster
also called for reevaluation of U.S. maritime strategy, both military and civilian.
According to the author, “capabilities for sea control give operational freedom and afford
useable access to the crisis.”452 He included assessments of DoD capabilities and options
during the late 1970s. “Major reliance would have to be placed on sealift in case of a
military undertaking of substantial size and duration. Defense sealift in active use in
peacetime is severely limited in capacity. Additional sealift from commercial shipping
lines…would be needed.”453 In short, Goodpaster argued for both a debasement of labor
and a subcontracting of emergency sealift to a non-existent U.S. flagged commercial fleet
in order to prepare for conventional operations in Western Europe.
In the late 1970s, concerns regarding NATO capabilities against a resurgent
Soviet threat occupied the minds of civilian and military planners. Post-Vietnam War
plans of the United States only accounted for one side of the long standoff in Central
Europe. In spite of internal economic and food supply problems, the Soviet Union began
a program of incremental increases in military spending during the 1970s. Similar to the
American economic woes of the decade, the Soviet command economy faltered. In 1974
and 1975, however, the Soviet military budget enjoyed exponential growth.454
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Soviet Union, as an oil exporter, benefitted greatly from the oil embargo of 1973. The
steep increase in the price of oil not only saved the Soviet economy, but also provided
ample funds for building up the Soviet military. By 1976 and 1977, the Central
Intelligence Agency estimated that Soviet military expenditures had increased by nearly
30 percent from 1970 to 1975.455
As a result of the boom times in Soviet military spending, extraordinarily
expensive programs or areas in which the Soviets traditionally did not compete with the
United States became available. Spending for strategic offensive weapons, both
conventional and nuclear, increased substantially in the late 1970s. In addition, the
Soviet Navy, long a subordinate to the strategic nuclear or armored vehicle spending
programs, received a welcomed funding boost. In particular, the Soviets began to build
aircraft carriers.456 The Soviets mimicked the use of aircraft carriers as a power
projection tool from the United States. The Soviets built Kiev class aircraft carriers and
other large ships, such as the Kirov class of battlecruisers. Soviet naval spending marked
an escalation in Cold War maritime affairs.457

455
Central Intelligence Agency, Estimated Soviet Defense Spending in Rubles, 1970-1975 (Washington,
DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1976), 8-15.; Charles E. Maier, Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism
and the End of East Germany, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 61-72. Maier argues
artificially high oil prices covered the internal flaws in the Soviet economy of the 1970s. The collapse of
oil prices and grain harvest issues led to serious economic and social fractures in the broader Sovietinfluenced economic bloc in the 1980s.
456
A.W. Marshall to Donald Rumsfeld, Memorandum on Key Military Balances, Rumsfeld Library,
http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/490/From%20Andrew%20Marshall%20re%20McClellan%20Letter%
20on%20Recent%20Trends%20in%20the%20Military%20Balance%20Between%20U.S.%20and%20Sovi
et%20Union%2003-23-1976.pdf#search=%22logistics%22 Accessed on September 21, 2015.; Firth and
Noren, Soviet Defense Spending, 110-121. Much of Marshall’s work at the DoD focused on the disparity
between Soviet and U.S. naval expenditures. Marshall continued in his position at the DoD Net
Assessment office until 2002.
457
Milan Vego, “Soviet and Russian Strategy in the Mediterranean Since 1945,” in Naval Strategy and
Policy in the Mediterranean: Past, Present, and Future, John Hattendorf, ed., (London: Frank Cass, 2000),

160

The potential of a much larger and more powerful Soviet fleet matching that of
the United States complicated plans for a conventional war both on the high seas and in
continental Europe. Following post-Vietnam War spending reductions, western defense
officials argued that U.S. maritime power failed to meet the challenge of the rising Soviet
threat. The Atlantic Council, a prominent international affairs think tank, cited threats,
including newly commissioned nuclear programs, the “Arab oil weapon”, and the
omnipresent Soviet Union. The Atlantic Council commissioned a series of studies and
public statements calling attention to the variety of threats to the United States. Members
of the working group at the Atlantic Council included career diplomat Harlan Cleveland
and retired NATO Supreme Commander Andrew Goodpaster.458 In 1977, the Council’s
recommendations included a broad expansion of military spending to counter “what the
Soviet Navy was up to.”459
The chorus of voices advocating a free enterprise model repeatedly found new
opportunities to argue in favor of using private sector methods in the defense sector. By
1980, and after several years of revived increases in defense spending, industrial scholar
Jacques Gansler called for reforms related to contracting and federal intervention. In
spite of the lessons allegedly learned by cost overruns and inefficiencies in the private
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defense sector during the Vietnam War, new defense appropriations in the late 1970s
followed old formulae. Massive expenditures for new weapons and advanced automation
technologies demanded large percentages of the military budget for DoD prime
contractors. According to Gansler in his 1980 text The Defense Industry, a trend in the
private sector was to reduce labor costs and increase automation. Following the private
sector’s lead, Gansler advised that defense planners had the obligation to follow suit and
reduce labor costs.460 Suggesting federal intervention in defense contracting, Gansler and
other defense experts agreed on the overwhelming ideology of “proper management” by
private contracting or corporate methods.461
In his recommendations for the future of the defense industry, Gansler argued for
several possible models to reform a bloated, inefficient, and ineffective Department of
Defense. Included in these models were arguments for nationalization, as well as
regulation, of the defense industry as a public utility. For what Gansler called “lower
levels of the defense industry” or logistics and supply, he argued in favor of a “’free
market’ model. According to Gansler, the “free market model” existed in industries with
“multiple customers and multiple suppliers.”462 Gansler’s last point in his “free market
model” was to expand the defense industry to a multinational, interdependent mode of
production. In supporting his multinational model, Gansler stated that “the United States
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would consciously decide to not be self-sufficient,” but that this decision would “improve
economic efficiency.”463 Gansler’s models, which he touted as “the choices of the best
students of the defense industry,” acted as more than recommendations. Perhaps
unconsciously, he was outlining what had already happened in the maritime industry.
By 1980, the politics of defense spending and federal management went beyond
discussions in congressional committees or in monographs written by experts. Rather,
the presidential election cycle again seized upon both the military prowess of the United
States and the effectiveness of the federal government. Carter, in spite of several years of
new military spending initiatives, could not counter the perception that he was weak on
matters of national security. Defense spending in the Carter administration actually
increased. The defense budgets between 1976 and 1978 were $283.8 billion, $286.2
billion, and $286.5 billion. In 1979 and 1980, the defense budgets surpassed $300 billion
for the first time since 1973. Inflation in the late 1970s, however, outstripped the buying
power of the extra billions devoted to the DoD.464
The election season of 1980 featured attacks on the Carter administration’s record
on economics and defense policy. Energy crises, a deep recession, and a national
“malaise,” as President Carter himself stated, led to a series of assaults on the general
economic policy of the country. Seeing an opportunity to blame Carter for high
unemployment and low economic growth rates, advocates of deregulation offered new
463
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economic solutions. Heavily influenced by Milton Friedman, “supply-side” economics
became a popular alternative to post-World War II Keynesian economic consensus.
“Supply-side” proponents argued for removing obstacles to production of goods, such as
taxes, regulations, or tariffs. Once removed from the cost of production, private
enterprise could propel economic growth to new heights.465 The editorial page of the
Wall Street Journal became the venue for frequent criticism of Carter and advocacy for
“supply-side” economics. Editor Robert Bartley informed the two million daily readers
of the Journal that “supply-side” deregulation and tax cuts could save the economy from
the ineffective Carter economic policies. According to the Washington Post, Bartley not
only turned “supply-side” economics into a household phrase, but also swept Carter out
office in 1980.466
Carter faced more opposition, within his own party and from the defense
establishment. A primary challenge by Senator Edward Kennedy weakened Carter’s
reelection campaign. Kennedy’s scandalous past and weak union support, especially in
the transportation industry after his advocacy of deregulation, became a fatal flaw in the
struggle with Carter for the Democratic nomination.467 After surviving the nomination
challenge by Kennedy in the primaries, Carter suffered challenging attacks from
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members of the military. In May 1980, Congressman Gillespie V. “Sonny” Montgomery
of the House Armed Services Committee questioned Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
General Edward Meyer on budget and supply issues within the Army. Montgomery
asked if the Army had the necessary tools and funding to counter the Soviets. General
Meyer told the committee that “we have a hollow army” following budget cuts of the
previous decade.468 Meyer’s remarks ignited a political firestorm. Recurring mentions of
military spending cuts during the 1970s clung to President Carter during his 1980 reelection campaign. The budget battle revived the perception of Carter’s weakness
following several foreign affairs fiascos during his term. The Soviet Union invaded
Afghanistan in 1979 to support a pro-Moscow government in Kabul. The protests of the
Carter administration proved to be insufficient for Republican opponents and hawkish
Democrats, such as Montgomery and Henry Jackson of Washington. In addition, agents
of the Iranian government stormed the U.S. embassy and took American diplomats
hostage. The Iranian debacle for Carter and the United States culminated with a failed
rescue attempt of the hostages by the U.S. military.469
Restoration of military strength and economic prosperity became the foremost
issues in the election battle between Carter and Republican nominee Ronald Reagan.
During the Cold War, political campaigns frequently dwelled on issues of spending and
military strength. Reagan promised enormous spending increases and his vow to
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challenge the Soviet Union following the Afghan invasion found popular support from
voters across party lines.470 Reagan’s campaign against Carter also included calls for
devolution of federal powers to the states. Moreover, Reagan’s campaign message drew
heavily from the deregulatory ideology inspired by Milton Friedman. During the
campaign, Reagan argued for a sweeping away of any regulation which burdened
businesses that were foundering after the oil crises and other economic ills.471
Reagan’s campaign statement linked military prowess with economic prosperity,
especially in his discussions of a rapid reconstruction of both naval and merchant fleets.
At campaign stops in regions relying on the maritime industry, Reagan enumerated his
platform to “provide a unified direction for all government programs affecting maritime
interests.”472 Reagan’s plan called for preservation of shipbuilding and coordinating the
totality of the country’s maritime abilities for national defense. Reagan’s plans echoed
the 1968 pledge of Richard Nixon’s campaign to “restore the maritime abilities” of the
country.473
The collapse of U.S. flagged shipping and maritime labor over the course of the
1970s weighed heavily on any plan for restoration. Reagan’s maritime plan reflected the
results of economic recession, as well the contraction of the U.S. flagged fleet.
Accordingly, three of Reagan’s points reflected the economic ideology of his campaign.
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Reagan promised to “reduce the severe regulatory pressures that inhibited American
competitiveness” and to “restore the cost competitiveness of U.S. flag operators.”474
Finally, the Reagan campaign’s maritime policy pledged to “improve military resources
by increasing commercial participation in support functions.”475 Reagan’s plan for
competitiveness by way of deregulation and “increasing commercial participation” found
tremendous support among maritime industry and labor groups .476 Andrew Gibson,
Nixon’s Federal Maritime Administrator described the plan as “vintage Reagan-visionary
but silent on costs or means of implementation.” 477

Similar to maritime labor’s

embrace of containerization in the 1960s, the positive reaction to Reagan’s promises of
deregulation cut both ways. The cost by the mid-1980s for laborers and the U.S.
shipping industry, which supported the plan, resulted in the near death of the domestic
maritime trade.478
Between 1971 and 1980, defense and maritime policy took similar courses. With
the unbridled spending of the Vietnam Conflict over in the early part of the decade, a
reduced defense budget and inflation cut the DoD’s buying power by nearly 40 percent.
Nixon administration officials began to introduce new measures to maximize what funds
were available to sustain the DoD’s mission. As the leadership at the DoD came from the
private sector, individuals such as David Packard used business management methods in
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government work.479 “Management” became a buzzword within the DoD, but the term
evolved into a preference for using corporate means and measures of costs and benefits
for all decisions. By mid-decade, changes in the global financial and economic order
changed the management ideology by planners at the DoD. Instead, a belief in blanket
deregulation began to appear in their statements and in policies handed down from
elected officials to bureaucrats. The outcome of a deregulatory impulse within the DoD
and the broader federal government over-corrected spending priorities, especially for
maritime logistics. After the election of anti-regulation, “supply side” political
candidates such as Ronald Reagan, privatization and automation became a palatable
alternative to dealing with labor problems or expenses.
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MAKING WAVES: REAGAN ERA DEFENSE AND
MARITIME POLICY, 1981-1986
In October, 1984, Congressman Bill Nichols of Alabama addressed the annual
meeting of the American Logistics Association (ALA) on U.S. naval and maritime
policy. Nichols’ long congressional career and membership on the House Armed
Services Committee lent gravitas to his speech and the proceedings at the ALA’s
meeting. Nichols’ prepared speech included references to the recent revival in U.S. naval
spending, which he described as “a rejection of maritime inferiority.”480 In particular,
Nichols highlighted advances made by the Navy in automating and containerizing its
daily supply operations and in planning for future missions. The lone point of criticism
in Nichols’ remarks related to the security of cargoes under the control of the Navy and
its uniformed personnel. Nichols noted that the completely military naval supply center
in Norfolk, Virginia, was “insufficiently staffed.” Later, Nichols mentioned the
importance of Norfolk as a center for military logistics as “almost half the items issued to
the naval fleet throughout the world are made from that activity.”481 Nichols continued,
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“At the same time, about half the inventory losses and thefts experienced by six Naval
Supply Centers were taking place at Norfolk.” 482 In this case, the specter of pilferage
and theft came under the watch, and at the hands, of military personnel rather than
mistrusted maritime workers such as longshoremen. According to Congressman Nichols,
navy personnel themselves were responsible for such thefts.483 In spite of a campaign
within the Department of Defense (DoD) for the use of “theft-proof” cargo containers
and reductions in civilian workers throughout the 1970s, pilferage persisted in military
supply centers.
Pilferage and general corruption in the defense sector became an increasing
concern during the massive defense buildup of the early 1980s. This chapter will discuss
the legislative and regulatory changes in national maritime policy during the early 1980s.
Concerns for theft of naval stores and materials paled in comparison to stories of “waste,
graft, and fraud” in defense contracting and weapons procurement during same era’s
large expenditures for military technology. The Reagan administration’s commitment to
“making America great again,” as promised in the 1980 campaign, included a rapid
increase in military expenditures over the course of the 1980s.484 Lean defense spending
in the 1970s gave way to an expansion of the national security state during Reagan’s
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term. Increases in military spending for new weapons technology, aircraft, and naval
vessels expanded U.S. offensive firepower. The expansion of the defense budgets
combined with the reduction of currency and Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation
resulted in a near doubling of military spending.485 During the boom years of revived
military spending, defense contractors reaped the vast majority of funds for the
construction of sophisticated aircraft, nuclear missile systems, and the highly touted
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Devotion to technological innovation in defense fields
began far earlier than the early 1980s. The DoD’s commitment to experimental weapons
and logistics support during the decade consumed much more funding than in decades
past. Included in the defense expansion was a restoration of American maritime
supremacy under the direction of Navy secretary, John Lehman. Contractors and
congressional leaders who endorsed Reagan and Lehman’s “600 ship” Navy plan
received or steered the delivery of lucrative contracts to build up the new fleet. In an
interview early in his term, when Lehman was asked what the ideal defense system was,
he stated, “…one with a part made in every congressional district.” Rewarding
congressional allies with contracts for their districts became part of the political quid pro
quo of the era.486 During the Reagan era military buildup, it appeared as if everyone
connect to the national security state benefitted from enormous spending increases.
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Calls for reform of defense contracting came after highly publicized episodes of
“waste, graft, and corruption” in military procurement became a recurring theme during
the mid-1980s. Repeated stories of “$1200 hammers” and “$6000 flashlights” paid for by
defense contracts paled in comparison to billions spent on faulty or inoperable weapons
systems. The Project on Military Procurement (PMP) compiled hundreds of pages of
quotes and news reports discussing billions of dollars in procurements for missiles,
armored personnel carriers, and naval vessels that did not work. Frequent reports in
national and local media discussed faulty equipment, contractor quid pro quo and
kickbacks, or rigged tests of weapons systems as endemic in defense contracting. The
media reports raised enough of a public outcry to prompt calls for contracting reforms by
1985.487
Even during the age of expanded military, especially naval, spending, federal
maritime funding and legislation failed to maintain the decreasing fleet of U.S. flagged
ships. Beyond emergency defense sealift needs, normal economic shipping of increasing
amounts of imported goods dominated the cargo market for both U.S. and foreign
shipping firms. As part of a continuing effort to integrate the United States into ocean
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trading and commerce, Congress passed several maritime reform laws with the full
support of the Reagan administration. Important legislative reform acts included the Farm
Bill of 1984 and the Shipbuilding Act of 1985.488 Each act’s impact on the maritime
industry and shipping methods intended to capture the zeitgeist of an increasingly
deregulated, automated, and globalized maritime industry. Ocean commerce reform laws
intended to increase competition and to preserve the maritime industrial base. Instead,
legislative efforts opened to the floodgates of non-US flagged shipping or accelerated
outsourcing of shipbuilding. Finally, automation and globalization starting with the
invention of cargo container led to the final collapse of U.S. shipping and the domestic
maritime economy during the 1980. Effects on defense logistics wouldn’t be obvious
until later in the 1980s and into the 1990s. The deregulatory ideology, which permeated
Reagan era efforts and reforms, however, undercut the ability of the United States to
follow through on its military commitments.489 Without regulations intended as
employment and security safeguards for the United States, the domestic shipping and
sealift fleet continued to wither in the 1980s.
The historiography of defense, maritime, and labor events tied to technology,
increased spending, and automation discussed these subjects as separate, discreet
concepts. Paul A.C. Koistinen’s State of War: The Political Economy of American
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Warfare explained the complex interplay between Cold War military necessities,
contractor interests, and the vast sums of money devoted to defense spending. Koistinen
paid particular attention to the symbiotic relationship between the DoD and large defense
contractors. The author argued that by the mid-1980s too close a relationship existed
between DoD officials and large scale contracting firms.490 Moreover, Koistinen
illustrated the role that dependence on expensive technology and automation played in
substantially increased defense budgets. Finally, Koistinen described the relationships
between contractors and DoD officials as a form of corruption and criminality. Koistinen
stated that no corruption charges came as a result of improper relationships, wasted
spending on inoperable military systems, or graft in defense spending. By contrast,
maritime workers and unions in the same era suffered under the burden of perpetual
federal investigation.491 Similarly, Andrew Bacevich argued in Washington Rules:
America’s Path to Permanent War that a defense spending “consensus” developed
among politicos during the Cold War. Bacevich discussed the restoration of the
“consensus” with renewed vigor and vast budget increases after comparatively low levels
of spending in the 1970s. The “consensus” that Bacevich described consisted of major
defense appropriations by members of Congress regardless of political party. This
“consensus” included collusion between government and private sector figures in order to
channel funding into technologically sophisticated and profoundly expensive weapons
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systems.492 Koistinen and Bacevich focused entirely upon the financial and political
origins of increased spending in the 1980s. Rather than offering a detailed critique of
individual policies or aspects of the military economy, however, both Koistinen and
Bacevich discussed broad strokes such as political ideology or contracting corruption in
their criticisms of defense budgets or policymakers in the Reagan administration.
Scholars of early 1980s political history highlight the economic ideology of the
Reagan administration with varying degrees of success. Sean Willentz detailed the
environment in which the supply-side and deregulatory ideologies dominated in the early
1980s in The Age of Reagan: 1974-2008. Willentz was quick to state that he did not wish
to “add to the copious literature of either hagiography or vilification” about various
political leaders. While Willentz is fair in his analysis of the Ford, Carter, Reagan, and
Bush administrations, he also added little to the discussion of economic conditions, which
factored into decisions or events.493

Daniel Rodgers, on the other hand, discussed

economic reforms introduced by the Reagan administration in detail in Age of Fracture.
Rodgers illustrated policy and legislative initiatives during the first Reagan term that
deregulated the transportation industry. Rodgers offered a nuanced and well-informed
approach when noting that “deregulation was a radical project before it became a
conservative one.”494 Deregulation as a governing philosophy grew out of the
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Buckley, and economist Milton Friedman favored the “unleashing of private enterprise”
to solve the problems government created or could not solve. Removing government
regulations became the political solution for an anemic transportation industry racked by
economic slowdown and energy crises. The principle of the “government that governs
best governs least” became a plank in Reagan’s platform in the election of 1980 and for
much of his administration. 495 Rodgers overwhelmingly focused on deregulation of the
airline and ground transportation industries. His study disregarded the focus of this work,
the maritime economy. Ships carried nearly 95 percent of cargo in the 1980s, a far higher
number than the relatively small scale road and rail industries.496
Government reform became a frequent method of addressing allegations of waste,
graft, and corruption in federal spending. Alan I. Marcus, in his article “’Would You
Like Fries With That, Sir?’: The Evolution of Management Theories and the Rise and
Fall of Total Quality Management Within the American Federal Government,” noted the
popularity of a variety of scientific management theories in the federal and defense
sectors, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. The purpose of the wide array of management
theories, according to Marcus, was to correct unproductive or inefficient behaviors in
federal workers. Marcus’s article covers events in the later 1980s and 1990s when the
government adopted the organizational reform program known as Total Quality
Management (TQM). TQM claimed to improve productivity of workers using statistical
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modeling and privatization.

According to Marcus, no agency “embraced the

managerial ethos more passionately than the Defense Department.”497 Rather than a late
1980s development, this chapter aims to reorient the privatization of defense logistics to
much earlier in the decade.
Recent studies of labor’s decline in the 1980s highlighted the effect of several
Reagan administration decisions for worker rights and union strength. Jefferson Cowie’s
study of labor in the late 1970s and early 1980s described the era as “Waterloo for unions
and regulators.”498 Cowie’s description of the 1980’s decline of unions included more
analogies. “The turbulent waters of the 1970s,” wrote Cowie about unions, “roared with
a vengeance during the 1980s.”499 The most important labor decision of the early Reagan
years was the mass firing of Professional Air Traffic Controllers Association (PATCO)
strikers in 1981. PATCO strikers were not only fired by Reagan, but he permanently
barred them from federal employment. Cowie described the banning of PATCO
members as the “fist-in-glove” manner the Reagan administration dealt with working
class institutions such as public employee unions.500 Cowie’s treatment of labor’s rapid
decline through the 1970s and into first years of the Reagan administration culminates
with the PATCO strike and its aftermath. PATCO leaders were led away from
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courtrooms in shackles by federal agents, and permanent ban of members from federal
employment led to the union’s dissolution. Cowie concludes that public employees and
transportation workers feared a fate similar to that of the fired air traffic controllers.
Laborers avoided conflicts with management in the 1980s for fear of losing what little
they had left after the economic erosion of the 1970s.501 Cowie, however, treats the
1970s and early 1980s as a prologue to a larger story of labor’s collapse in later decades
without further explanation. Major deindustrialization did not take place until later in the
1980s and 1990s. Beyond a few anecdotes, Cowie failed to integrate his story into trends
such as globalization or outsourcing.
Scholars of maritime history illustrated waning employment for workers
following automation and the crippling of unions under federal investigation.

Andrew

Gibson and Arthur Donovan described the 1980s as “the approaching end” of U.S.
maritime relevance.502 In spite of spending increases during the decade “strongly linked
to military readiness,” Gibson and Donovan argued that deregulation and automation
decimated the maritime labor pool by the late 1980s.503 The two countervailing trends, an
expansion of military spending and decreased maritime employment, only widened in
disparity during the decade. Gibson and Donovan’s work is a well-informed text and a
rare example of a history of American maritime policy. Their text, however, rarely
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discussed important details such as individual pieces of legislation or decision makers
who shaped policy.504
Challenges contributing to the decline of maritime unions came in the form of
federal investigations of organized crime activity. Former federal prosecutor James
Jacobs argued that mafia infiltration of maritime unions delegitimized the broader goals
of organized labor. Jacobs spent much of his section on the 1980s exploring pursuits of
the mafia in maritime labor. Following passage of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) Act, the new law empowered the government to seize or takeover
of organizations linked to criminal activity.505 According to Jacobs, the pension fund for
the ILA at the port of New York became a mafia slush fund. The federal government
first used RICO to purge unions, including the ILA, in the early to mid-1980s. Frequent
investigations by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and repeated references to the ILA as
an asset of organized crime perpetuated decades-old charges of rampant criminality along
the waterfront.506 Jacobs’ position as the prosecuting U.S. District Attorney in the
Southern District of New York lent gravity to his assertions. That said, his past as a
prosecutor in maritime labor cases also weakens his work. Jacobs’ uncritical chronicle of
DOJ efforts as a righteous crusade in the 1970s and 1980s delegitimized the veracity of
his text. Furthermore, Jacobs and the DOJ’s use of the media to try suspects in the court
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of public opinion constituted an abuse of power during the RICO prosecutions.507 Other
texts, such as Marc Levinson’s The Box and Leon Fink’s Sweatshops at Sea, illustrate the
further weakening of seafaring and waterfront unions. Levinson and Fink discuss the long
decline of waterfront jobs during the 1960s and 1970s. Levinson and Fink also noted that
the 1980s witnessed a tipping point when unions ceased to be a major force in effecting
policy.508 Finally, both authors blamed deregulation and automation for maritime labor’s
steep decline.
This chapter’s purpose is to illustrate the deregulation of the maritime industry
and automation technologies on the national security waterfront.509 In the 1960s, the
cargo container’s invention and subsequent partial adoption by the DoD occurred in
conjunction with the private sector’s near universal use of the “box.” DoD officials from
the private sector, such as Robert McNamara, supported the military’s use of the
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container and automated methods to limit labor costs. Throughout the 1970s, new
methods of managing substantial cuts in defense budgets increased DoD’s attention to
private sector methods of cargo transport.510 The near universal adoption of the container
by deregulated, globalized shipping firms by the early 1980s informed legislative and
regulatory changes in federal maritime management. Defense planners already predisposed to follow the lead of private contractors embraced the globalized shipping
model provided by shipping firms and containerization. This chapter will also connect
the disparate aspects of expanded defense spending of the early 1980s and the increased
reliance on private contracting for all facets of military preparedness. Coupled with
deregulation of the maritime economy, automation and outsourcing of military logistics
reached reality by the middle of the decade.
At the beginning of Ronald Reagan’s term of office, his administration and
Congress attempted to reform the federal budget fulfilled a campaign promise to “unleash
the private sector.” In his first inaugural address, Reagan succinctly laid out his vision of
reform in the aftermath of economic and governmental problems of the 1970s.
According to Reagan, “In this present crisis, government is not the solution to our
problem; government is the problem.”511 Reagan’s first months as president featured a
broad agenda, which targeted inefficient areas of federal spending for deregulation or to
remove governmental obstacles to private enterprise. Using executive orders, Reagan
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instructed Office of Management and Budget (OMB) director David Stockman to
“reduce the burdens of existing and future regulations.”512 The Reagan administration’s
early deregulatory efforts included allowing the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
broad latitude in removing fixed prices on rail and road transportation rates. Price
controls and limited competition in the railroad industry failed to correct the decline of
several major rail corporations in the 1970s. In the deregulatory experiments of the early
1980s, removal of price controls on cargo and load restrictions on train cars allowed
struggling rail companies to improve their profits.513

Legislative allies of the Reagan

administration aggressively pursued a broad deregulatory agenda. Beginning in 1981,
new legislation deregulating transportation, radio and television, and the banking industry
appeared in both houses of Congress. With legislation stalling because of procedural
matters or opposition in Congress, the Reagan administration turned to executive
action.514 When deregulation failed in government, however, corporations began to look
to unregulated environments overseas. Beginning in the late 1970s and accelerating
through the 1980s, American corporations began to relocate entire factories to countries
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with favorable tax codes and limited labor or environmental regulations. Across all
sectors of the economy, consumer goods producers moved manufacturing plants for
automobiles, electronics, and even food production to locations overseas.515
Deregulation coupled with companies bypassing regulations by moving production to
cheaper markets persisted in later years. The origins of what became known as
outsourcing, however, came from reform movements of the early years of the Reagan
administration.
Regulatory reform occurred simultaneously with another Reagan campaign
promise to rapidly expand defense spending. Taking office after vowing to restore
American military prestige, Reagan and his Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
pursued new defense appropriations to counter the Soviet Union’s expanded spending of
the 1970s. According to historians Allen Millett and Peter Maslowski, Reagan’s planned
expansion of nuclear and non-nuclear preparations and weapons systems was “nothing
short of a fusion of Ike’s ‘rollback’ and ‘New Look’ with JFK’s ‘flexible response.’”516
Weinberger’s aggressive lobbying within the Reagan administration and on Capitol Hill
paid dividends. Weinberger’s efforts led to the largest defense budgets since the mid1960s. Between 1981 and 1985, the defense budget grew by 56 percent. By some
estimates, the Reagan administration and congressional appropriators spent nearly $2.4
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trillion on defense during that period.517 New technology and modernization of the
armed forces accounted for the majority of expenses in the early 1980s.
The centerpiece of expanded spending under Reagan and Weinberger was a
modernized “600 ship” navy plan. While some of the new vessels came from
appropriations before Reagan took office, Navy Secretary John Lehman ensured that the
new administration received credit for the increased American presence on the high
seas.518 Curiously, modernization of the fleet included high levels of spending on new
technology for old platforms. Lehman’s plan recommissioned dozens of older ships,
including the notoriously obsolete World War II-era Iowa-class battleships. The Iowaclass returned to the fleet with state of the art missile systems at the cost of nearly $2
billion a ship. Newly build cruisers were less than half the price of obsolete Iowa
class.519 Early in the process of tremendous new commitments in defense spending and
technology, questionable choices in procurement hampered the bold new efforts of the
Reagan administration.
Coupled with upgrading obsolete systems, the monetary problems of the late
1970s complicated attempts to boost military spending. According to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), cost increases affected “the defense industry at a much
higher rate than the general economy.”520 Inflationary pressures on the economy and
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federal spending subsided by 1982. The havoc wrought by inflation in previous years
weighed heavily on appropriations and slowed deliveries of defense programs.
Contractors faced higher costs for materials and commodities such as aluminum and oil.
Assistant Secretary of Defense-Comptroller John Quetsch’s testimony before the House
Government Operations Committee indicated that inflation decimated the defense budget.
In one Government Accounting Office (GAO) report, “anticipated inflation equaled
41.59 percent of the total current cost estimates…or approximately $129 billion.”521
Monetary policy and inflation only accounted for some cost concerns in defense
spending. According to Quetsch, management and accounting solutions introduced in the
Nixon and Ford years increased inefficiencies in defense spending. New accounting and
administrative standards began in 1971 as a broader effort by Deputy Secretary of
Defense David Packard to introduce managerial reforms. 522 The continuous auditing of
contracts, however, added wasted time and effort to already inefficient practices. For
example, the GAO found massive waste in purely administrative costs at Newport News
Shipbuilding and Drydock. As the only shipyard capable of building or repairing nuclear
powered aircraft carriers, which was a cornerstone of Reagan’s military buildup plan,
Newport News became an exemplar for “good” budgeting. According to DoD estimates
in the early 1980s, new accounting and oversight standards “added $13 million annually
to defense contracts” for carrier construction alone between 1972 and 1980.523 Reagan
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administration officials, already pre-disposed to remove regulatory obstacles argued for a
reversal of DoD regulations or budget increases. Quetsch noted that “if inflation…turns
out to be higher than forecasted back in 1977 when the program was fully funded,
program reduction or budget shortfalls” were inevitable. 524
Shortly thereafter, Secretary Weinberger sought more appropriations and rolled
back accounting and oversight standards. Not only did the Reagan DoD boost military
spending, but it also began to deregulate the contracting process. According to
Weinberger, much of his early reform agenda at the DoD was designed to “fight waste
and to save taxpayer dollars.”525 Weinberger’s campaign to cut waste in weapons
systems took aim at direct annual congressional oversight of defense budgets and
individual procurement contracts. Discussing a congressional vote on the 1982 defense
budget, Weinberger described the U.S. government as a “poor customer,” which needed
“multi-year procurement” to maximize the efficiency of increases in defense spending.
Concluding his plea to Congress, Weinberger argued that his “top priority” in the
acquisition of new weaponry was to do so in a manner “that this country can afford and
[is] consistent with our economic recovery efforts.”526 Weinberger summed up his call
for multi-year procurement as a method of “providing real dollar savings and a
preservation of our defense industrial base.”527 The reform agenda at the Weinberger
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DoD was clear; expanded defense spending required less management and regulatory
authority in order to stabilize ailing defense plants and contractors. Targeting wasteful
spending with annual reviews of budgets or individual systems ended during
Weinberger’s tenure at the DoD.
While budgetary reform became enormously important in the early 1980s, a
similar recalibration in federal labor practices came to the forefront during the first years
of the Reagan administration. In August of 1981, a dispute between federal management
and air traffic controllers became the flashpoint in a battle that ended labor’s ability to
strike at will. The Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) contended
that the stressful nature of the work caused psychological and physical maladies to the
union’s members. In order to mitigate illness and stress, PATCO demanded concessions,
including higher wages and lower hours, from the federal government over the course of
the 1970s.528 In spite of PATCO’s endorsement of Reagan in the election of 1980, the
new administration failed to reach an agreement with the union over wages and hours in
the summer of 1981. PATCO went on strike in early August, and chaos ensued both in
the air and on the ground. President Reagan threatened to fire the 13,000 air traffic
controllers over the strike, which grounded thousands of flights and brought the
transportation economy to a halt.529
Looking to assert his authority and rebalance the labor/federal management
relationship, Reagan imposed the full weight of federal power on PATCO and its
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members. Reagan’s promises of terminating air traffic controllers coupled with a
familiar litany of anti-labor rhetoric and federal investigations of the union from decades
past. After filing injunctions describing the work stoppage as a violation of the TaftHartley Act, the Reagan administration called on PATCO officials to end the strike. In a
courtroom showdown between the union and the Reagan administration, a federal judge
found PATCO’s leadership to be in violation of the injunction and led them away in
handcuffs for waiting television cameras.530 The Reagan administration summarily fired
the 13,000 striking PATCO members and replaced them with temporary labor and even
military air traffic controllers. Even with temporary labor, it took several years to retrain
new controllers after the Reagan administration banned former PATCO members from
federal employment.531 The precedent set by the PATCO situation reduced the
frequency of work stoppages or aggressive stances by workers long after the strike.
Transportation workers, even highly skilled ones like air traffic controllers, were
replaceable in the post-PATCO era.
Anti-labor attitudes in the early Reagan years also affected waterfront workers.
Industrial safety regulations at marine terminals added greatly to costs, and employers
often cut corners. In spite of automation, death or severe injury plagued maritime
communities nationwide.532 The International Longshoreman’s Association (ILA)
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appealed to legislators and several presidential administrations during the 1970s to
address unsafe conditions along the waterfront. In 1981, the ILA asked Senator Orrin
Hatch, the newly installed chair of the Senate committee On Labor and Human
Resources, to investigate safety codes at the nation’s docks and terminals. In his letter to
Secretary of Labor Ray Donovan, Hatch requested a “fresh look by your [Donovan’s]
administration at the problem and advise us of your recommendations.”533 Renewed
federal attention to the waterfront had mixed results. ILA appeals to Hatch and the Labor
Department resulted in executive scrutiny of recurring rumors of criminality among
longshoremen. Donovan’s response to Hatch and Senator Sam Nunn of the Senate
Armed Services Committee highlighted the “activities and convictions of certain officials
of the ILA.”534 According to Donovan, any discussion of safety or compensation for
worker injuries had to take place in light of “serious crimes related to the conduct of
union business.”535 In the same week, Hatch’s committee received more public appeals
from the ILA and Donovan’s office issued press releases pledged a “serious inquiry” of
the longshoreman union.536 In an odd turn of events, Donovan strangely included the
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ILA in a discussion of the mafia-infiltrated Teamsters Union. Responding to the ILA’s
safety demands, Donovan issued press releases with references to “pending litigation in
the Teamsters Central States’ Pension Fund.”537 The pension fund case had nothing to do
with the ILA or safety on the waterfront.538 Instead, the Labor Secretary cleverly
conflated the ILA with the notorious Teamsters and reinforced the persistent image of the
criminal longshoreman.
Meanwhile, the Department of Justice (DOJ) turned its investigative attention
toward the ILA. Armed with the newly minted Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) act, the DOJ pursued investigations and potential indictments
against unions and other organizations allegedly permeated by organized crime.
Congress passed RICO in 1970 to try and convict organized crime or “corrupt
organization” leadership for ordering subordinates to engage in criminal behavior.
Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, the DOJ indicted and won convictions with
RICO as a catchall law covering various aspects of public corruption.539 Following a five
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year FBI sting operation, the DOJ won a RICO conviction for racketeering of ILA
officials Anthony Scotto and Anthony “Tough Tony” Anastasio. The FBI investigated
ILA locals in Philadelphia, Baltimore, Wilmington, NC, Miami, and Mobile. According
to former federal prosecutor James Jacobs, only the investigation of ILA locals in New
York harbor yielded any evidence of corruption. Shipping firms, however, participated in
bribery of mafia figures in order to ensure the loading and unloading of their ships.
While they escaped prosecution, union officials did not.540

Stories of Anthony Scotto’s

rule of the ILA and the Brooklyn waterfront and stories of mafia shakedowns made
sensational headlines in New York media. Nightly stories of organized crime figures
broadcast from the largest media market in the country rippled from coast to coast.
Mobsters on the waterfront became a frequent story on national newscasts, often with
references to the 1954 film On The Waterfront with Godfather star Marlon Brando. With
only the corruption in New York, the trope of the criminal dock worker became an oftrepeated national story in the early 1980s.541 At a time when military maritime firepower
underwent a renaissance, the civilian maritime sector appeared to be mired in the
corruption of the past.
Accusations of corruption or waste on the waterfront added to criticism of
subsidizing the U.S. flagged fleet for military purposes. Thrusting the relatively obscure
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matter of military ocean transportation into the national conversation, the New York
Times published several opinion pieces from “experts” in the maritime industry.542
Speaking from a position of authority, former House Merchant Marine Committee staffer
Charles Fager described subsidies to the maritime industry as “giving free dope to a
junkie.”543 He even acknowledged that “we [the United States] need maritime subsidies
to make sure we have enough cargo ships to supply our military forces overseas in case
of a long, non-nuclear war.” Fager, however, argued that “these programs have been
wracked by revelations of waste, graft, impropriety, and corruption.”544 Fager
acknowledged the President’s sensitivity to cutting any program connected to national
defense. In his closing, Fager argued that “making extensive use of foreign shipping”
while cutting maritime subsidies would “eliminate waste and abuse and strengthen
national security.”545 The echoing of “waste, graft, and corruption” as a trio of charges
against the maritime industry recurred before, during, and after 1980s.
Following Fager’s initial charge against subsides, opponents and supporters of
maritime subsides took to the editorial page of the New York Times to reargue the need
for a domestic maritime industry. A key issue for many of them was subsidizing the
shipping industry. Author and journalist David Fairbank White’s opinion piece on
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October 6, 1981 listed the benefits of maintaining the subsidy system. White wrote, “in
1962, there were 44,423 seafaring jobs in the nation; 23,000 exist today.”546 Beyond
practical unemployment concerns, White also referenced the security needs of the United
States in maintaining subsides. According to White, “without shipping and merchant
convoys, we are unable to maintain significant contact with allies or have a significant
presence overseas.” White continued, “in the last 20 years, [the Soviet Union] has
steadfastly increased the size of its fleet, from 4.5 million tons in 1960 to 21.6 million
tons in 1980…the Soviet merchant fleet recently surpassed the United States fleet in total
tonnage.”547 White’s forewarning of the security consequences of the shipping industry’s
decline was met with retorts from the shipping industry. Philip J. Loree, chair of the
maritime industry’s lobbying group, the Federation of American Controlled Shipping,
wrote a similar op-ed in the New York Times shortly after White. Loree argued that the
“indisputable fact” of U.S. shipping’s decline was a result of “spiraling costs of payroll
and shipbuilding.” Instead of reducing subsidies, Loree called for a reduction in “noncompetitive costs as the starting point” for a revitalization of U.S. flagged shipping.
According to Loree, “non-competitive costs” included expensive laborers.548
Uncompetitive or corrupt labor, not lucrative corporate subsidies, appeared to be the
recurring problem.
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In spite of promises by the Reagan administration to preserve the U.S. maritime
economy, business interests looked to extend deregulation to cargo preference
requirements. For decades, the Cargo Preference Act of 1954 required a fixed percentage
of exports and federal contracts to employ U.S. flagged shipping. The percentage of
cargo volume varied, but business interests claimed that “U.S. shipping charges more
than 300% above the world average.”549 Foreign flagged vessels could only be used in
emergencies or when U.S. flagged shipping was unavailable. Beginning in 1983, the
Reagan administration and labor allies in Congress, such as Rep. Mario Biaggi of New
York, proposed the Ocean Shipping Act to expand the cargo preference.550 According to
even the staunchest opponents of the preference, the purpose behind the Ocean Shipping
Act was “to achieve the laudable goal of a stronger, more efficient and competitive
merchant marine.”551 Labor and shipping interests with remaining U.S. flagged hulls
supported the legislation as an instrument to “remove regulatory handicaps” and as a
preservative measure for the faltering U.S. shipping economy. The ILA-backed Maritime
Institute for Research and Industrial Development (MIRAID) persisted in lobbying
members of Congress to pass the Act in order to “reform and clarify the regulatory
authority of the Maritime Administration.” MIRAID’s desire for regulatory reform was
at the heart of their plea for congressional support. Their hope of stripping unneeded
regulations related to the pre-container shipping economy was aimed at preserving what
The Fertilizer Institute to William Nichols, June 26, 1983. Nichols Papers What is this? Is it a letter, an
article?
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little was left of the domestic maritime economy and employment base.552 Meanwhile,
non-maritime business interests coordinated a lobbying campaign against the cargo
preference. Farming interests represented by the Washington-based Fertilizer Institute
claimed that using U.S. flagged shipping increased transportation costs “adding 30% to
the value of agricultural exports.”553 The coordinated campaign included pre-addressed
postcards sent by farmers to their respective members of Congress. Congressional offices
received hundreds of these postcards, each with identical text informing the reader that
“cargo preference has been a burden to farmers and taxpayers.” The direct mail
campaign concluded with the request that Congress permanently “sink the cargo
preference” while also rejecting the new shipping act.554 Ultimately, the cargo
preference remained in place, but the new shipping act failed to win congressional
approval. The battle between maritime labor and agricultural interests, however,
continued well into the mid-1980s.
Fractures in the maritime industry contributed to the confusion in ocean
legislation and policy. In late 1983, lower numbers of U.S. flagged ships meant limited
employment opportunities for union mariners. Meanwhile, Cunard Lines attempted to reflag two of their ocean liners for Jones Act trade.555 Re-flagging of the Cunard Princess
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and Cunard Countess offered service and expanded their share of the lucrative Jones Act
trade routes between New York and Puerto Rico. Acquiring Jones Act exemptions
proved difficult because both were built and registered in Denmark. Cunard attempted
to shepherd H.R. 2883, a Jones Act-exemption for the two ships, through Congress in
September 1983. Serious opposition to the bill came from shipbuilding management and
shipyard labor interests.556 While a relatively small affair and only involving two ships,
schisms within the broad base of the maritime community came to the surface over H.R.
2883. While shipbuilders opposed the reflagging bill, the Seafarers International Union
(SIU), an affiliate of the ILA, supported the act. The SIU argued that two new ocean
liners in U.S. coastwise trade could create “nearly 1,000 new maritime jobs,” “support
shore side jobs,” and “bolster a very slim U.S. troop-carrying capability.”557 In its
support of H.R. 2883, SIU President Frank Drozak argued in favor of the two ships’
admission to coastwise trade while upholding the “sanctity of the Jones Act.” According
to Drozak, SIU’s support of HR 2883 in no part reflected concessions by the SIU to “the
Reagan administration’s ‘build-foreign’ proposals.”558 Introduced by Congressman Clay
Shaw of Florida and pro-labor Congressman Mario Biaggi of New York, the bill found
heavy support in the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. In spite of union
shore side and shipboard labor support, the bill died in the House due to overwhelming
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opposition from shipbuilders, shipyard workers, and House leadership.559 Divided
interests, economic pressures, and political maneuvering ultimately halted Cunard’s
expansion into the American market. Moreover, the division of maritime interests
deprived a rare opportunity for maritime labor to reverse their souring fortunes.
Countervailing interests, between labor and business, as well as within the federal
government, led to a fractured approach to regulatory reform at sea and on land. In
October 1983, the Reagan administration attempted to streamline the federal bureaucracy
and procurement process. As part of his larger deregulation and reform agenda, Reagan
noted that his program intended to attack “waste and fraud” in the government by
“getting this government running as honestly and efficiently as any successful American
business.”560 Reagan enumerated his administration’s cost and paperwork cutting
measures at the General Service Administration (GSA), “all while absorbing budget cuts
of 20 percent and the attrition of 7,000 employees.”561 Reagan similarly lauded the
Department of Defense for “$16.1 billion in savings,” which he attributed to “savings or
cost avoidances on waste and fraud.”562 Reform 88, the government wide program
launched by the Reagan administration in 1982, coordinated all federal streamlining or
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attacks on “waste and fraud” in federal procurement. Reagan concluded that
“management systems in every department” had one goal. “When this administration
leaves the stage, the American people will have a federal government that operates in a
businesslike manner.”563 The numerous references to “waste and fraud” and cuts to
budgets and personnel laid the cornerstone for much of the Reagan administration’s
broader reform efforts.
Budgetary reforms and cuts included targeting federal subsidies to the maritime
industry. In August of 1983, the Reagan administration proposed large reductions in, or
total abandonment of, maritime shipbuilding and operating subsidies. The channeling of
nearly $10 billion sustained domestic shipbuilding and repair yards. These subsidies had
partially offset the long decline in U.S. maritime infrastructure since the 1950s.564
Meanwhile, yards in Japan, South Korea, and Brazil grew to build the majority of global
shipping over the same time period. Rather than citing “waste and graft” as a reason for
the reduction of the subsidies, the Reagan administration cited “inefficiency” at U.S.
yards as the purpose of the cuts.565 The editorial board of the New York Times argued
that the maritime industry could not compete with “foreign yards, where cheaper labor
and material...put ships on the market for one-third the cost of similar models built in the
United States.”566 Retired navy admiral Harold Sheer, the Reagan-appointed Federal
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Maritime Administrator, argued that subsidies were “exorbitant and ineffective.”
Shortly thereafter, Sheer allowed shipping firms to use subsidy money purchase and
operate non-US built ships for the first time since World War I.567 In response, domestic
shipbuilders warned of an impending disaster for their existence and the maintenance of
skilled maritime labor. According to the Shipbuilders Council of America, only one nonmilitary ship had been ordered at U.S. shipyards in 1983.568
With shippers allowed to purchase overseas built cargo vessels, an important link
in the maritime industry and maritime labor faltered. In spite of supporting the Ocean
Shipping Act, the Reagan administration’s choice of ending shipbuilding subsides proved
disastrous for the maritime industry in subsequent years. The fractured approach to
maritime policy, with some acts supporting and others damaging labor, was not part of a
sinister plot. Rather, as one longshoreman explained, “it was a case of too many cooks in
the kitchen.” 569 Fractured interests inside the government and the maritime industry set
policy adrift.
Budgetary reforms and reduction of subsidies became a focal point of the 1984
presidential campaign. While Reform 88 aggressively cut the federal budget, incidents of
“waste and fraud” at the Department of Defense became an embarrassment for the
Reagan administration’s campaign for re-election. The Project on Military Procurement
(PMP), a non-profit that investigated federal budgetary abuses, turned its investigative
567
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lens to the DoD in 1984.570 Stating that the “$200 billion deficit” in the federal budget
was the most pressing issue of the campaign, PMP listed a litany of failed defense
systems and the exorbitant prices paid for failure. Describing the DoD’s expense
euphemistically as “more bucks, less bang,” PMP opened their study with a December
1981 quote from then OMB director David Stockman. Stockman promised to “really go
after the Pentagon. Hell, I think there is a kind of swamp of $10 to $20 to $30 billion
worth of waste that can be ferreted out if you really push hard.”571 Three years following
Stockman’s statement, PMP used dozens of subsequent quotes to illustrate the continued
corruption, waste, and contractor excesses at the DoD. The chair of the Senate
Government Affairs Committee stated in 1984 that “trying to fix responsibility for waste
in the Pentagon is like ‘trying to nail Jell-O to the wall.’”572 PMP’s introduction to their
study included a sample of defense contractor-supplied household items billed to the
DoD at outrageous prices. Included in the list was the “$1100 dollar hammer” and the
“$9600 Allen wrench.” The accounting of the Allen wrench was particularly egregious
according to the PMP. In a line-item analysis of the wrench’s development, PMP
included the original contract for an 8 cent wrench and $9608 in administrative costs
passed on to the DoD by contractors at General Dynamics and Westinghouse.573
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Much of PMP’s research came from a flurry of national media reports on a variety
of similarly out of control programs costing significantly “more bucks” with “less bang.”
The investigative journalism of the Washington Post, the Fort Worth Star-Telegram, and
other media outlets focused on federal budgetary blunders throughout the early and mid1980s. PMP re-printed the Post’s reports of DoD cost overruns measured in billions of
dollars worth of undelivered or faulty systems.574 PMP reproduced 100s of media stories
illustrating the prevalence of rank waste and corruption in defense contracting.575
PMP’s aggregation of media reports illustrated extraordinary waste and
corruption in exemplary programs, such as the Army’s Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the Air
Force’s Maverick missile and the Navy’s AEGIS cruiser. The Bradley, a protected troop
transport vehicle, and the Maverick, an air-to-ground missile, both required expensive
redesigns following failed tests for basic functionality. Mannequins of soldiers inside the
Bradley melted or burned when the vehicle was hit with test rounds, and the Maverick
failed to hit the majority of targets.576 The Hughes Corporation manufactured the
Maverick and was under continuous investigation by the Defense Contract Audit Agency
(DCAA). The DCAA became the lone regulatory and oversight body for military
procurement within the DoD following the failure of Congress to provide oversight on
multi-year projects in 1981.577 With no congressional oversight on multi-year projects,
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the DCAA had complete authority in investigating allegations of weak contract controls,
waste, or corruption. DCAA auditors and investigators, however, found “no evidence of
waste” in the Maverick project at Hughes. One DCAA auditor, who proclaimed the
missile system and its contract free of waste, left his government job and shortly
thereafter went to work for Hughes as a well-compensated executive.578 According to an
ABC News report on the program 20/20, Hughes and the DCAA had a “cozy
relationship,” which allowed for immediate hires and similar breaches in professional
ethics. PMP also noted that whistleblowers, or reporters of waste or corruption often lost
their jobs or received no legal protection when they were sued or prosecuted for their
disclosures.579 PMP similarly compiled a multi-page list of media reports discussing
high-level military officers and civilian bureaucrats at the DoD who found lucrative
employment with defense contractors after their departure from government service.
Conflicts of interest abounded, so much so that PMP described the DoD to private sector
transition as a “revolving door syndrome which operated as a subtle form of bribery.”580
PMP’s investigation of maritime spending focused on the Aegis Missile Defense
system. The Aegis system integrated radar and weapons systems designed to protect an
aircraft carrier battle group or a supply convoy at sea. Initially procured in the mid1970s, the U.S. Navy outfitted Spruance class destroyers with integrated missile, Gatling
gun, and radar systems to protect more valuable capital ships in the fleet. Screening ships,
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called that because they screened fire against battleships, carriers, and convoys in the two
World Wars, found little support for construction or use during the early decades of the
Cold War. The Soviet naval buildup of the mid 1970s spurred the renewal in screening
ship production. The Aegis system’s development anticipated massed fleet battles or
convoys crossing the Atlantic in a hypothetical conventional war with the Soviets.
Moreover, the Aegis system would also engage underwater targets, such as Soviet attack
submarines attacking a fleet or convoy. In addition, 1970s weapons developments
including air or sea launched anti-ship missiles that Aegis’s integrated rail or Gatling
guns could hypothetically shoot down.581 Aegis’s shielding capability would provide an
umbrella of protection around the fleet or convoy. The automated and integrated aspects
of the Aegis system, however, required decades of testing and billions in development
costs. According to PMP, each experimental Aegis Ticonderoga-class cruiser cost at
least $1 billion in 1984 dollars. The Ticonderoga class came in at a little more than half
the price of the much larger, much more complex, and nuclear-powered Nimitz-class
aircraft carriers of the day.582
PMP’s inclusion of the Ticonderoga-class and the Aegis system as “Weapons
That Don’t Work” seemed appropriate considering the cost and time involved in
development. Protection from anti-ship missiles was the purpose of the Aegis system’s
development. In tests conducted throughout the early 1980s, the Aegis system did not
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identify or engage 75 percent of incoming, low flying test missiles. When the tests were
changed to increase the altitude of the incoming test missiles, Aegis identified 90 percent
of incoming targets. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger described the test results
as an indication of “human error” and that the automated aspects of Aegis were “fully
operational.” Navy Secretary John Lehman also blamed the test failures on human error
and argued for “crew rotations” to ensure only the best sailors worked on the system.
The New York Times editorial board even described changes in the parameters of the
Aegis test as “Procurement, Soviet style.”583 While leadership at the DoD and the Navy
had faith in the automated aspects of Aegis, unrealistic testing condition and an inability
to engage the targets it was designed to destroy caused PMP to describe the system as
“vulnerable.” 584
The Aegis system and its failure, however, proved to be an indication of larger
problems of procurement methods and resistance to reform at the DoD. According to
PMP, alluring technological and automated solutions to defense problems came at a high
financial cost with limited oversight. Newspaper or television investigations into defense
waste or fraud created a public firestorm of protest and letter writing campaigns to
members of Congress. Afterward, members of Congress held public hearings and
pressed DoD officials on obvious cases of waste and abuse. Senators William Roth and
David Pryor drafted legislation aimed at adding realistic, wartime testing procedures to
procurement and testing. In response, Secretary of Defense Weinberger and Under
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Secretary of Defense for Research and Technology Richard DeLauer lobbied against
rigorous testing while products were under development. Both Weinberger and DeLauer
offered an alternative proposal, to test military products only after their procurement and
manufacture.585 In public statements, DeLauer criticized the legislation as well as Roth,
Pryor, and other members of the Congressional Military Reform Caucus. According to
DeLauer, members of the caucus were “cutting [DoD] up into pieces,” and the Reagan
administration was “getting no place” in its effort to support the country’s defense
industry.586 DeLauer’s past made him all too aware of expensive procurements and the
desires of defense contractors to maintain the status quo. Prior to guiding the DoD’s
procurement policy, DeLauer served as executive vice president at defense contractor
TRW. At TRW, he led the company’s non-functioning and profoundly expensive
ballistic missile defense program.587 Shortly after Weinberger and DeLauer opposed
procurement reform efforts in Congress, legislation aimed at altering testing and funding
matters at the DoD failed to secure passage. In their conclusion, PMP authors described
the organizational culture at the DoD as “lacking the will” to reform. They continued,
“taxpayers and the servicemen are their constituents, not the dozen or so major
corporations whose primary concern is not national security, but profit.”588
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Major financial outlays for technology enhanced “cozy” relationships between the
DoD and contractors during calls for reform during the 1980s. Overwhelming prime
contractor influence in the defense sector went beyond stories of waste and corruption.
These stories of influence represented persistent cases of the government as a
monopolistic buyer of the contractor’s products. Repeated commitment to research and
development (R&D) throughout the 1970s and 1980s accelerated the share of the DoD’s
budget devoted to expensive technology. By the mid-1980s, economist Ann Markuson
stated that the DoD sponsored nearly 70 percent of R&D in the United States.589 The
vast majority of the DoD’s R&D budget went to contractors who were building new
aerospace systems, including aircraft, missiles, and the expensive centerpiece of the
Reagan administration’s nuclear umbrella, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). SDI,
dubbed “Star Wars” by its proponents, aimed to build a space borne laser system to shoot
down inbound Soviet nuclear warheads. Building such a complex system required vast
sums of DoD dollars. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), SDI cost
$1.1 billion in 1983 and $3.1 billion in 1984. The CBO also projected that by 1989, the
missile shield would consume nearly $69 billion dollars annually or 16 percent of the
DoD’s budget.590

589
Ann Markuson, et. al., Rise of the Gunbelt: The Military Remapping of America, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1991), 212.

“Analysis of the Costs of the Administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative, 1985-1989”, Congressional
Budget Office Staff Working Paper, May 23, 1984, 5-8. https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/98thcongress-1983-1984/reports/doc05_2.pdf Accessed on January 26, 2016. DoD’s budget in 1981 was
roughly $200 billion and $430 billion by 1989. Thus, the initial annual procurement for SDI rose from a
mere 0.5 percent of the DoD budget in 1981 to the enormous sum by 1989.
590

206

SDI, however, represented merely the latest expensive system, which required the
appropriation of tremendous sums of taxpayer money be transferred to conglomerated
defense corporations. The legacy of the first several years of the Reagan administration
included a $2.4 trillion expansion of defense spending, the majority of which went to
private contractors for new weapons systems.591 Promised budget streamlining during
Reagan’s 1980 campaign and his presidency failed.592
In the midst of scandals and outrageous price tags in defense procurement, the
DoD consulted and contracted private corporations for logistics support. Defense
logistics became an exemplar for waste within the federal government in the early 1980s.
The Navy’s Military Sealift Command (MSC) similarly became a standard of
inefficiency. The Reagan administration attempted to merge the MSC with a similarly
tasked organization, the Military Transportation Management Command (MTMC), but
the effort failed in a spectacular fashion.593 The DoD contracted private consulting firm
Harbridge House to find alternatives to the use of redundant agencies.594 In their reports
to Congress in 1981 and 1982, Harbridge House criticized the DoD for its failure to
containerize for all military goods. The management consultants of Harbridge House
ultimately recommended that the DoD universally adopt the cargo container and private

591

Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 612.

592

Markuson, et. al., Rise of the Gunbelt. 212.

593 Mason Reid Shafer, “Backing into the Buzzsaw: The Defense Department’s Attempt to Merge the
Military Transportation Management Command and the Military Sealift Command, 1973-1984,” (Ph.D
Dissertation, American University, 2001), 1-2.
594 Ibid, 107-147.

207

sector methodology to be in line with the commercial shipping industry. Harbridge
House concluded that the “cost effective measure” of automation would result in “a far
more efficient agency.”595
Shortly after the publication of Harbridge House’s recommendations, in 1984 and
1985, the Department of the Army conceived of a larger role for private contractors in
wartime emergencies and operations. The Logistics Civil Augment Program (LOGCAP)
became a catchall program built to “preplan for the use of civilian contractors to perform
selective services in wartime.”596 Normal Army or even wartime operations utilized
some civilian workers on a regular basis for logistical support. LOGCAP, however,
specified new contractor based roles to assist in “supply, maintenance, and
transportation” in support of Army operations. According to LTG (Retired) Russel
Honore, “the idea then [mid-1980s] was how you use a lean supply chain for ‘just in time
delivery’...when we went to ‘just in time’, the budget was tight as was the timeline.”597
Private transportation contractors, such as Federal Express and Kellogg, Brown,
and Root pioneered “Just In Time” delivery of military goods. The development of “just
in time,” however, grew out of Japanese automobile manufacturing in the 1960s and
1970s, not logistics. “Lean,” or minimal manpower or material support on hand, assumed
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supply chains were constant and uninterrupted by unforeseen events.598 In the case of
LOGCAP or other logistics innovations of the 1970s or 1980s, “just in time” methods of
prime contractors became the method used by the DoD. LOGCAP allowed “the
contractor to be as self-sufficient as practical” in wartime operations.599 The Army
allowed private contractors rights only afforded to seafarers and longshoremen aboard
ship and along the piers in the United States. Under the auspices of LOGCAP, private
contractors were protected by “the insurance available under the Defense Base Act and
Longshoreman’s and Harbor Workers Compensation Act…administered by the
Department of Labor.”600 In short, private contractors now had the same liability
coverage as longshoremen while working under Army contract without union
membership. Rather than legislating changes to the labor/management relationship vis a
vie longshoremen, the DoD found an administrative and doctrinal solution to the vexing
issues of workers and their financial and regulatory compensation. Private contractors
could avoid using union labor and maintain their lucrative relationships with the DoD
under LOGCAP. Adopting the private sector solution to “perform selective services in
wartime” became a frequent occurrence in defense contracting.601
Logistics matters again came to the legislative forefront in the mid-1980s during
enormous upheaval in the U.S. and global maritime economies. The rapidity with which
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containerization, automation, and outsourcing to non-U.S. flagged ships only increased
over time. Large scale corporations, usually manufacturers of consumer goods, began to
merge or acquired their way into the maritime transportation industry during the late
1970s. New corporate conglomerates attempted to bring their lean management methods
to ocean shipping including mass containerization and construction of container ships.
The prime example of conglomerates purchasing shipping firms was tobacco
manufacturer RJ Reynolds acquisition of cargo container inventor Malcom McLean’s
SeaLand Corporation in 1978.602 SeaLand at its time of purchase was by far the largest
containerized shipping firm in the United States.603 SeaLand’s containership
experiments reached new levels of technological sophistication after its purchase by RJ
Reynolds. The SL-7s cargo ships, built in Europe for SeaLand and designed for very fast
speeds, large numbers of containers, and automation to reduce crew costs represented the
peak of cargo ship technology of the era. The SL-7s, however, proved too expensive to
operate because of high rates of fuel consumption upon their completion.604
Containerization of American-owned shipping, construction of fast ships overseas, and
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lowering numbers of laborers proved to be the way of the future in spite of the SL-7s
failure.
The maritime industry’s future included further deregulation in light of the cargo
container’s influence. Containerization’s effect on the economics of shipping demanded
attention from legislators. Between 1980 and 1984, containerization grew ocean
commerce at an annual rate of 4 percent a year, outperforming GDP growth in the same
time period.605 Regulators and members of Congress argued that this growth could be
even higher if aspects of the Jones Act controlling the trade of foreign-flagged carriers,
and price controls maintaining an advantage for U.S. flagged shipping were swept away.
The Shipping Act of 1984 quickly ended price controls and created a “more competitive”
ocean commerce economy.606 The new law codified the deregulatory predilections of the
Reagan administration. The Shipping Act required the Federal Maritime Commission
(FMC) to align American ocean commerce “in harmony with, and responsive to
international shipping practices.” The predominant international shipping practice was
containerization.607 The Act strangely weakened the FMC’s position as defender of U.S.
flagged shipping while also demanding “the development of an economically sound liner
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fleet capable of meeting national security needs.”608 Rapidly changing and containerizing
ocean commerce induced a government response that was contradictory.
Tremendous upheaval in maritime affairs similarly complicated the DoD’s plan to
supply a war with the Soviet Union. Naval historian Salvatore Mercogliano argued that
the Navy’s “adoption of the so-called ‘maritime strategy’” ignored the collapse of the
merchant fleet during 1970s and early 1980s.609 This “maritime strategy” differed from
the Reagan campaign’s 1980 promise to restore the U.S. commercial maritime industry
through targeted subsidies for shipbuilding. The updated naval strategy at DoD focused
entirely on military spending and warfighting. The strategy planned for a three-stage
conventional war with the Soviet Union for control of the sea lanes of communication
between the U.S. and western Europe. The broad and ambiguous strategy called for
overwhelming numbers of aircraft carriers and submarines to engage the Soviets on the
high seas. The core of the new naval strategy became offensive weaponry. Meanwhile,
merchant shipping mattered little.610
During a hypothetical World War III, mariners and merchant shipping would have
had several roles to fulfill in support of the overall mission plan. The Military Sealift
Command, merchant mariners, and longshoremen would have reinforced and resupplied
the U.S. and NATO mission in western Europe. In addition, the United States would
maintain supply lines for food stuffs and basic commodities to sustain the economies and
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necessities for NATO allies.611 According to contemporary maritime scholar Clinton
Whitehurst, the Atlantic war plan for the U.S. and NATO “depends on allied capacity to
support such a battle [in the Atlantic]. Without adequate pools of merchant shipping and
protective maritime forces, the sea lines of communication cannot be relied upon.”612
“Adequate shipping” to support “such a battle” was not readily available by 1983
and 1984. The broader NATO pool of merchant ships numbered nearly 5,900, more than
enough to maintain the sea lines of communication. A large percentage of this pool,
some 2,100 ships, however, sailed only in the Mediterranean under a Greek flag. Their
crews had not been cleared by NATO allies. Moreover, these ships were obsolete and
profoundly slow in comparison to the Soviet attack submarines that they would have to
avoid in the North Atlantic.613 The uncertainty of whether allied vessels were available
led Mercogliano to ask, “Would they [allied shipping] willingly participate or would they
have to be coerced?”614 Shipping problems highlighted the uncertainty of whether the
United States could support a large scale maritime support of NATO in wartime.
A test case of sorts for distant sealift support and modern naval warfare occurred in
the 1980s during the conflict between the United Kingdom and Argentina. The
Argentine invasion of the Falklands Islands in 1982 resulted in a British response, which
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combined the resources of the Royal Navy and the British merchant marine.615 The
conflict proved to be the “first truly naval confrontation since the Pacific conflict of
World War II.”616 The Royal Navy’s mission covered nearly 8,000 miles of the Atlantic
from the U.K. to retake the islands. Unlike the experience of the United States landing
of materials and troops with little opposition in Vietnam, the Argentinian Navy
challenged the British sealift and naval forces in the operation.617 British losses from
enemy submarines and aircraft included two destroyers, two frigates, and three merchant
ships. Numerous other British ships sustained damage severe enough to take them out of
action.618 Ultimately, the British mission to retake the archipelago succeeded.
The cautionary example of the British fleet’s losses to a technologically and
financially inferior Argentinian enemy provoked a research question for the U.S. Navy.
According to a Navy Department report on the conflict, the lessons gleaned from the
Falklands needed to be considered “in the light of Soviet-US capabilities.”619 In light of
the mobilization of the Royal Navy and coordination with the British merchant marine,
the U.S. Navy report stated, “While the task of mobilizing sufficient strategic sealift for
adequate conventional deterrence is difficult enough, it would be impossible to sustain a
conflict given the level of attrition suffered from submarine warfare in World War II.”620
Department of the Navy, Lessons of the Falklands, Summary Report, (Washington, DC: Office of
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The Navy’s report concluded that “commercial shipping in support” was unsuited for
ongoing military operations such as a support mission for western Europe. Furthermore,
the Navy’s report suggested “planning with the Maritime Administration to ensure the
ships in the National Defense Reserve Fleet were available for activation.”621 Due to the
high losses of Royal Navy vessels in the Falklands, the U.S. Navy argued for a larger
fleet of military-armed and operated cargo ships, a much higher reliance on government,
not private solutions to logistics, and prepositioning of weapons in crisis zones.622 In
spite of the study’s suggestions, the DoD rejected proposals for expanding cargo ship
construction. DoD planners feared cargo ship construction would detract from the “600
ship Navy” plan for new offensive weapons. Ironically, the lack of cargo ships actually
accelerated reliance on private shipping. Only prepositioning, first developed in the biannual Reforger exercises, actually came to fruition.623
One effort to update the anemic military-owned cargo fleet embraced
containerization, privatization, and the regulatory reform currents within the Reagan
administration. The SL-7 containership ships built in the Netherlands and West Germany
for Malcom McLean’s Sea-Land found little use under corporate ownership. The SL-7’s
foreign construction made them ineligible for Jones Act trade. In addition, the ships were
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incredibly expensive to operate. The SL-7s sailed at high speeds but consumed vast
amounts of fuel during the oil shocks of the 1970s. Without any use, the ships ended up
mothballed and out of operation.624 Rather than building new military cargo ships, the
Navy acquired the SL-7s to supplement the dwindling numbers of U.S. flagged ships
available for sealift. Along with the acquisition of the ships, the Navy purchased nearly
5,000 cargo containers for use with the ships.625 The military’s campaign for automation
reached new heights with the acquisition of the SL-7s. In order to prepare the eight SL-7s
for military service and to allow them to operate as U.S. flagged ships, conversions for
Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) and container service began at American shipyards.626. The
newly converted SL-7s became the Algol class Fast Sealift Ships on their introduction to
military service in 1985. Stationed entirely on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, the eight
ships of the Algol class became the nucleus of the DoD’s rapid resupply plans for
emergencies in Europe or the Middle East. In addition, the DoD contracted shipyards in
Louisiana and Virginia for new special built cargo ships, but none with the capacity and
underway speed of the Algols. Rarely did 1980s military appropriations purchase or
build cargo ships. The extraordinary expense and operating costs of the Algols, however,
proved to be the limit of the DoD’s interest in diverting funds away from offensive
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weapons. Even after the Falklands War example, naval planners balked at an investment
in military cargo ships. 627 Conversion of the containerized Algols constituted a stopgap
in sealift readiness, but signaled the DoD’s transition to automated cargo handling as
well. The DoD and the Navy literally bought into the private sector’s model for cargo
transportation with purchase of the SL-7s.
The lack of available shipping and political considerations influenced other DoD
maritime procurements by the mid-1980s. The domestic maritime industry continued its
drift towards insolvency because of reduced ship orders, declining labor pools, and
withering physical infrastructure. Private shipyards in major ports, such as Fore River
Shipyard in Boston, Sun Shipbuilding in Philadelphia, and Bethlehem Steel in Baltimore
went out of business during the early 1980s. By the mid-1980s, smaller yards without
federal contracts failed to compete with larger, consolidated shipbuilding and ship repair
yards owned by defense contractors.628 In 1982, 42 shipbuilding and repair facilities
existed in the United States. By 1985, 19 of those permanently closed while another 14
survived only on naval construction and repair contracts.629 Military contracts for
shipbuilding often became political rewards within congressional caucuses. Legislators
with committee chairmanships or seniority steered contracts toward their own districts.
Notably, Speaker of the House Thomas P. O’Neill and House Armed Services Chair
Mendel Rivers halted the Navy’s closure of two naval shipyards in their respective home
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districts in Boston and Charleston, SC. Senator John Stennis, senior member of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, single-handedly steered dozens of shipbuilding
contracts to Ingalls Shipbuilding in his home state of Mississippi. According to
economist and geographer Ann Markusen, “congressional delegations enhanced their
district’s share of the defense-budget pie.”630 Markusen further argued that boosterism
and lobbying by civic officials and by prime contractors combined to “dole out bases and
contracts at the taxpayers’ expense for narrow electoral gains.”631 Ultimately, important
legislators ensured manufacturing plants and large scale employers in their districts
maintained a small nucleus of domestic, mostly military, shipbuilding.
Years of steering prime contracts to select shipbuilders and neglect of the
merchant fleet by the DoD and the Maritime Administration took their toll on emergency
ship building and repair capabilities by 1985. During Senate Armed Service Committee
hearings for the National Shipbuilding Base Act of 1985, fears of insufficient emergency
ship building and sealift capabilities came to light. Proposed by Senator Stephen
Symmes of Idaho, the Shipbuilding Base Act intended to preserve what little remained of
the domestic maritime industry after the bankruptcies of the 1980s.632 Budgetary
constraints for shipbuilding and repair for vessels other than combatants for the “600
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ship” navy plan fell by the wayside between 1981 and 1985. During the first term
of the Reagan administration, some 150 new naval combat vessels were built or
recommissioned from the “mothball fleet.” In the same time period, less than 50 new
merchant ships were built in the United States. The majority of new additions to the
cargo fleet were built at shipyards overseas.633 Everett Pyatt, Reagan’s Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Shipbuilding and Logistics, testified that “uncompetitive yards”
and “wage differentials” on shore and at sea caused the collapse of domestic maritime
trades. Moreover, Pyatt noted that the DoD projected another 25 percent contraction in
American maritime trades by 1990.634 The breathtaking rapidity in the decline of the
domestic maritime industry heightened the interest at the DoD for finding alternatives to
U.S. workers and ships in case of a “global sealift mobilization” or a Third World War.
Senator William Cohen of Maine, chair of the Subcommittee on Sea Power and
Projection asked several questions of Pyatt regarding cruiser and destroyer construction
at Bath Iron Works in Maine. Pyatt acknowledged that Bath would remain the choice for
building dozens of new Arleigh Burke destroyers in the coming decades.635 Confirming
a bright future of steady naval construction and employment along the Kennebec River in
Maine, Cohen turned his attention to sealift issues. The senator stated, “There has been an
argument going on for quite few years regarding the availability of a U.S. controlled
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fleet. Are those ships part of your contingency plans for wartime sealift?”636 Pyatt
answered in the affirmative. Cohen then asked, “Your plans include these ships…built in
other countries and registered in Panama, Liberia, or Honduras?” Pyatt noted that the
DoD’s plans relied heavily on foreign flagged ships and crews.637

Cohen’s finally asked

whether “we have any plan to reduce our reliance on these [foreign flagged] ships in the
future?” Pyatt’s answer of “No, I do not know of any” confirmed the DoD’s intended
reliance on outsourcing.638 The Shipbuilding Base Act meant to preserve the small
remainder of the maritime base in the United States. The Act ultimately failed in
committee because of labor costs.
The pace of cost reductions by way of outsourcing and automation for federal and
defense cargo needs accelerated in spite of limited measures designed to support the
maritime industry in the mid-1980s. While U.S. flagged shipping faltered throughout the
decade, Congress attempted to preserve what little of the merchant fleet remained. The
Food Security Act of 1985, also known as the Farm Bill, expanded cargo preference for
agricultural exports. Public Law 480, a vestige of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936,
required at least 50 percent of government shipments to utilize U.S. flagged shipping.
The Farm Bill raised the Department of Agriculture’s (DoA) requirement to 75 percent
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for grain shipments at ports in the Great Lakes.639 Ultimately, the legislative support for
Great Lakes ports meant little to offset the collapse of U.S. flagged shipping. More grain
shipments found their way to the automated port facilities in New Orleans where nonU.S. flagged shipping was in abundance and not subject to the Farm Bill’s added cargo
preference requirements. The added requirement did benefit local economies, however.
The Farm Bill increased numbers of jobs for longshoremen and promoted growth at port
cities such as Duluth, MN, and Milwaukee, WI. Unfortunately for the short-lived
renaissance in select Great Lakes ports, the lure of lower costs due to automation and no
added rules at Gulf Coast ports was far more attractive to the budget minded Department
of Agriculture.640
In spite of the Farm Bill’s requirements, the DoA ignored the new law’s
requirements as well as general P.L. 480 cargo preference rules. The ILA and the
Seafarers Union accused the DoA of circumventing maritime laws, including P.L. 480
and the Farm Bill. Secretary of Agriculture John Block’s reasoning for bypassing U.S.
flagged shipping was that high costs and union labor “hurt the American farmer.”641 First
term Congresswoman Helen Bentley of Maryland attacked Block’s explanation as “an
excuse.” Bentley added that “[Block’s] agency repeatedly and flagrantly violated cargo

Public Law 99-198. https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-99/pdf/STATUTE-99-Pg1354.pdf.
Accessed on February 12, 2016.
639

640
Charles S. Gitomer and C. Ford Runge, “Cargo Preference Legislation, Agricultural Exports, and the
Future of the Duluth-Superior Economy: A Legislative History and Economic Analysis”. Records of the
Office of Management Services, Division of Management and Organization, 1981-1984; Box 20; Records
of the U.S. Maritime Administration, Record Group 357; National Archives, College Park, MD. The
authors argued that Congressional delegations from the Upper Midwest instated the Great Lakes export
provision into the bill.
641

“A Friend of Shipping”, Journal of Commerce (New York), April 23, 1985.

221

preference laws.”642

Bentley, the former maritime editor of the Baltimore Sun and

former Federal Maritime Commissioner, added that most federal agencies regularly
ignored P.L. 480 and other cargo preference ordinances because the laws had “no teeth.”
The collapse of regulatory authority in transportation extended even to the federal
government enforcing its own behavior. Bentley continued, “even after Maritime [the
FMC} finds violations, there is no provision for penalties or any way to make possible
the recapture of lost cargoes.”643
Bentley and labor unions also attacked federal agencies such as the Department of
State and the DoD for ignoring cargo preference laws. Secretary of Transportation
Elizabeth Dole stated that “the White House approved” of federal agencies finding
alternatives to U.S. flagged shipping throughout the early 1980s. Members of Congress
from maritime districts attacked members from agricultural districts and vice versa over
the cargo preference issue.644 The Agency for International Development, which shipped
much of the State Department’s food relief cargo to the developing world, fell below the
50 percent requirement in 1983, 1984, and the first few months of 1985.

The same was

true of NASA, the DoA, and the DoD.645 Cargo preference laws required federal
agencies to search for available U.S. shipping before contracting with foreign flagged
shipping.
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shipping after the industry’s long decline or the frequent refrain of “U.S. shipping and
labor” cost too much.646 The DoD’s reasoning behind attempted circumvention of cargo
preference laws was a bit more complex. In spite of the allocation of hundreds of billions
of dollars for new weapons systems during the 1980s, the DoD deemed the comparatively
small costs of using U.S. flagged shipping or labor as “exorbitant.”647 The Maritime
Administration’s surveillance of DoD contracts showed a “persistent attempt by the
DoD” to avoid using the cargo preference. Additionally, Congresswoman Bentley
described the DoD’s behavior as “a threat to the viability of the cargo preference.”648
The behavior Bentley warned against included a DoD backed bill to amend the
Cargo Preference Law of 1904. Unlike other federal agencies, preference laws required
the DoD to attempt “in good faith” to ship 100 percent of their cargo using U.S. flagged
shipping. Only the lack of available U.S. flagged ships legally allowed the DoD to
contract foreign flagged ships. The DoD sent legislation to Congress in April of 1985 to
“authorize the president to enter into agreements with member nations of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization for certain cooperative projects.”649 According to Bentley,
“one section of the proposed bill would exempt all DoD procurements involving these
NATO countries from America’s cargo preference laws.” Bentley and her colleagues on
the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee blocked the DoD’s proposed
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bill.650 In August 1985, the DoD attempted a non-legislative circumvention of cargo
preference. In a short memorandum from the desk of Ronald Reagan, the President
“delegate[d] to the Secretary of Defense all the functions vested in me by the Cargo
Preference Act of 1904.”651 In essence, the DoD now had a free hand in avoiding cargo
preference and U.S. flagged shipping. The NATO-shipping plan, which failed in
Congress, required funding in the next defense budget, but allies of maritime labor
blocked the administration and the DoD’s attempt to find a way around preference. In
the final line of the 1987 $456.5 billion defense appropriation bill, Alaska Senator Ted
Stevens inserted a prohibition of “the expenditure of funds to implement” the DoD’s
“Cargo Preference.” Finally, the bill required the DoD to “use funds…in accordance
with the Cargo Preference Act of 1904.”652 Attempts by the DoD to outsource,
circumvent, and explore new methods of cost reductions in cargo transport ultimately
bore no fruit. The recurring attempts, though, illustrated a persistence within the DoD to
avoid relatively small costs related to cargo preference. The Maritime Administration
(MARAD) documented reimbursement of other federal agencies for government related
shipping aboard U.S. flagged vessels in 1983 and 1984. The sum total transferred from
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MARAD to these other agencies was $536 million, a small amount when compared to the
billions wasted on military procurements the era.653
Calls for reform in defense spending, procurement, and operations came to a head
with another heavily publicized study of defense procurement in 1985. Chaired by
former NATO commander Andrew Goodpaster and former Secretary of Defense Melvin
Laird, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) “Defense Organization
Project” sought to address repeated criticisms of military spending and planning.654
According to Goodpaster and Laird, “through the course of this study, we have become
convinced of the need, and potential benefits of, defense reform.”655 The members of the
project’s steering committee included a “who’s who” of members of Congress, political
appointees, and retired members of the military. Chairs and ranking members of the
House and Senate Armed Services Committees, including Newt Gingrich, Les Aspin,
William Cohen, and Sam Nunn, were all members of the steering committee. Executive
appointees, academics who studied the military-industrial complex, and other politicos,
such as Norman Augustine, Jacques Gansler, and Samuel Huntington, filled out the
remainder of the committee. The CSIS’s committee represented the most powerful
political and intellectual forces in Washington.656
653
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According to the study, CSIS launched its project to “enhance the organization
and management of the defense establishment.”657 In an introduction written by Robert
McNamara and his five successors as Secretary of Defense, the former administrators
warned that “we cannot afford to waste scarce defense resources in the face of continued
tests from enemies and requests for assistance from allies.”658 The recommendations
received the support of former secretaries since they were “united in support for the
general thrust of [the study’s] proposals.”659

The study’s proposals included the familiar

buzzwords of the deregulatory reform movement, including “efficiency” and
“streamlining.” Caspar Weinberger’s 1982 argument in favor of bi-annual defense
budgets and less congressional oversight resurfaced as the very first proposal made by the
CSIS study in 1985.660

Other proposals within the study obliquely addressed disastrous

cost overruns for inoperable or deficient weapons programs of previous years. A panel
on weapons acquisition chaired by management specialist and automation proponent
Jacques Gansler argued for “natural market incentives” for cost reductions. Gansler
hoped that market forces could “increase…the health of the defense industrial base.”661
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Calling attention to out of control prices on defense products, the report called for
Congress to adopt “a multi-year budget cycle and disengage itself from detailed line-item
reviews”.662
Budget reviews aside, reorganizing the DoD became the study’s most important
long-term suggestion. The study’s most well-known recommendation called for a
strengthening of the position of Chair of the Joint Chiefs Staff (JCS). Cutting
organizational waste and steps in the chain of command and consolidating processes
became the recurring argument of CSIS. Duplicated agencies and efforts represented a
recurring problem in defense management throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The multiple
agencies tasked with logistics alone embodied inefficiencies within the DoD; the failed
merger of the MSC and MTMC in 1982 exemplified the problem. The CSIS study made
pointed recommendations for merging DoD commands in order to cut wasteful spending
and overstaffing.663

The study called for reductions in Office of the Secretary of

Defense (OSD) staff and corresponding “cuts in the congressional staff” because these
personnel “[have] been a major factor in the growth of micro-management of defense
issues by Congress.”664 In order to bring about the recommended changes in
congressional and OSD oversight, the study called for cutting 15,000 DoD civilian jobs
and “even larger numbers of personnel” assigned to support facilities.665 Rather than
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directly addressing the numerous cost overruns and episodes of waste and abuse of
contracts during the early 1980s, the best and brightest in the military-industrial complex
called for cuts in staffing and civilian personnel. According Andrew J. Pierre, a senior
fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations, consolidating the JCS role and reforms of
DoD procedures made the CSIS study the most “moderate and realistic” proposal for
DoD reforms in decades. Moreover, Pierre described proposed changes in procurement
based on “market incentives, in lieu of regulation” as a “pragmatic, non-polemic”
approach to reform.666
The CSIS study and an accompanying television special released in mid-1985
accelerated public and political criticism of defense procurement and operations. The
study’s description of a “broken” defense establishment and well-known figures in
concurrence lent gravitas to the findings. More than 30 newspapers printed reviews of
the study, and nearly every article discussing defense reform made reference to CSIS and
its high-profile participants. In addition, CSIS coordinated with PBS station WHRO to
produce an hour-long, nationally televised special in the summer of 1985. According to
study coordinator Philip Odeen, “nearly 20 stations” aired the special in cities such as
“New York, Washington, Tampa, and San Francisco.”667 The study, media reports, and
the television special’s wide distribution allowed Odeen to state that the CSIS made “an
important contribution to debate on these issues.” Odeen took pride that study
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contributor Congressman Les Aspin introduced legislation that “bares a strong
resemblance to the recommendations to our study group.” Odeen stated, “legislation is
expected to follow completion of this process in the fall.”668
Along with legislative initiatives, President Reagan appointed a special
commission to study reform with familiar names from CSIS’s committee. In June, 1985,
the president formed the Presidential Commission on Defense Management. Tasked with
suggesting further reforms at the DoD, the panel drew much of its membership from the
CSIS study board. Former Under Secretary of Defense William Perry and Under
Secretary of the Navy James Woolsey joined the commission from the CSIS panel.669
No figure, however, commanded attention more than the commission’s chairman,
former Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard. Upon his appointment by the
president, the New York Times described Packard as “a 72 year old industrialist…[ who]
has 6-foot-four presence and an imposing reputation that tends to lend credibility to an
enterprise.”670 Packard, who returned to his computer and defense contracting firm after
leaving public office, introduced “proper management” to defense contracting during his
tenure at the DoD between 1969 and 1971. According to Packard in 1971, “proper
management” meant using private sector models to streamline a bloated, inefficient
government. Packard’s methodology and preferences while at the DoD included a higher

668

Ibid.

669

Ibid.

Bill Keller, “A Familiar Face, a Familiar Problem”, The New York Times, June 20, 1985.
http://www.nytimes.com/1985/06/20/us/a-familiar-face-a-familiar-problem.html Accessed March 22,
2016.
670

229

reliance on expensive technologies and automation. 671 In 1985, Packard wanted to
know “why the hell they didn’t keep it up.” As chair of the DoD reform commission,
Packard promised, “it is one of the things I want to find out.”672 In accepting the
leadership of the commission, Packard vowed to “build a battering ram” against accepted
DoD practices and to “try disestablish some procedures.” <word missing According to
Packard, he intended to accept all of the CSIS recommendations in “radically revamping”
the organizational culture within the military-industrial complex. Packard explained that
“people are really fed up” with the recurring stories of waste and mismanagement at the
DoD.673 Packard’s commission offered fundamental changes within the militaryindustrial complex by the fall of 1985. Packard’s changes would emulate his
management solutions offered in the early 1970s and mimic governmental deregulation
and privatization from the early 1980s.
Over the course of the first term of the Reagan administration, reform became
another term for deregulation and, in some cases, privatization of federal responsibilities.
Throughout the early 1980s, regulatory protections gave way to a popular sentiment that
deregulation and private sector solutions were a panacea for ills in the federal
government. Even in light of large scale corruption and abuse by large scale defense
contractors, the allure of the private sector for more solutions in the government and

671
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military sectors remained.

The rise of large scale, increasingly globalized and

automated shipping mirrored the process of government abdicating responsibility for
aspects of the economy. Erosions of older practices and protections for labor during
PATCO, RICO indictments of labor organizations, and deregulation of the maritime
industry resulted in fewer voices and opportunities to stem the flow of jobs from the
shoreline and ships involved in military trades. Persistent attempts by the DoD to avoid
using U.S. flagged shipping embodied one of these tendencies. Finally, increased
attraction to technologies related to automation worsened the depopulation of the national
security waterfront during the early 1980s. The process of automation, beginning with
the introduction of the cargo container in the late 1950s, culminated in the globalization
of the national security waterfront by the late 1980s. The security consequences of
depopulation and mass unemployment of maritime labor on the docks, ships, and in the
shipyards repeatedly reared its head by the 1990s and beyond.
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“THEY DIDN’T HAVE THE NUMBERS”:THE TWILIGHT OF
MARITIME LABOR, 1986-1997.
In 1997, the facilities of Long Beach Naval Shipyard sat dormant following its
closure two years earlier. The collapse of the Soviet Union prompted Congress and the
defense establishment to begin reductions in military spending. The end of the Cold War
resulted in cancellation of weapons contracts, reductions in uniformed personnel, and a
partial demilitarization called the “Peace Dividend.”674 Support facilities such as Long
Beach closed in the early 1990s along with hundreds of sites and defense plants
nationwide. Few regions were as reliant on defense dollars as Southern California.
Municipal leaders in Greater Los Angeles looked to the naval shipyard site on Terminal
Island to stabilize the local economy after the end of big defense budgets. Beginning in
March 1997, Los Angeles began to raise capital to convert the abandoned naval shipyard
to build “the world’s largest container terminal.”675
Rather than merely repurposing an abandoned site, the transfer a former naval
base for use as cargo container terminal represented the culmination of automation and
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globalization along the National Security Waterfront.676 The invention of the cargo
container in 1958 began a chain of events culminating in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
First, new management methods introduced by the McNamara and David Packard tenures
at the Department of Defense (DoD) during the 1960s and early 1970s called for greater
dependence on technology and automation. Next, greater dependence on automation
technologies included the DoD’s decision to containerize its cargo shipments and
facilities.677 Defense spending cuts of the 1970s and increased containerization in the
private sector combined with an economic downturn to further the process of automation.
The rise of deregulation and automation-related wage cuts as cure-alls became popular in
political campaigns and in defense planning during the late 1970s and early 1980s.678 The
penultimate stage of this process came during the first term of Ronald Reagan’s
administration. Defense budget increases in the early 1980s during construction of a
“600 ship navy” and other military improvements went solely to technological

The “National Security Waterfront” was an outgrowth of the Cold War era “National Security State.”
Beginning in 1947, military preparedness influenced the vast majority of national economic and policy
decisions. The “National Security Waterfront” describes the maritime logistics aspects of the Cold War
military buildup. For more on the labor and shipping concerns of the U.S. military, please see Chapters IIIV of this study. For more on the broad strokes of national policy under the auspices of the National
Security State, see Douglas T. Stuart, Creating the National Security State: A History of the Law that
Transformed America, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 1-8.
676

Andrew Gibson and Arthur Donovan, The Abandoned Ocean: A History of United States Maritime
Policy, (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2000.),107; Anthony Scotto, “Has the
Container Bubble Already Burst?”, ILA Local 1814 Newsletter, April 8, 1968. Helen Delich Bentley
Papers, Langsdale Memorial Library, University of Baltimore, Baltimore, MD.; Transcript, David Packard,
November 29, 1988, interviewed by Albert Goldberg and Maurice Matloff, pg. 13, Historical Office, Office
of the Secretary of Defense,
http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_PackardDavid11-28-1988.pdf
677

Transcript, David Packard, November 9, 1987, interviewed by Albert Goldberg and Maurice Matloff,
pg. 12, Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_PackardDavid%2011-9-1987.pdf.
678

233

innovations.679 A deregulatory and free enterprise impulse within the Reagan
administration characterized the government’s response to the steep decline in the
domestic maritime industry and labor pool.

As a result of the processes beginning in the

1950s, the DoD committed to containerization in order to match trends in the private
sector during the 1980s.680
The fourth and final stage in the process of globalization on the National Security
Waterfront took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Decisions and policies aimed at
improving logistics through containerization integrated the Defense establishment into
the globalized shipping economy. Rapid deindustrialization, or the decimation of jobs
and infrastructure in the maritime industry justified the DoD commitment to
containerization.681 The results of deindustrialization, limited U.S. flagged shipping and
maritime labor to man the military terminals, hastened the pace of containerization.
Defense reforms stemming from the decline of the Soviet Union, procurement
scandals, and organizational confusion complicated the DoD’s transition to
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containerization. The Reagan administration formed the Packard Commission in 1985 to
address procurement scandals, which arose in the President’s first tern. The commission’s
recommendations, which included reorganization of the DoD and removing regulatory
oversight from defense contractors, became law with the Goldwater-Nichols Act of
1986.682 The rapid declension of the Soviet Union and budget cuts similarly determined
changes for the DoD’s conduct of operations.683
In spite preparing for a major strategic conflict with the Soviet Union since the
1940a, the DoD was unprepared for logistical support operations by the late 1980s
because of containerization. Sealift scenarios in DoD exercises, such as the bi-annual
Reforger deployment of equipment and troops, failed to prepare U.S. logistics networks
for a realistic emergency. Small scale shipping operations scheduled months ahead of
time lacked the spontaneity of a potential Soviet invasion of western Europe.684 The
decline of shipping and maritime laborers throughout the 1970s and 1980s reared its head
after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. The DoD responded by staging an
emergency sealift to defend Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf allies of the U.S. with
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Operation Desert Shield. According to a senior longshoreman, however, the DoD’s
reliance on containerization meant that “they didn’t have the numbers” of workers to load
the ships departing from the United States for the Persian Gulf. Of the required 2,500
longshoremen needed to load ships at military ocean terminals in North Carolina and
Texas, only 500 were available on site. In order to complete the herculean task of
loading dozens of ships in time, thousands more raced to the piers filled with idle military
cargoes.685 In spite of a colossal effort by often maligned longshoremen and merchant
mariners, the DoD accelerated its commitment to automation and outsourcing after the
Gulf War. The post-Cold War DoD shrank while folding its logistics operations into an
increasingly globalized and automated shipping network. Policy decisions by the
Clinton administration in 1993 attempted in vain to reverse the decline of maritime labor
and the DoD’s sealift abilities. Economic legislation connected to new global regimes in
the mid-1990s mitigated the benefit of preservative efforts.686
Globalization by way of containerization forever altered maritime logistics. Policy
decisions following containerization the late 1980s and early 1990s marked the beginning
of the end of maritime labor. This chapter aims to illustrate the legislative, operational,
and policy history of a period, which set the United States and the DoD on a course for
automation and deindustrialization. By pulling these separate thematic threads together,
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this chapter explains the contributing factors that permanently codified a containerized
economy and logistics system after the end of the Cold War.
Priorities in defense policy and spending of the late 1980s changed as a result of
warming relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Just as the United
States experienced in the 1970s, the Soviet Union underwent a severe economic
downturn in the mid-1980s. Prior to the final downturn of the linked economies of
Eastern Europe, oil sales on the global market mitigated structural problems in the Soviet
economy. Oil provided a modicum of stability and source of economic growth for the
Soviet Union. Central economic planning tied to high oil prices of the 1970s and early
1980s, however, proved unsustainable.687 The Soviet Union was incapable of keeping
pace with American military spending while maintaining other state obligations. As a
result, internal pressure forced the Soviet government to change its economic
priorities.688 The ascent of leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 began changes within the
Soviet Union. Market and governing reforms under the slogans of perestroika and
glasnost attempted to reform the Soviet economy.689 Moreover, Gorbachev initiated a
series of arms reduction summits with President Ronald Reagan. Without signaling

Charles Maier, Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany, (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1997), 61. COMECON, the western name for the linked economies of the
Soviet bloc, attempted to develop a consumer goods export economy like the United States. The only
Soviet product purchased in any volume on the global market was oil.
687

688
Maier, Dissolution, 105. Stephen Kotkin argues that Soviet military spending accounted for as much as
30 percent of the U.S.S.R.’s GDP by 1985 and that the occupation of Afghanistan continued to be a
financial millstone around the Soviet Union’s neck. For more on internal problems as the catalyst for the
end of the U.S.S.R., see Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted: Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2008), 60-61.

Kotkin, Armageddon Averted, 61-62. Perestroika aimed to bring market reforms to the Soviet statedirected economy. Glasnost referred to Gorbachev’s pledge for greater freedom and openness in Soviet
society.
689

237

weakness on either side, Gorbachev and Reagan negotiated large scale cuts in strategic
nuclear arsenals and each country’s respective military budgets.690
Changes in the global security situation and reports of contracting abuses inspired
DoD reforms culminating in the Packard Commission in 1986. Studies, such as the
Project on Military Procurement (PMP), illustrated deepening problems in weapons
spending and management issues within the DoD. Notorious episodes of waste, graft,
and corruption featured in the PMP’s study ignited a political and media firestorm. With
looming defense cuts following talks between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the need for
budgetary reforms had greater urgency by 1985 and 1986.691 In order to extinguish
outrage and address areas for improvement, current politicos and former members of the
defense establishment offered suggestions for solving the DoD’s budgetary and
organizational problems. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) study
of the DoD, “Toward a More Effective Defense,” included proposals for “future security
obligations,” budget management, and procurement reform.692 The recommendations
from the study evolved into the formation of a presidential “blue ribbon” panel chaired by
former Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard. The Packard Commission
comprised the best and brightest in the defense establishment. The goal of the
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commission was to re-introduce “proper management” techniques first offered by
Packard during his term at the DoD in the 1970s.693 Packard wondered aloud in media
reports “why the hell they [the DoD] didn’t keep” using his methods after a mere fifteen
years. In short, Packard intended to restore his methodology in his reform of the
military-industrial complex.694
The Packard Commission’s study of the military establishment offered numerous
recommendations after identifying serious problems in procurement as well as
organization at the DoD. Throughout the first half of 1986, members of the commission
compiled problems and offered interim or draft recommendations on solutions in
numerous well-publicized reports. Numerous “old hands,” including Secretary of
Defense Frank Carlucci, former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, and Nixon
administration economist Herbert Stein, among others, contributed to the commission’s
reports.695

Interim reports by the Packard Commission identified broad contracting

abuses identical to the Project for Military Procurement Study in 1984.696
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commission recommended by-passing the lengthy, expensive, and abused prone method
the DoD used to develop new systems, parts, or goods. Rather, the early
recommendations of the commission argued for greater reliance “off the shelf” products,
or buying new parts and products directly from manufacturers. Instead of reforming the
DoD’s procurement methodology, Packard his commission argued for purchasing readymade solutions from the private sector.697
In their evaluation of how best to reform the DoD, the commission’s final report
followed the deregulatory impulse, which characterized much of the Reagan
administration’s governing agenda. According to Packard’s introduction, the the
President charged the commission “unleash the drive and entrepreneurial genius that are
the core of human progress.”698 Among the key takeaway points from Packard’s
introduction, he and the commission argued for establishing “Centers for Excellence” to
propel “revolutionary progress throughout defense management.”699 “Centers for
excellence,” according to Packard, were DoD agencies that ran most like a private
corporation. The “revolutionary progress” would come about at the Centers where base
or project commanders were given a free hand in cutting through red tape or bureaucratic
obstacles such as regulations and labor costs. “Wasteful regulations” were the most
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pernicious obstacles enumerated by Packard in his litany of problems in day to day DoD
operations. He continued, “The [centers for excellence] program has shown the increased
defense capability that comes by freeing talented people from over-regulation…”700
Finally, Packard noted, “DoD must displace systems and structures that measure quality
by regulatory compliance and solve problems by executive fiat.” Packard’s prescription
simply followed his faith in private sector solutions for government problems. “Defense
contractors and DoD must each assume responsibility for improved self-governance to
assure the integrity of the contracting process.”701 As it was in the late-1970s and
throughout the 1980s, deregulation and allowing for corporate “self-governance” became
a cure-all for the ills in terms of government reform and spending. The Packard
Commission’s mission, to cure organizational problems and contractor abuses at the
DoD, turned into an instruction manual for privatizing aspects of DoD functions.
The commission’s final suggestions included budgeting and procurement reform.
The commission acknowledged the “increasingly troubled relationship between the
defense industry and the government” and the “depth of public mistrust of defense
contracting is deeply disquieting.”702 Affirming doubts of the general public, the
commission also reiterated its support for “industry self-regulation” rather than criminal
prosecution as a means of deterring bad procurement behavior. The commission
reasoned that prosecutions in other industries failed. “Nor have criminal sanctions
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historically proved to be a reliable tool for ensuring contractor compliance,” stated the
commission.703 No small part of the dislike of criminal proceedings as a tool of
maintaining good contracting behavior came from concerns regarding the damage
prosecutions could inflict on the defense industry. According to business ethics attorney
Andrea Bonime-Blanc, the commission “worried that misplaced and, in their opinion,
overblown public concerns about wide-spread abuse and fraud would also harm the U.S.
industrial base.”704 As PMP illustrated in their studies of the defense industry, “widespread abuse and fraud” was endemic in the defense procurement process rather than
“overblown.”
In its summation of how best to avoid extraordinary waste in procurement, the
commission argued for the defense industry to take the lead in rebuilding legitimacy. The
final report of the Packard Commission, released in June 1986, proposed a list of
“Defense Industry Principles” for contractors to follow in the future. Among the list of
“principles” and internal reforms, the commission called for contractors to adhere to a
“written code of ethics.” The “code of ethics” enforced conduct which “preserve[d] the
integrity of the defense industry” and to ensure the industry “self-governed by monitoring
compliance with federal procurement laws.”705 Previously, the Packard Commission
Ibid, 77. In the meantime, criminal prosecutions of labor unions and leaders reached an unprecedented
high during the late 1980s. For more, see James Jacobs, Mobsters, Unions, and Feds: The Mafia and the
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claimed public fears of fraud or graft in the defense industry were “over-blown.” In spite
of this assertion, the commission included these edicts as a proposal to root out fraud and
corruption in contracting.706 Corporate ethicist Bonime-Blanc noted that precepts for
internal reform and deregulation failed to maintain legitimacy because they were born out
of the defense industry. There was no “third party” or outside observation of defense
industry practices with the exception of the tax payer and the media. Moreover, BonimeBlanc explained that corporate ethicists within defense corporations had little access for
resources to enforce the prescribed “principles.”707
Organizational reform recommendations from the Packard Commission inspired
executive orders that altered the structure of the military establishment. Reorganization
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and their roles within the military command structure at
the DoD was part of an ongoing process prior to the commission’s assembly. In April of
1986, the Reagan administration issued National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)
219. NSDD 219, titled “Implementation of the Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon
Commission on Defense Management,” became an instrument of change within the DoD.
The President argued for “quickly and decisively” imposing suggested changes to
strategic planning, budgeting, and numerous other functions within the DoD.708 For the
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sake of simplifying the procurement and operations issues, the Packard Commission
suggested placing the acquisition functions, research and development, and operations of
the individual military branches into one condensed agency.
The Reagan NSDD mirrored the commission’s suggestions, but legislative
alterations in the DoD’s organizational structure came after passage of the GoldwaterNichols Act of 1986.

The Act codified the Packard Commission’s proposed alterations

for procurement methods and management at the DoD. Goldwater-Nichols also merged
similar functions duplicated among the various military branches and commands.
Packard suggested that the “Secretary of Defense should establish a single unified
command to integrate global air, land, and sea transportation.”709 Following the passage
of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the DoD condensed commands related to all aspects of
military operations, including by geographic region and specialized tasks.710 Commands
reorganized included regional specializations including U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM) for matters in the Middle East and European Command (EUCOM) for
NATO concerns. In addition, unique tasks, such as special operations (SOCOM) and
strategic matters (USSTRATCOM), combined related DoD agencies under unified
commands.711
Following Goldwater-Nichols, the DoD merged logistics agencies into the
Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), with varying degrees of success. The
709
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formation of TRANSCOM in 1987 placed the Army’s Military Traffic Management
Command (MTMC), the Navy’s Military Sealift Command (MSC), and the Air Force’s
Military Airlift Command (MAC) under one commander and one agency’s umbrella.
Initially, the Navy bristled at placing the MSC under joint command. Alfred Hansen, the
first commander of TRANSCOM, argued that the Navy’s objections came from a fear
that other branches or TRANSCOM “would usurp the authority of their fleet
commanders” in wartime conditions.712 Moreover, the Navy Department objected to
losing control of its assets, including a $7 billion investment in sealift technology during
the 1970s and 1980s. The bulk of these investments came in the form of purchasing SL-7
cargo container ships from the SeaLand Corporation.713 Ideally, the formation of
TRANSCOM would sweep away organizational infighting and allow the DoD to prepare
for logistical uncertainties. The reality, however, proved to be the opposite. The Navy’s
reluctance to cooperate with other subsidiary commands within TRANSCOM meant
command structure chaos in the first years after Goldwater-Nichols. Organizational
assets under total control of the Navy and the MSC, including prepositioning and sealift
ships, remained out of the purview of the newly formed TRANSCOM.714 Command
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structure change mandated by Goldwater-Nichols fell by the wayside as uncooperative
branches complicated organizational change.
While the DoD reorganized under the mandate of government attention, the
maritime industry woes reached a critical tipping point with only indifference as a
response. According to projections by the Department of Commerce and the AFL-CIO,
the rise of automation and a lack of younger mariners entering a dying field led to a
shortfall of nearly 8,000 seamen. Talmadge Simpkins, the director of the AFL-CIO’s
maritime committee stated that rather than addressing the compounding crisis along the
waterfronts of American cities, the federal government had a low level of interest in
maritime affairs. Business leaders described the Reagan administration’s lack of concern
regarding “merchant marine and shipbuilding problems” as a “bore in the White
House.”715 According to maritime writer Thomas Schaff, “our sealift deficiencies and the
mounting price tag of naval construction…is steadily undermining the defense buildup of
the Reagan presidency.”716 Furthermore, Schaff identified the public discussion and
frequent media reports of maritime decline as an obviously exploitable weak link in the
U.S.’s defensive posture. Citing the Falklands War as well as President Reagan’s own
statements about the importance of merchant shipping and maritime civilian workers,
Schaff argued that “our ability to re-supply U.S. forces overseas is rapidly going from
marginal to insufficient.”717
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While the maritime industry feared an “insufficient” sealift capability, U.S.
flagged shipping’s anemic abilities found its way into popular fiction’s depiction of a
third world war. Dozens of novels in the 1980s, occasionally bordering on Science
Fiction, discussed cataclysmic scenarios of war between the United States and the Soviet
Union. Most contemporary military fiction or “techno thrillers” featured massive nuclear
exchanges between the two sides and resulted in post-apocalyptic tropes of a fractured,
depopulated world. Other stories featured weapons systems run amok and technological
advances dehumanizing combatants or the general population.718
During the defense buildup of the 1980s, nuclear war fiction in print and in film
returned from a long hiatus during the 1960s and 1970s. Films, such as Nicholas
Meyer’s The Day After, Mick Jackson’s Threads, and John Milius’ Red Dawn, illustrated
a potential aftermath of a nuclear war in civilian society.719 Tensions between the
Soviets and the U.S. during the 1980s stoked fictional scenarios of World War III
featuring both nuclear and conventional weapons. Among the most popular examples of a
fictional conventional war scenario was author Tom Clancy’s Red Storm Rising. Clancy’s
“techno thrillers” found popular support in military and political circles. Clancy’s first
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text, The Hunt for Red October, became a bestseller when President Reagan lauded
Clancy and claimed that he “could not put the book down.”720
Clancy’s follow up text was Red Storm Rising, published in 1986. In the book, a
Soviet invasion of western Europe remained a conventional war and NATO forces
required sealift support from the east coast of the United States. The fictional Soviet
invasion of West Germany included a destruction of prepositioned American equipment
and supplies for NATO forces required to repel such an incursion. The book’s
description of how the United States would respond indicated the widespread knowledge
of the deterioration of the shipping fleet. In Clancy’s scenario naval vessels waited in
Delaware Bay while cargo ships awaited loading in Philadelphia, Camden, New Jersey,
and Wilmington, Delaware, joined a convoy bound for European ports. Naval officers
aboard escort frigates and cruisers feared the limited number of ships available for the
fictional resupply of ammunition and other war materials to fight the Soviets.721 The
convoy’s commander lamented the decline of U.S. flagged shipping and the
extraordinarily low number of available ships in comparison to World War II-era
convoys. The captain mused, “Now a submarine could sink one ship and get the benefit
it would have achieved in World War II of sinking four or five.”722
“Tom Clancy dies in Baltimore at 66,” The Washington Post, October, 2 2013.
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According to Clancy, by way of his fictional characters, the culprit in the failure
of America’s cargo fleet was expensive labor. In his description of the cargo fleet,
Clancy stated that “the senior seamen who made as much as” the naval officers who
protected the fleet were unprepared for the “wolves hiding under the gray surface of the
Atlantic.” Clancy further described merchant mariners as a liability in wartime
conditions. The naval officer questioned whether the mariners’ “comfortable, unionnegotiated salaries would be valuable in the face of missiles and torpedoes.”723 In
concluding his section on convoy preparations, Clancy, by way of his naval commander
character, offered two observations. First, he described the collapse of American flagged
shipping and the small National Defense Reserve fleet as an “outrage.” Clancy’s portrait
of the maritime industry’s decline included the severe description “to call the situation a
disgrace was to describe gang rape as a mild social deviation.”724 Furthermore, Clancy’s
naval officer observed supplemental vessels entering Delaware Bay to relieve the
insufficient numbers of U.S. flagged ships. A “Dutch container ship” arrived to add to
the convoy’s numbers, leading the commander to say “We’ll need all the help we can

arriving at ports in Belgium and the Netherlands in a major conventional European war. The estimate
argued the Soviets would probably attack the sealift as they approached the Bay of Biscay off the French
coast. Clancy’s scenario of an attack on the convoy bears a striking resemblance to this document. An
alternate CIA scenario included a non-nuclear attack on American port cities such as Norfolk, Virginia,
Wilmington, Delaware, Wilmington, North Carolina, and Jacksonville, Florida. The attack might include
the use of chemical weapons, such as nerve gas, on the port areas. As this would not count as a nuclear
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get.”725 Clancy’s description of the conventional sealift decried the failure of the United
States to prepare for this scenario and placed the blame squarely on the high salaries of
union mariners and a failure of national policy. In addition, a foreign flagged container
ship sailed into an American port to save the day.726
Clancy’s texts, especially Red Storm Rising, earned high profile supporters and
influenced global security in the late 1980s. Shortly after a failed summit between
Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, the president conferred
with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher on matters of Soviet-NATO relations.
Reagan suggested Red Storm Rising to Thatcher as a primer on how to read the Soviets
and how to prepare for conventional warfare in Europe. Charles Powell, Thatcher’s
private secretary, noted that the president argued for using Clancy’s text because “it gave
an excellent picture of the Soviet Union’s intentions and strategy.”727 The impact that the
text had on policy went beyond recommendations from the president. Red Storm Rising
was as wildly successful as Clancy’s earlier texts. According to historian Walter Hixon,
the best seller shaped the discourse and aspects of public opinion regarding defense and
security policy.728 The vignette of Clancy’s fictional sealift offered a surprising
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illustration in popular culture of the collapsed of the American maritime industry.
Moreover, the episode indicated the inaction of both politicos and the general population
to another potential threat to national security.
Seemingly connected to fictional sealift featured in Clancy’s text, in 1988 the
DoD staged the largest conventional deployment and resupply exercise since World War
II. The Reforger (an imprecise anagram for “Return of Forces to West Germany”)
exercises began in the late 1960s after the transfer of combat divisions from NATO
positions in Western Europe to Vietnam. In order to illustrate American commitment to
defending against Soviet forces, the DoD began the annual Reforger logistics exercises
and practice deployments of at least a division from the bases in the United States to
NATO bases in the Netherlands and West Germany in 1969.729 Army units prepositioned
tanks, armored personnel carriers, and a limited supply of ammunition and relied upon
airlift operations to fly soldiers into bases in West Germany. The purpose of the
exercises was to prove that the U.S. could reinforce NATO positions in Western Europe
in case of Soviet attack. Instead of relying entirely on cargo and personnel flights from
the U.S., Reforgers before 1988 featured limited maritime maneuvers.730
Prior to the 1980s Reforgers, other DoD exercises illustrated weaknesses of U.S.
logistics support plans. “Nifty Nugget,” a military and civilian airlift and sealift exercise
staged in 1978, was the worst example of DoD logistic ineptitude. “Nifty Nugget,”
Lt. Col. Martyn Morford and Captain Greg Jones, “Sustaining A Cold War Army”, Millrinder, No. 2,
(2011), 21-22. The article appeared as an official history in the Army’s 21 st Sustainment Command’s
quarterly newsletter. The deployments featured a mixture of active and reserve units and featured
coordination with airlift and sealift commands.
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which simulated a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe, failed to account for
adequate ships or aircraft for cargo. In the simulation, the totality of U.S. conventional
forces in Europe were destroyed and nearly 400,000 soldiers “died” because cargo ships
failed to arrive in time to deliver parts, ammunition, and other supplies. The
prepositioning of equipment was not a factor in the simulation. Most equipment was
destroyed without other needed supplies.731 Episodes such as “Nifty Nugget” had their
limits and merely reinforced the need for the actual redeployments of Reforger. The
horrific concept of all conventional forces and troops in Europe dying as a result of an
inadequate sealift and airlift chastened planners for future exercises.732 Reforger 88,
known as Operation Certain Challenge, became the largest actual redeployment of troops
to Western Europe since the end of World War II. Reforger 88 also included a massive
sealift operation from the United States to Military Traffic Management Command
(MTMC) terminals in Western Europe. In spite of a thaw in relations between the Soviet
Union and the United States, Reforger 88 deployed nearly 125,000 troops as an overt
demonstration of U.S. logistical prowess.733
Reforger 88 illustrated the extent of containerization’s effects on military
logistics. As an annual planned exercise, the lack of spontaneity in Reforger meant

James K. Matthews and Cora Holt, So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast: United States Transportation
Command and Strategic Deployment for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, (Washington, DC: Joint
History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and Research Center, United States
Transportation Command, 1992.), 1-11. The authors failed to identify the important details of “Nifty
Nugget”. They spoke of the broad strokes during the 1978 exercise as a bad antecedent to what they
described as a successful Desert Storm/Desert Shield sealift and airlift in 1990. The authors describe the
simulation’s death toll with “nearly all the 400,000 troops in in theater “died.”
731

732

Ibid, 2.

733

Morford and Jones, “Sustaining A Cold War Army”, 22.

252

staging materials and contracting shipping was a regularly scheduled operation. In
addition, loading “roll-on/roll off” (RO/RO) vessels headed to Europe at
MTMC/TRANSCOM ports in Texas, North Carolina, and other terminals became an
exercise under normal, non-wartime conditions. RO/ROs featured large ramps and flat
decks for armored vehicles. The ships for Reforger, both U.S. and foreign flagged, were
contracted well ahead of time. In addition, the vessels were in place for weeks or months
in waters off the MTMC container and breakbulk terminals in Beaumont, Texas, and
Wilmington, North Carolina.734 Reforger 88 took nearly a month to transport materials to
the port of Rotterdam in The Netherlands. Rotterdam, in the Rhine/Meuse delta, had long
been an important port in Europe. Containerization fundamentally altered Rotterdam
beginning in the mid-1960s. Road and rail access from Rotterdam to the interior of
Europe, especially the industrial regions along the Ruhr River, transformed it into the
continent’s biggest port.735 Beginning in the late 1970s labor costs and persistent work
stoppages along Rotterdam’s piers led the Dutch government to investigate methods of
automating the ports. Initial experiments, started in 1984 at Rotterdam’s Europoort,
included a massive expansion of container capacity and automated container handling
systems.736
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Across the Rhine/Meuse delta in the Rotterdam suburb of Capelle aan den IJssel
sat the MTMC’s primary port for Northwestern Europe. Proximity to the North Sea and
the rail and road access to U.S. bases in Europe made it a prime location for landing
materials on a regularly scheduled basis. Moreover, in case of a conflict with the Soviets,
the MTMC’s terminal on the Rhine/Meuse would be able to provide direct access to
NATO bases in the Netherlands and West Germany. Ships could deliver heavy
equipment and supplies, such as tanks, fuel, and other non-containerized material.737
Reforger 88 featured an extraordinary deployment of materials to Europe. After action
reports illustrated the volume of containerization at the MTMC’s terminal in Capelle aan
den IJssel. RO/ROs and standard cargoes landed at the MTMC port while automated
“computerized travel models” and containers ensured “port operations ran very
smoothly.”738
The redeployment exercise, however, lacked the spontaneity of an enemy
invasion and took entirely too much time to be considered “smooth” or efficient.
According to a RAND Corporation study commissioned by the DoD in early 1989 and
completed in early 1990, emergency sealift reinforcement from the Continental United
States (CONUS) to Rotterdam and Antwerp should take no more than 17 days.739 Even
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with the regularity of Reforgers and the prepositioning of materials for completion of the
exercise, the MSC and MTMC took a full month to complete the cargo aspect of the
mission. In essence, the extra two weeks to transport materials in a practice exercise was
unacceptably long.740
According to military sources following Reforger 88, the solution for slow cargo
delivery in military logistics was more automation and less civilian labor. Officers at
MTMC terminals enumerated the complex interaction at the piers under their command.
LTC Clark Hall and LTC Vincent Bernhard explained the complex interaction between
shippers, the military, and what the two officers described as the “labor intensive
process…of the movement of cargo itself.” 741 Rather than focusing on laborers in
MTMC activities, Hall and Bernhard emphasized the automated models the MTMC used
for faster throughput at ports. “Virtually all sustainment [of DoD missions] will move in
containers via the commercial transportation network.”742 Beyond their endorsement of
containers providing “unprecedented efficiency within the transportation system,” they
similarly testified to a second model also coming from the private sector. The officers
looked to the “success of Federal Express (FedEx),” which they stated was the exemplar
of correct logistics management. Hall and Bernhard, however, criticized the increasing
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subcontracting of military logistics support to the private sector. The authors concluded
that the MTMC needed to invest heavily in containerization.743 In doing so, the authors
inadvertently advocated the private sector and the container as the only solution for DoD
cargo handling.
By the late 1980s, the container’s efficiency in deindustrializing the waterfront
coupled with federal criminal investigations heavily damaged maritime labor. The term
deindustrialization entered the American political and economic discourse after the
publication of Bennett Harrison and Barry Bluestone’s 1980s text The
Deindustrialization of America. Harrison and Bluestone focused on populations
undergoing upheaval and mass unemployment as a result of plant closures in urban areas.
Poverty, crime, and related social ills followed the “ruins” of manufacturing towns and
abandoned factories the authors described.744 The authors interviewed workers
undergoing the trauma of losing their places of work and as a result, their communities.
One worker in Youngstown, Ohio, argued that “what Hitler couldn’t do, the [demolishers
of his plant] did.”745 Harrison and Bluestone’s emphasis on the Upper Midwest and
Northeast car plants and steel mills failed to capture the totality of what globalization had
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wrought on the American working class. Harrison and Bluestone failed to make one
mention of maritime trades, the terms maritime, waterfront, or longshoremen.
While scholars such as Harrison and Bluestone lamented the rapidly deteriorating
“Rust Belt,” the members of the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) were
under perpetual federal harassment regarding alleged mafia connections and other
unsavory behaviors. Allegations of mafia influence on the docks and among the workers
persisted after a flurry of federal investigations in the 1960s and 1970s.746 By the late
1980s, federal investigations of a new generation of organized crime leaders resulted in
media attention linking the mafia and the ILA.747 State and federal investigations in New
York of Gambino crime family leader John Gotti found racketeering activity along the
docks of Brooklyn waterfront. Brooklyn ILA leader Anthony Pimpinella simultaneously
maintained his membership in the union and the Gambino family. According to
testimony in federal court, Pimpinella was a mobster who used his position in the ILA to
further the Gambino’s loan sharking, gambling, and smuggling operations on the
docks.748 As with incidents of mafia infiltration of the docks in the 1940s or the 1960s,
the limited criminal element within the ILA of the 1980s became overblown by
sensationalized media reports. John Gotti, known as the “Teflon Don,” became a
flamboyant, notorious figure in mass media during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The

746

Jacobs, Mobsters, Unions, and Feds, 228.

747

Ibid.

Alan Abrams, “Brooklyn ILA Leaders Called Part of the Family”, Journal of Commerce, (New York),
April 24, 1991. Abrams indicates that the story of Gotti’s influence on the ILA first came to light in court
documents and the media during the late 1980s.
748

257

ILA sharing the spotlight with Gotti’s lengthy record of corruption easily categorized the
longshoremen as proxies for criminality.749
Automation compounded the ILA’s problems in the late 1980s. The
containerization of piers and ships accelerated during the latter half of the decade. 75
percent of longshoremen lost their jobs as a result of automation at large Atlantic ports
such as New York and Baltimore.750 Containerization had as profound an impact as
deindustrialization in the “Rust Belt.” No texts or national attention, however, came to
the rescue lamenting the “criminal” longshoremen. Rather, the opposite, or ignoring the
plight of workers on the waterfront was true and had been since the invention of the
container.751
Maritime labor’s twilight along the piers of America’s waterfront became an issue
in the election of 1988. Vice President, George H.W. Bush, ran to succeed President
Reagan and pledged to continue his policies. Similar to Reagan, Bush promised to
continue defense reforms and arms reduction talks with the Soviet Union. Bush’s lengthy
resume in national security and foreign affairs lent credence to his assertions that he was
the candidate in the best position to shepherd the United States through the waning days
of the Cold War.752
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In terms of continuing Reagan’s maritime policy, Bush’s promises were identical
to that Reagan’s 1980 campaign. In 1980, Reagan’s campaign proposed a seven point
plan to preserve the domestic maritime industry. Reagan’s litany of proposals included
preservation of shipbuilding, upholding the sanctity of the Jones Act, and maintenance
and growth of the U.S. flagged merchant fleet. Reagan promised to place the concerns
of the maritime industry and labor interests at the center of his plan and coordinate the
nation’s maritime infrastructure for national defense.753 Bush’s six point plan similarly
called for a revitalization of the U.S. flagged fleet, maintenance of the Jones Act, and
action on matters of government procurement by “consulting representatives of the
maritime industry and labor groups.”754 Bush’s nearly identical plan earned several
endorsements from maritime labor, including the prominent AFL-CIO’s National Marine
Engineers’ Beneficial Association (NMEBA). Bush’s accumulation of endorsements and
his close connection to Reagan contributed to his victory at the polls in November.755
Upon assuming office in January 1989, Bush placed a priority on coordinating
national security issues while keeping an eye on the waning Soviet economy and military.
Bush’s national security team included several Ford administration officials. Former
National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft served in the same capacity for President
Bush. Ford’s Chief of Staff, Congressman Richard “Dick” Cheney of Wyoming, became
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Secretary of Defense. Bush and Cheney’s tenure came at the close of the Soviet Union’s
ability to maintain its role as a strategic competitor of the United States. Bush’s own
recollection of assuming office indicated the dramatic shift in U.S./Soviet relations.756
“[Gorbachev] promised to shift Soviet military doctrine to a more defensive stance and
would unilaterally reduce their armed forces by 500,000 in two years—which, given their
total size, was small but a good start.”757 The concept of a reduction in Soviet forces,
previously unthought-of in the West, indicated the economic stabilization program
launched by Gorbachev years earlier failed. In addition, Gorbachev promised to begin
withdrawing Soviet armored divisions from Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and other
Warsaw Pact members by 1991. The largest conventional threat to NATO since World
War II had been the overwhelming numerical advantage that the Soviets had in tanks and
other armored vehicles along the West German border. The indication that this threat
would be removed in less than two years illustrated the startling changes underway in
military affairs.758
Proof of the rapid change in the global security situation and an emphasis on nonSoviet targets came in the first year of the Bush administration. The Bush administration
shifted its attention to smaller scale conflicts and interventions starting with the invasion
of Panama in December, 1989. The relatively small Operation Just Cause deposed
Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega with relative ease. Logistics for the operation
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proved to be a simple exercise of airlift and reliance on materials already in the area. The
collection of U.S. bases within the Panama Canal Zone provided the material support for
the invasion force. At least half of the 25,000 troops involved in the operation were
already stationed in the Canal Zone.759 The remaining balance of troops airlifted from
bases in the United States. Close proximity to CONUS, the near universal surrender of
Panamanian forces, and the rapid capture of Noriega in January 1990 halted combat
operations relatively quickly.760 Political figures hailed the successful operation as proof
of restored American military prowess. More critical voices noted that “a superpower
just whipped the poop out of 10 percent of the police force of a Third World nation. You
are supposed to be able to do that.”761
Changes in the security situation revived governmental attention toward defense
maritime matters as well. By 1989, the number of U.S. flagged merchant ships fell to its
lowest level since before World War I. Compounding the disappearance of U.S. flagged
shipping, replacement ships from the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) sat at their moorings
decaying and needing repair. The Department of Transportation’s Maritime
Administration (MARAD) repeatedly requested millions in funding to maintain the ships
of the RRF. Repeatedly, Congress underfunded MARAD’s requests. For the 1990
budget, MARAD requested $118 million to maintain the ships of the RRF for emergency
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activation. MARAD received $59 million, or half its initial request. Of the 76 ships
MARAD deemed capable of responding to emergency orders, the agency only fully
maintained 21 ships for reactivation.762
Shortly before the invasion of Panama in October of 1989, the Bush
administration issued National Security Directive 28 on the subject of sealift. Following
up on his campaign promise to ensure the importance of U.S. flagged shipping, President
Bush established policy guidelines to “ensure that the U.S. maintains the capability to
meet sealift requirements in the event of crisis or war.”763 Pursuant to that end, the Bush
administration instructed the DoD even in peacetime to “operate a minimum number of
sealift ships, including reserve ships.” This order required for the DoD to plan for any
contingency or as tested in exercises.764 Finally, the Bush administration’s attempt to
bolster a rapidly deteriorating sealift fleet included a massive recalibration of reliance on
NATO allies shipping fleets. Public statements during the Reagan administration alluded
to using shipping under allied control, mostly from NATO partners. In the case of
Bush’s change in policy, he intended for the United States to “be prepared to respond
unilaterally to security threats.” In addition, the new policy demanded that “sufficient
U.S.-owned sealift resources must be available to meet requirements for such unilateral
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action.”765 With the directive of the Bush administration, an attempt at altering and
restoring the sealift fleet was at hand.
Direct action by the Bush administration for a restoration of sealift capability
came in the midst of media reports and statements from allies airing serious concerns
about preparedness. Supreme Allied Commander Europe General John Galvin stated that
NATO allies were growing increasingly concerned during the late 1980s about the “crisis
in the U.S. shipping industry.”

According to Galvin, sealift capabilities were “weak in

the ability to move things in the first few days of a crisis.”766 Repeated calls for
preservation of U.S. flagged shipping fell on uninterested ears throughout the 1980s. By
1989, however, concern for the vitality of the shipping economy came from military
leadership. TRANSCOM Deputy Commander VADM Albert Herberger echoed the
sentiments of Galvin as well as that of European allies. According to Herberger, “for the
first time in U.S. history, three key elements for a healthy shipping industry are in
decline: numbers and types of ships, trained personnel to man and load cargo ships in
wartime, and the industrial base to build and repair ships.”767 From Herberger’s vantage
point, the long decline in the maritime industry had reached a crisis point. Herberger’s
mention of “personnel to man and load cargo ships” was a rare acknowledgment of
labor’s role in military logistics. 768 According to Herberger “our ships carry only 4

765

Ibid.

Theresa Hitchens, “NATO Chief pushes for National Sealift Policy”, Navy Times (Washington, DC),
September 4, 1989.
766

767

Ibid.

768

Ibid.

263

percent of the total of U.S. commerce.” “A new sealift policy would increase U.S.
competitiveness in shipping and provide a military advantage.”769 Herberger went as far
as to state that he was “confident Congress will support revitalizing the shipping
industry.”770 Galvin echoed Herberger’s promise of congressional support.771 Herberger
did not ‘promise’ Congressional support. “In fact”, Galvin stated, “I think Congress is
very interested in it, and as am I.” 772
In spite of executive and military support for sealift restoration and the
preservation of what VADM Herberger described as “trained personnel to man and load
cargo ships in wartime,” the plan found limited support in Congress. Shortly after the
Bush administration’s directive on sealift and public military support was released,
Florida Congressman Charles Bennett introduced legislation for a sealift revival with the
Merchant Marine and Defense Act of 1989. The bill expanded the subsidies offered by
MARAD for U.S. flagged shipping to include any ship capable of supporting an
emergency sealift.773 Maryland Congresswoman Helen Delich Bentley, a cosponsor of
the bill and longtime expert on maritime affairs, advocated passage for the sake of
rescuing the U.S. flagged fleet. According to Bentley, the federal government’s long
“benign neglect” of the maritime industry caused “intolerable losses to the maritime
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industry—some to the point of near extinction.”774 Rather than dwelling on how much
damage “benign neglect” inflicted upon the maritime industry, Bentley addressed the
legislation at hand. She noted that H.R. 2463 represented a comprehensive approach to
the “very serious deficiencies of our maritime industries.” Bentley added the bill
“mirrored the proposals of the President.”775
In spite of broad support from members of Congress representing maritime
districts or coastal states, members of the Bush administration and the remainder of the
House opposed H.R. 2463. MARAD Administrator Warren Lebeck affirmed the fact
that the maritime industry had suffered a steep decline since the Second World War.
Rather than looking at H.R. 2463 as a solution to cure the maritime industry’s ills,
Lebeck stated that the Department of Transportation could not support the bill. Lebeck
argued that while “similar declines have occurred in the fleets of our NATO allies,” the
administration “could not support programmatic legislative initiatives proposed in the
bill.” According to Lebeck, the administration opposed the tenets of the bill, which
increased the operating differential for U.S. flagged shipping. 776
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Following Lebeck’s testimony before the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries
committee, Congresswoman Bentley reminded Lebeck of other facts related to defense
maritime matters. Bentley stated, “There is a regulation...requiring the Defense
Department to ship all offshore supplies on U.S. flag ships…You know who we’ve had
the most trouble with that amendment? It’s over at the Department of Defense.”777
Words seem to be missing. Bentley’s interrogation of Lebeck went a step further than her
criticism of cargo preference rules. Bentley stated, “They do not want to use it. The
Navy does not want to use American flagged shipping. Why?”778 Rather than accusing
the Navy of malfeasance and illegality in following cargo preference laws in her opening
remarks, she used the question and answer period to raise the question of the Navy
avoiding U.S. flagged shipping. Lebeck responded that it was the fault of lightly
regulated private contractors, not the DoD. Lebeck explained that the methods of
contractor expenditures were unregulated by the DoD or MARAD.779 In the closing of
Bentley and Lebeck’s conversation, the Congresswoman raise the cargo preference issue
once more. “The reason we are putting the [cargo preference] in this law is because we
are afraid the DoD will begin flim-flamming again. We are very aware of the games
being played over there.”780 The matter, however, would be rendered moot. Rather than
offering an alternative for added funds devoted to preserving maritime labor and
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shipping, Lebeck and the administration’s opposition killed H.R. 2463. Beyond the
“benign neglect” suggested by Bentley, hesitance in enforcing regulations and apathy
characterized national maritime policy the late 1980s.
In light of the failure of H.R. 2463, the DoD began to search for alternatives for
U.S. flagged shipping and maritime labor. The DoD commissioned another RAND
Corporation study of sealift in light of challenges posed by automation and a changing
global logistics marketplace. According to the study, “until recently, the privately
owned U.S. flag merchant fleet provided sufficient numbers of cargo ships to transport
military unit equipment. The direct military utility of this fleet decreased substantially
because of increased proportion of containerships.”781 RAND’s concern in the decline
American maritime infrastructure by 1989 and 1990 included shipping and labor. The
trend of containerization in commercial logistics ultimately debased the DoD’s ability to
support a sealift mission because “special cargo modules [containers] cannot carry the
vast majority of Army u/e.”782 Subsequently, the DoD deepened its commitment to
modified container ships to carry a combination of cargo boxes and non-modular military
equipment such as tanks, helicopters, and other items that did not fit into containers.
Additionally, the DoD developed an “auxiliary crane ship” program. The “crane ships”
would assist ships carrying DoD containers to ports without container facilities. The two
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programs existed because the DoD designed “military equipment to fit commercial
containers, thereby increasing the transportability of military forces.”783
The RAND study suggested the solution to all future DoD transportation needs,
further containerization and subcontracting of logistics support to the private sector. At
the outset of their study, the authors discussed the most “important trends in civil
shipping.” “Integrated logistics companies provide end-to-end transportation services.
This evolution will continue to affect the types of ships being built and the availability of
those ships.”784 Due to increasingly containerized ports and sea lanes, the authors
concluded that rapid change in global shipping “can be viewed as a mixed blessing.”
Intermodality of containers, which the study described as “synchronization with all
transportation modes,” indicated one of the many benefits of recent trends towards
efficiency in cargo movement.785 Finally, the authors concluded their study with a broad
overview of the commercial shipping industry’s efforts in automation. “The trend
towards increased use of intermodal transportation will continue to reduce the number of
[non-container] ships in the U.S. merchant fleet. Given these circumstances, DoD either
has to fund programs to preserve ship classes that are no longer commercially attractive
or has to adapt to containerization.”786 Given the predisposition to automation in
previous government studies and actions, the DoD’s adaptation of containerization was
already well underway.
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By late 1989 and early 1990, DoD logistics planning for warfare became a
secondary concern as a result of the accelerated decline of the Soviet Union. In Eastern
Europe, calls for reform in Warsaw Pact states became full scale popular uprisings
against forty years of Soviet occupation or control. East Germany, the launching point
for a Soviet invasion of the West, became the first of the Warsaw Pact satellites to fall.787
The cascading rebellions or peaceful insurrections spread to the remaining countries
under indirect Soviet control such as Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. The rapidly
escalating crisis posed a diplomatic and security challenge for the Bush administration.
NATO allies grew concerned for instability in the East while the Bush administration
prepared for the consequences of the Soviet Union’s collapse. According to
contemporary reports, the U.S. government feared instability, but welcomed reform.788
One unnamed official cautiously warned, “If the opposition runs amok, we’ve got a
potential problem.”789
With the attention of the world focused on the Soviet collapse, long smoldering
turmoil in the Middle East ignited in the summer of 1990. For nearly a decade after the
Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iraq and Iran fought a long, bloody war. Nearly 1.8 million
Iraqis and Iranians died and eight years of war drained each country’s economic
resources.790 At the war’s cessation in 1988, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein requested
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fellow Arab League members to help pay off accrued war debt by cutting oil production.
The Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), along
with other members, voted against Hussein’s demand to cut production as well. When
rebuffed by Arab allies, Hussein took neighboring Kuwait to task and demanded
compensation for drilling oil wells across the Iraqi border.791 The Emir of Kuwait and his
oil minister denied the charges, but Hussein remained resolute. During the summer of
1990, the enormous Iraqi army conducted exercises along its border with Kuwait.
Hussein threatened Kuwait by referring to the wealthy Persian Gulf emirate as the “19th
province of Iraq.” Repeated veiled and open threats by Hussein continued into July of
1990.792
American involvement in Middle Eastern affairs increased throughout the 1970s
and 1980s. Interest in Israeli security, the region’s oil supply, and Soviet proximity to the
Persian Gulf following it invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 cemented U.S. alliances with
Arab states. The American interest in interdicting Soviet machinations, as well as
deterring post-1979 Iranian vows to expand into neighboring countries, deepened U.S.
commitment in the region.793 By the late 1980s, the United States had a regular naval
presence in the Persian Gulf. Iranian expansion into the Gulf included minefields and
small scale skirmishes with U.S. naval vessels. The U.S. Navy went as far as escorting
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oil tankers through the Iranian minefields near the strategically vital Straits of Hormuz.
Preservation of the integrity of sea lanes and securing stable oil prices for economic
purposes was at the heart of American strategy in the Persian Gulf.794
Military presence aside, the U.S. exerted financial and diplomatic pressure on
Middle Eastern states, including Iraq. During the 1980s, Iraq’s war with Iran drew the
attention of U.S. policy makers. The U.S. provided financial support and used the Iraqi
regime as a proxy against Iran. Ironically, Iraq used American economic incentives to
purchase computers from companies such as Hewlett-Packard and heavy weapons and
armor from the Soviet Union.795 In the summer of 1990, while Hussein made bellicose
statements, the Bush administration hoped to remind the Iraqi regime of the informal
alliance it had with the U.S. several years earlier. Bush and State Department officials
issued warnings to Iraq to cease its threats and military buildup along the Kuwaiti border.
With nearly a million troops and thousands of tanks, the Iraqi Army and Hussein seemed
incline to disregard its recent ally.796
In spite of U.S. warnings, Iraq followed through on its threats and invaded Kuwait
on August 1, 1990. After the Iraqi army quickly overran Kuwait, the U.S. quickly
responded diplomatically and with military preparations. President Bush made vows that
the “aggression against Kuwait will not stand” while the United Nations Security Council
passed resolutions calling for Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait.797 On August 4th, Bush
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assembled his national security staff to discuss options for responding to the invasion. As
Iraq’s stated goal was economic restoration through oil revenues, the Bush administration
feared interruption of oil supplies from the Gulf and the Iraqi threat to petroleum rich
regions in Saudi Arabia. After securing permission from King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and
other Gulf state emirs and monarchs, the United States began its operations to secure the
economic and military integrity of the region.798

The Bush administration formed a

coalition while the DoD’s prepared for military operations.
Similar to U.S. plans for the initial response to a Soviet attack on Europe,
defending the Gulf from the enormous Iraqi Army relied on preposition materials and
airlift. Following a meeting and a request for assistance from King Fahd, Secretary of
Defense Dick Cheney ordered the deployment of the first wave of American support.
Enormous C-5 Galaxy cargo jets and 747 passenger planes arrived in Saudi Arabia from
the United States and NATO bases in Europe with essential equipment and personnel to
defend the oil fields of the Kingdom. In the first week, thousands of American troops
arrived in Saudi Arabia with limited equipment and supplies. The commitment of troops,
however, failed to include sufficient armor or weapons to defend against the 5,000 tanks
of the Iraqi army.799
Prepositioned materials, including armored vehicles, sat decaying aboard Military
Sealift Command (MSC) ships anchored at the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia.
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Prepositioning materials in potential crisis points had long been a tactic of the DoD. The
Reforger exercises relied on materials and vehicles stored in West Germany, the
Netherlands, and Belgium. In the case of South Asian contingencies, the DoD
prepositioned MSC ships 2400 miles to the southeast of the Arabian Peninsula on the
British atoll of Diego Garcia.800 Their relatively close proximity to Saudi Arabia was a
demonstration of good DoD planning for crises involving the Persian Gulf. The age of
the materials, however, proved to be a challenge. Prepositioning ships as well as the
cargo aboard the ships held required overhauls once every two years in order to maintain
their operability. In the case of the five preposition ships at Diego Garcia in August,
1990, the vessels and their contents were at the end of the two year maintenance cycle.
Gasoline in the fuel tanks denatured and rubber tires rotted on armored vehicles aboard
ship in the heat and high humidity of the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, marine growth on
the bottoms of the vessels reduced the operating speed of the prepositioning ships. On
August 8th, the five prepositioning ships with aged and insufficient cargo departed Diego
Garcia bound for the Persian Gulf.801
The scale of Operation Desert Shield rapidly outgrew the insufficient and partially
inoperable materials prepositioned in the region. According to the Bush administration,
50,000 U.S. personnel would be required to defend Saudi Arabia. That number
increased greatly in light of the numerical superiority of the Iraqi Army over U.S. allies
800

Mercogliano, “Sealift”, 376.

Ibid, 377. The growth of marine life on the hulls of ships and other watercraft “fouls” the bottom.
Fouling of vessel bottoms adds weight and increases drag on the hull. This can reduce speed by as much as
25 percent or more. The fuel issue also weighed heavily on readiness of prepositioned vehicles. The
tropical climate allowed for algae growth in fuel tanks of army vehicles. The warm climate and salt in the
sea air also corroded electronics and armor in a large portion of the vehicles.
801

273

in the region. The Bush administration initiated the largest military operation since the
Vietnam War to defend the Arabian Peninsula. The United States planned to deploy as
many as 450,000 military personnel to Saudi Arabia by the end of 1990.802 By the
second week of August, aircraft landed and unloaded troops, materials, and “outsized”
equipment only deliverable by enormous Air Force C-5 cargo planes. “Outsized”
equipment included armored vehicles and limited numbers of tanks. The limited number
of C-5s and hazardous materials such as ammunition, however, meant that only 25
percent of materials or vehicles for the operation could be delivered to Saudi Arabia by
air.803 Why were they delivering hazardous materials? With the limited capability of
airlift, maritime logistics became the only solution for operational requirements. By
August 8th, Secretary Cheney ordered the Navy and MARAD to begin preparations for a
massive sealift from the United States to the Middle East.804
Once the decision was made to initiate a large scale sealift, warned deficiencies in
American maritime preparedness came to the forefront. While the Bush administration
marshalled diplomatic and airlift support during the second week of August, the sealift to
support Operation Desert Shield began as well. The majority of emergency sealift
resources existed on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts. Planned for relieving NATO during a
Soviet attack in Europe, the MTMC and MSC built up resources the Military Ocean
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Terminals at Wilmington, North Carolina, Savannah, Georgia, and Beaumont, Texas. The
eight converted Algol-class Fast Sealift Ships departed on August 7th and 8th from their
moorings at naval bases along Atlantic coast, bound for the three Military Ocean
Terminals.805 Fear of Iraqi armor and the rapid collapse of the Kuwaitis increased the
urgency of finding enough ships to carry mechanized infantry divisions to the Gulf.
Beyond the Algol-class ships, the lack of available shipping became obvious during the
second week of August. The ships of the Ready Reserve Fleet would take weeks or
months to activate. Breakbulk cargo ships able to hold the irregular size and shapes of
military equipment were in short supply. Containerization had all but forced breakbulk
service into extinction over the course of the 1970s and 1980s. By August 9th, the MSC
had only secured one available merchant ship for the sealift.806
Containerization’s damage to sealift became obvious when the Algols sat at their
piers empty because there were not enough longshoremen for loading. Two of the eight
Algols, Capella and Altair, arrived at Savannah on August 11 and the Pollux arrived at
Wilmington on August 12.807 Upon the arrival of the ships, insufficient longshoremen
meant long delays in loading containers, breakbulk cargo, and military equipment sitting
at the piers. According to ILA Executive Vice President Benjamin Holland,
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containerization reduced numbers of longshoremen at Wilmington-Sunny Point and
along the Savannah River in Georgia. Ordinarily, the ports employed about “500
[longshoremen], at Sunny Point and Wilmington, North Carolina, general cargo and
military.” According to Holland “once the Gulf War escalated, they needed a lot more
[longshoremen] and the call went out.”808 Retired Marine Corps General Bernard Trainor
and New York Times columnist Michael Gordon’s observation of the sealift illuminated
the serious problems in the DoD’s plans and assumption that containerization could solve
all problems in logistics. Trainor and Gordon commented that the delays on the piers was
the “price of years of [DoD] neglect” of maritime labor and shipping.809
Luckily for the DoD and the success of the mission, the long maligned and
marginalized longshoremen came to the rescue. Buses and private cars filled with
longshoremen departed ports along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts and raced for
Wilmington and Savannah. While military equipment travelled by road to the ports,
thousands of longshoremen rushed to the terminal points along the same highways.
According to Holland, “[the military] needed 2000 qualified longshoremen and we didn’t
have 2000. That’s the advantage of the ILA. We were able to mobilize qualified
longshoremen from far away, from Texas and Florida, to go and stay in Wilmington and
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Sunny Point and Savannah.”810 Available longshoremen by 1990, however, were few
and far between due to automation and containerization in previous decades. Holland
continued: “They didn’t have the numbers (workers). They needed to work around the
clock. They couldn’t work ten hours and take off or work ‘til midnight, fifteen hours.
They needed to work around the clock. If not, they couldn’t get the ships loaded to get
the military their cargo overseas.”811 After arriving at Wilmington, the longshoremen
immediately went to work. By August 16, less than 72 hours after the ILA began
coordinating the effort to get workers to Wilmington, the fully loaded Pollux departed for
Dammam, Saudi Arabia. The remainder of the Algols summoned to Savannah and Sunny
Point departed loaded by August 22.812
The emergency round the clock operations conducted by the ILA continued well
into August and September because of insufficient shipping. As car and busloads of
longshoremen made their way to Wilmington, MARAD and the MSC activated the aged
ships of the RRF. Several of the larger and faster ships laid up at RRF anchorages hadn’t
been tested in nearly fifteen years.813 Similar to the herculean effort to get longshoremen
to the terminals in Wilmington and Savannah, the DoD relied upon maritime unions to
find available retired or unemployed merchant mariners. Numbers of merchant mariners
in the United States had dwindled to a precious few by 1990. It was so difficult finding
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enough workers that the MSC and MARAD contracted then-retired merchant mariners
able to operate RRF ships. Furthermore, older or seasoned mariners were the only
personnel capable of operating older or obsolete machinery aboard RRF ships.814
Overcoming large distances between anchorages and MSC terminals exacerbated
the slow response by MARAD. Numerous RRF ships called into action sat at moorings
along the Pacific Coast at San Diego, Los Angeles, San Francisco, or Seattle. For
example, the Cape Horn was among the first of the RRF vessels activated in San
Francisco on August 8th. Passing through the Panama Canal, the Cape Horn travelled
5,100 miles at sea before it arrived at its designated Military Ocean Terminal in
Beaumont, Texas, on September 1st .815 Rather than a total disaster because the DoD
neglected sealift requirements, the sparse remnants of the maritime industry arrived just
in time to salvage the situation
The sealift continued well into the autumn of 1990. An army of longshoremen
continued secretly loading RRF ships at Wilmington and Beaumont. The secret stage of
the sealift continued well into September, October, and November of 1990. The
concealment was a political decision by the Bush administration. In order to obscure the
large scale of the operation until after the November midterm elections, the sealift from
Wilmington, Savannah, and Beaumont continued in absolute secrecy.816
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“Phase II” of the sealift took place after the election. Beginning in mid-November, a
second sealift surge started in order to get materials to Saudi Arabia and launch military
operations before the of Islamic holy month of Ramadan in March. By January 1, the
majority of materials had departed Sunny Point, Savannah, and other MTMC/MSC ports
in the United States. 817
The enormous scale of the “Phase II” sealift operation required the use of foreign
flagged shipping. The long unmanaged decline of American maritime industry meant
there were simply not enough U.S. flagged ships for the sealift operation. Of the 459
ship loads of materials landed in Saudi Arabia before the beginning of Operation Desert
Storm, foreign flagged ships carried 196.818 In comparison to other planned or potential
operations during the 1980s or early 1990s, the Desert Shield sealift was a relatively
small, safe operation. There were no Soviet submarines attempting to sink the sealift
ships, nor were there any attacks on port facilities in either the United States or in Saudi
Arabia. The 196 voyages or nearly 30 percent of the cargo carried by foreign vessels
showed the degree to which U.S. flagged shipping had declined.819 The emergency call
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up of longshoremen and merchant mariners, however, indicated maritime labor was
needed in such an operation.820 In the meantime, airlift ferried soldiers into position in
Saudi Arabia, and the Bush administration continued its coalition building. By early
January 1991, a confrontation between the marshaling forces of the United States and the
Iraqi occupation force in Kuwait was inevitable.
The unexpected rapid collapse of the Iraqi army meant that military operations
and logistical support came to a swift halt. Operation Desert Storm began in mid-January
1991 with an aerial bombardment and cruise missile attack on the Iraqi capitol of
Baghdad and Republican Guard positons in Kuwait. Shortly after the air war began, the
United States-led coalition invaded Kuwait. The much-touted Iraqi army surrendered
within four days, and the war ended relatively quickly by early March, 1991.821 The
stalemate the U.S. had prepared to supply with overwhelming logistical support failed to
occur. Ships sailing for the Persian Gulf were turned around, and loading at MTMC/MSC
piers ceased.822
After the war’s speedy conclusion, the DoD researched the reasons for victory
and how to improve operations for future conflicts. According to naval officer and

“ignoring cargo preference,” the necessity for shipping during Desert Storm/Desert Storm far outstripped
normal operations.
Benjamin Holland (President, International Longshoreman’s Association, Beaumont, TX), Telephone
Interview with the author, telephone interview, September 2, 2015.; Mercogliano, “Sealift”, 436, Office of
the Director of Central Intelligence, “Soviet Intentions and Capabilities for Interdicting Sea Lines of
Communication in a War with NATO”, Central Intelligence Agency, September 1, 1981.
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000261312.pdf Accessed on January 3, 2015.
820

Philip Shenon, “War in the Gulf: Iraqi Elite Routed, U.S. Soldiers Say”, The New York Times, February
28. 1991., Gordon and Trainor, The General’s War, 431-455.
821

822

Mercogliano, “Sealift”, 436.

280

official MSC historian Captain Harold Tiernan, the sealift surge at Wilmington and
Savannah successfully interdicted the Iraqi army’s movement into Saudi Arabia.823
Tiernan offered suggestions for future operations, including “increasing the pool of
merchant mariners” and “expanding the number RO/RO ships” in the MSC fleet.
Finally, Tiernan suggested that the MSC “consider the increased use of container ships,
particularly during the deployment phase of an operation.” Containerization, not more
maritime labor apart from merchant marine officers, was Tiernan’s solution.824 None of
the suggestions offered by Captain Tiernan acknowledged the role of the longshoremen
in the success of the sealift effort.
Reasons for success aside, contemporary political and intellectual voices assumed
that the swift victory of the United States was a moment unlike any other in history. The
rapid collapse of the Soviet Union and the overwhelming victory of the American-led
coalition in Iraq seemly indicated that the United States had no equal. Syndicated
columnist Charles Krauthammer indicated that in 1990 and 1991 a new epoch of history
began, which he described as the “Unipolar Moment.”825 Unipolarity, in global politics,
referred to a single powerful state after the “Soviet Union called off the Cold War”
according to Krauthammer. No other state had the economic or military power of the
United States at this point. Thus, Krauthammer explained that American leaders had to
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think of this new order as a “post-Cold War world” with the United States as the lone
arbiter and mover of global affairs.826
The term “unipolar” required the final collapse of the Soviet Union. By the fall of
1991, the Soviet state was in a death spiral. Nationalist or independence movements
sprung up in constituent republics of the U.S.S.R. Schisms developed within the Soviet
political and military elite over Gorbachev’s reform efforts and their failure to cure the
economic ills of the Soviet Union.827 The U.S.S.R. granted a modicum of independence
to republics as a last effort to maintain the cohesion of Soviet empire. This concept also
failed when Russia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, among other territories, formed the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The fractures came to a head by late
December when Gorbachev resigned as President of the Soviet Union and relinquished
power to Russia’s president, Boris Yeltsin. Moreover, the members of the CIS divided
the enormous military arsenal amassed by the Soviet Union.828 “Unipolarity” for the
United States came to fruition in the last week of 1991.
The rapid and unexpected death of the Soviet Union forced the United States to
draw back on now-unneeded defense spending. For nearly five decades, military
spending drove most aspects of the American economy. Defense plants spread out across
the nation developed previously unindustrialized areas and employed millions in almost
every congressional district. Reducing defense spending promised to become a lengthy,
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time-consuming political and economic process with millions of potentially
unemployed.829
Voices in and outside of government called for a redistribution or recalibration of
defense dollars. Seymour Melman, chair of the National Commission for Economic
Conversion and Disarmament, argued for rechanneling federal tax dollars into national
infrastructure. The “peace dividend,” as Melman described it, would be a reallocation of
funds from the DoD to other federal projects.830

Melman’s recalibration of federal

military spending was nothing new, nor was he the only politco with similar ideas. In
April 1992, four months after the end of the Soviet Union, Chair of the House Armed
Services Committee Les Aspin circulated his proposals for long-term reforms in defense
spending.831 Aspin’s proposals acknowledged the enormity of recent global events. “We
need to make an intensive effort to rethink our country’s traditional security policies in
light of the collapse of the Soviet Union.” Aspin concluded that “…residual Soviet
conventional forces will be incapable of external aggression for years to come.”832
Aspin’s proposals called for a rethinking of the U.S. purpose in the world and as
well as for sufficient logistical support based on the recent Gulf War sealift. Aspin added
that his rethinking of the DoD’s budget and U.S. role in the world “should make us
829
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militarily stronger and more secure than simply buying less of the same old Cold War
forces—a defense by subtraction.”833 Rather than calling for cuts, Aspin’s proposal
maintained funding levels and merely recalibrated the types of conventional forces and
purchases the DoD should make. Aspin described included another Desert Storm sized
conflict as well as humanitarian relief missions. In all scenarios, however, Aspin called
for “a combination of sealift, airlift and prepositioning sufficient to deliver forces” to
potential conflict zones.834 Looking to the Gulf War as a model, Aspin recommended a
rethinking of the U.S.’s sealift capacity. Aspin acknowledged that a “relatively small
percentage of our forces” took part in combat operations while the operation demanded
“very large fractions of the United State[s’] total capacity in many supporting functions,
including sealift.”835 With support operations in mind, Aspin recommended that “we
need enough support to provide real combat power that can be brought to bear” in times
and locations of conflicts.836 Rather than ignoring the role of sealift in Desert Storm,
Aspin argued for logistical support as a key factor in the adjustment of U.S. forces for a
post-Cold War environment.
Similarly, the DoD focused on logistical support in the post-Cold War, post-Gulf
War environment, but had a different conclusion than that reflected in Aspin’s proposal.
In 1992, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney directed the DoD to study alternatives for

833

Ibid.

Les Aspin, “An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces for the Post-Soviet Era: Four
Illustrative Options”, February 25, 1992, 19. Helen Delich Bentley Papers, Langsdale Memorial Library,
University of Baltimore, Baltimore, MD.
834

835

Ibid, 20.

836

Ibid, 21.

284

logistical support for future conflicts. According to Cheney, “As a result of Desert
Storm, one of the conclusions we reached was there was a role here to contract out some
of the logistics and support functions. They’d [contractors] have on a stand-by basis
materials, equipment, so forth and they’d fly in and arrive at the same time as the troops
or shortly thereafter.”837 Cheney commissioned the Logistics Management Institute
(LMI) to study subcontracting of sealift and other maritime logistics problems. LMI’s
study of sealift focused on the availability of U.S. flagged shipping in future conflicts.
According to the authors of the study, “those vessels and services may not be available to
DoD in sufficient quantities because of economic and political considerations.”838 The
study defined “economic and political considerations” as the rapid decline of U.S.
flagged shipping and the increased reliance on foreign flagged vessels during Desert
Storm. The authors indicated that the decline of U.S. flagged shipping would probably
continue unabated for the foreseeable future.839
Critical of “insufficient containerization at military ports” or “containerization of
military equipment,” the authors suggested that the DoD increase the intermodality of its
cargo needs. LMI reasoned that “cost considerations” were but one benefit of
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containerization. The authors argued that DoD needed to increase port security to
prevent “destruction or loss from sabotage, civil disturbance, or theft.” Moreover, the
study indicated that threats of “demonstrations, riots, or terrorists” could be bypassed
with further containerization.840 Old accusations of “theft” of cargos along the waterfront
and potential radicalism returned to the conversation regarding reasons for automation.
LMI recommended that “USTRANSCOM, in coordination with the MSC and other
military departments, should lay out a strategy for expanded use of container ships and
container ship liner service during both surge and sustainment phases of national
emergencies.”841 In addition, due to the hastening decline of U.S. flagged shipping, LMI
suggested the MSC “develop procedures for incorporating worldwide intermodal
transportation services” into their standard procedures.842 Selectively drawing
conclusions from Desert Storm to support further containerization, LMI concluded that
“these recommendations have the potential to substantially upgrade DoD’s logistics
abilities.”843 Rather than sustaining the effort that worked in Desert Storm, LMI
ultimately concluded that further privatization and containerization was the solution to
future DoD missions.
In 1993 recalibration of the DoD as well as military spending continued under the
newly inaugurated President Bill Clinton. Citing persistent budgetary inefficiencies and a
“system that doesn’t work,” Clinton’s Vice President, Albert Gore, championed a
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complete reformation of the federal government. Partially inspired by the 1992
publication Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the
Public Sector, Clinton created the National Performance Review in March 1993. With
the goal of “improvement in government operations” as a guiding principle, the NPR
under Gore’s leadership produced reports on waste and inefficiency in the federal
sector.844 The NPR’s membership included “corporate executives, government leaders,
and consultants.” The NPR intended to “put customers first, empowering employees to
allow them to put customers first, cutting red tape that held back employees, and cutting
back to basics.”845 In essence, the NPR was another private sector-driven, deregulatory
effort similar to the initiatives of the Reagan administration in 1981 and 1982.846 The
first recommendations Gore made to Clinton led to the “cutting the [federal] work force
by 252,000 positions, cutting internal regulations in half, and requiring agencies to set
customer service standards.”847 In short, shedding workers meant reform. The NPR,
renamed the National Partnership for Reinventing Government in 1998, continued its
work throughout the eight years of the Clinton administration.
The NPR and its agenda guided Clinton’s administration and included reform of
the DoD. Clinton’s first Secretary of Defense Les Aspin built a long list of credentials as
a defense reformer. Seeking to implement the reforms he called for during his
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congressional career, Aspin targeted unneeded vestiges of the Cold War. Aspin’s review
of the DoD, released in September 1993, called for a rapid reduction of certain Cold War
forces while maintaining the overall security of the United States. Aspin suggested
cutting the Navy’s 12 carrier battle groups to 10, substantial reductions of troop levels in
Europe, and closure of unnecessary DoD bases and sites.848
The closure of Cold War era forts, naval bases, and air force bases began before
Aspin’s tenure and accelerated by the early 1990s. Beginning in 1988 and with
subsequent rounds in 1991 and 1993, the Base Realignment and Closure Commission
(BRAC) searched for inefficiencies in the DoD’s physical plants and infrastructure. The
1988 and 1991 rounds of closures remained relatively small, especially in light of the
continuing Cold War threat posed by the Soviet Union. The collapse of the U.S.S.R. in
late 1991 created the impetus for a much greater scale of realignment or closures that
came in 1993. In April 1993, Secretary Aspin instructed the various armed services to
coordinate their proposals to “streamline DoD activities and increase efficiency.”849 The
1993 round included a proviso from Aspin to assist local communities in repurposing
closed bases and softening the economic impact of rapid and devastating job losses.
According to Aspin, the DoD in the post-Cold War world required a “fundamental reexamination of our force posture.” Aspin also argued that “Cuts by the subtraction
method will not supply us with the forces we need for the future.”850
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Aspin’s plan for a capable DoD attuned to the new environment and past lessons
included an expansion of sealift capability. In September 1993, the DoD awarded a
construction contract for 20 new sealift ships to Avondale Shipyard in New Orleans.
According to Aspin, the construction program would “preserve the U.S. industrial base in
key defense sectors.”851 Additionally, Aspin’s plan would overcome the lack of surge
shipping during the Gulf War. The contract with Avondale eventually funded seven Bob
Hope-class RO/ROs as an attempt to avoid the problems encountered in 1990.
Eventually, Aspin initiated the construction of fifteen more MSC RO/ROs or mixed use
cargo ships.852

The plan was not without its critics. Senator John Breaux of Louisiana

opposed the contracts for new sealift ships and questioned why the DoD should now
support “roll-on/roll-off vessels…more than commercial containerships.” Moreover,
Breaux demanded that the DoD look into subsidizing U.S. flagged shipping more than
building new sealift ships.853
Aspin’s plan to reshape DoD policy was short lived.

Aspin’s management style

and his decisions at the DoD found few allies at the Pentagon and fewer in Congress. In
addition, the ongoing humanitarian operation in Somalia took a turn for the worse. The
United Nations relief mission turned into a full scale military operation led by the United
States. Insufficient military equipment and a denial of air support from the DoD shortly
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before the deaths of 18 American soldiers turned the media and political establishment
against Aspin. He submitted his resignation to the President shortly thereafter.854
Aspin’s legacy of preserving sealift capabilities, however, lingered until March
1994. Secretary of Transportation Federico Pena and Maritime Administrator Albert
Herberger announced a ten year, $1 billion subsidy program aimed at forestalling the
inevitable death of U.S. flagged shipping. Lane Kirkland, the President of the AFL-CIO
and a career merchant mariner warned, “America is perilously close to losing its domestic
flag fleet.” In 1984, the U.S. flagged fleet numbered 373 ships. In spite of insufficient
capacity during the Gulf War and the shortfalls in shipping as a warning, only 264 U.S.
flagged ships remained by 1994.855 Herberger, the former deputy commander of
USTRANCOM, hoped the new “Maritime Security” program would “provide costeffective supplemental sealift and other transportation resources when needed to support
the nation’s armed services.”856
Opposition to the plan came from members of congress ordinarily predisposed to
maritime subsidies. Rep. Helen Bentley applauded the Clinton administration’s plan, but
opposed the subsidy because it would “increase the tonnage tax that shipping companies
pay the federal government.”857 Bentley’s concern for her home district in Maryland
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motivated her opposition. “Already, Baltimore and other ports have called to complain
that they would lose cargo to Canada.”858 In spite of trade advantages for international
ports, the Act eventually passed years later after promises from Bentley for “quick
congressional action.” Targeted subsides for sealift purposes seemingly disregarded the
deregulatory agenda of the NPR and other Clinton era initiatives. Political confusion
over supporting the bill added to the intrigue related to maritime subsides. Bentley and
Republican colleagues, who ordinarily supported defense bills, opposed the subsidy.
Senate Merchant Marine Subcommittee chair John Breaux, who opposed the sealift
expansion program a year earlier, cheered the Clinton administration’s plan as the “first
comprehensive maritime reform proposal since the days of Franklin Roosevelt.”859
Concerns regarding international competition and domestic political alignment
confusion characterized the trade legislative initiative of the Clinton administration. The
private sector approach of previous Republican administrations returned during the
Clinton administration with the deregulatory aspects of the NPR. Similarly, trade
liberalization concepts from the Reagan and Bush administrations were revived during
the Clinton years. First introduced and signed by President Bush, ratification of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) became a cornerstone of the Clinton
administration’s economic policy.860 Business interests attacked trade barriers as
expensive regulatory obstacles. The precedent set by the tariff free zone and economic
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successes of the European Community (EC) prompted policy makers in the three NAFTA
signatory countries of Canada, Mexico, and the United States mimicked the EC’s model.
NAFTA proposed enormous trade liberalization policies designed to promote economic
growth in the member states.861
By the fall of 1993, congressional ratification of the agreement became a battle of
the Administration and business interests against unions and their congressional allies.
American corporations looking for access to lower wages and fewer environmental
regulations in Mexico supported ratification. Meanwhile, unions fearing massive job
losses opposed the measure. The non-partisan Congressional Budget Office estimated
that more than 20,000,000 jobs would be displaced by ratification of agreement.862 The
battle in the American press over corporate deregulation and against staggering job losses
became a political firestorm. Democratic members of Congress, ordinarily supporters of
the President, allied with public figures, such as former presidential candidate Ross Perot,
civil rights leader Jesse Jackson, and consumer advocate Ralph Nader, against NAFTA.
Moreover, the AFL-CIO opposed NAFTA with a well-funded media campaign against
the agreement’s ratification.863 The Clinton administration turned required congressional
approval of NAFTA into a national referendum on free trade. Vice President Al Gore
took to the nation’s television airwaves to sell the positives of free trade to the overall
economy. In a highly-touted debate on CNN’s “Larry King Live”, Gore and Ross Perot
861

Ibid.

862

Ibid.

Ibid.; William Safire, “Laughter After NAFTA”, The New York Times, October 21, 1993.;, Joshua Mills,
“Business Lobbying For Trade Pact Appears to Sway Few in Congress”, The New York Times, November
12, 1993.
863

292

battled over ratification. Illustrating the political confusion over free trade, Gore
enumerated a litany of supporters of NAFTA, including “distinguished Americans from
[General] Colin Powell to [former Speaker of the House] Tip O’Neill to [Clinton
opponent and conservative talk show host] Rush Limbaugh.”864
The improbable alliance, forged by the Clinton administration to shepherd
NAFTA through Congress, provided a template for larger free trade deals. With a
majority of the Senate supporting the agreement, the House vote would determine the fate
of NAFTA. Described by the New York Times as an “odd coalition,” 132 Republican
votes and 102 Democratic votes passed the NAFTA bill.865 The Times lauded the “huge
political victory” of Clinton’s coalition of free traders and conservative politicians.
Moreover, the win “empowered Mr. Clinton to complete the more important Uruguay
round of international trade talks.”866
The Uruguay round of talks referred to the Global Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) summit of 1994. GATT, first established by the Bretton Woods
Conference of 1945, promoted new trade rules aimed at removing trade barriers and
inefficient regulations.867 GATT, however, lacked a governing body to codify the free
trade system developed since the end of World War II. The Uruguay round of GATT
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talks in 1993 and 1994 intended to build an international regime by which the global
trade system would operate. President Clinton, emboldened by his NAFTA victory,
pledged to shepherd the American consumer economy, far and away the world’s largest,
into the proposed framework of a global trade body. According to Clinton’s trade
representative Mickey Kantor, “The President understands there is a seamless web
between domestic and foreign economic issues. [Clinton] understands this and therefore
put trade and international economics to the fore, as a means to reinforce our national
security.”868 The new body, known as the World Trade Organization (WTO), existed to
“police and facilitate” the lowering of global trade barriers and protectionist regulations
and laws.869 Ratification of American membership in the WTO passed Congress with a
free trade Democratic and Republican coalition similar to the NAFTA bill.870 The full
membership of the United States in the WTO provided the economic and policy
legitimacy of the trade deregulation movement initiated nearly fifty years earlier.
With the legal instruments of the WTO facilitating free trade by the mid-1990s,
the cargo container became the physical manifestation of a globalized economy.
Containerization, from its introduction in 1958 through the 1990s, lowered labor and
transportation costs and facilitated more trade by making shipment cheaper and
ultimately more profitable. Journal of Commerce maritime reporter and historian Marc
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Levinson argued that the “box” made the “the world smaller and the world economy
bigger.”871 By 1995, nearly every apparatus of the U.S. government embraced the cargo
container and its effect on the transportation economy.
The DoD’s cargo strategies similarly followed the lead of the increasing levels of
globalization and automation. In the post-Cold War drawdown of the DoD’s budget and
physical facilities following BRAC closures, much of its property was repurposed for the
“new economy.” After the 1995 BRAC round, no former DoD facility embodied the
transformation of the economy more than the former site of the Long Beach Naval
Shipyard on Terminal Island in California.

Neighboring the largest cargo container port

in the North America at the Port of Long Beach, Terminal Island would double the
capacity of its predecessor. Hoping to lure large scale international shipping firms to the
former site of the naval shipyard, the Port of Los Angeles secured a pledge from the
China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) to lease the new site. COSCO, under the
influence of the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), faced criticism for
transporting automatic weapons used by criminals in Los Angeles the previous year.
California’s congressional delegation repeatedly demanded investigations from the
Department of Defense and the Clinton administration into COSCO’s relationship with
the military of the PRC.872 Even as the FBI warned of COSCO’s behavior and
connections, unnamed federal officials responded to calls for investigations with
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silence.873 The naval shipyard site ultimately did not become a container terminal leased
by COSCO. The Korean company Hanjin Shipping took up the lease and opened a
container terminal.874 Beyond Long Beach, waterfront BRAC sites became cargo
container terminals or storage facilities for empty containers. Fleet Industrial Supply
Center Oakland, California, Naval Station Mobile, Alabama, and several other facilities
became container terminals.875 Occupying the post-Cold War, deindustrialized fate of the
National Security Waterfront was the new global indicator of economic growth, the cargo
container.
The twilight years of the Cold War facilitated a transition from an older, statecentric economic and military order to a new global economy. The collapse of the Soviet
economy combined with political uproars against abuses in defense contracting informed
reform efforts in the mid-1980s. Deregulation coupled with contracting reform, deeper
commitments to automation technologies, and reorganization of the DoD became the
reform solution offered by the Packard Commission.876 The Packard Commission and
legislation afterward reorganized the DoD, but still failed to address deficiencies in
maritime logistics. Compounding the “benign neglect” of U.S. flagged shipping and
maritime laborers, various DoD studies and procurements continued the commitment to
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containerization of military equipment.877 The results of insufficient maritime labor and
an over-emphasis on containerization came to a head for the sealift surge for Operation
Desert Shield. In spite of the staggering effort of longshoremen and merchant mariners,
the DoD redoubled its efforts to emphasize containerization. Finally, the end of the Cold
War reduced available defense dollars. In turn, containerization coupled with a rapid
liberalization of trade after ratification of the NAFTA and WTO agreements completed
the globalization of military logistics. 878 The micro-victories and macro-losses for
maritime labor beginning with the invention of the cargo container culminated in the
1990s. Containerization did not completely destroy maritime labor. Rather, automation
technologies inspired legislation that finished the job.

Lawrence Schwartz, Alfred H. Beyer, Frederick M. McNamee, Click D. Smith, Review of DoD’s
Strategic Mobility Programs: Commercial Sealift Support, (Washington, DC: Logistics Management
Institute, 1992), 2.
877

878
David E. Sanger, “The Lame-Duck Congress: The Vote; House approves Trade Agreement By A Wide
Margin”, The New York Times, November 30, 1994.

297

“GET USED TO IT”: THE AUTOMATION AND GLOBALIZATION OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY WATERFRONT, 2005-2016.
Conclusion
In February 2016, Vice President Joseph Biden toured the container terminal at
the Port of New Orleans. Biden lauded the port’s container handling ability as a measure
of economic success in a city still recovering from the disaster of Hurricane Katrina
eleven years earlier. Containers filled with “hundreds of flat screen TVs” and other
imports measured economic growth. According to Biden, “every time the port increases
the capacity to add another 1,000 containers, it adds 11 jobs.” Pointing to container
cranes, Biden stated, “This is a money maker, a job maker, a community maker.”879 The
reality of what containerization wrought was obvious far earlier than the arrival of
Hurricane Katrina.
Katrina’s inundation of areas already economically depressed in New Orleans
complicated rescues and the recovery after the storm passed. In August, 2005, the storm
swamped the low-lying, impoverished portions of the city and turned hundreds of
thousands of residents into refugees. Thousands huddled starving and dehydrated in illequipped shelters. Hundreds drowned in their own homes. Images of dead storm
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victims, too poor or unprepared for the storm to get out, flashed across television screens
globally. A lethargic federal response led reporters covering the storm to describe it as a
“natural disaster, followed by a human disaster.”880 The mayor of New Orleans, Ray
Nagin, gave a widely broadcast interview at the height of the crisis criticizing the federal
response. Nagin argued that federal inaction needed to end and that the government
needed “get off their asses and do something.”881 The exception to the post-disaster
dithering, according to Nagin, was “this John Wayne dude, General Honoré.”882
Lieutenant General Russel Honoré commanded the joint military relief mission in
New Orleans. Lauded for his adept handling of the crisis, Honoré was described by the
New Orleans Times-Picayune as a “cigar chomping guardian angel in camouflage.”
According to the Times-Picayune, he was a candidate for Time Magazine’s “Person of the
Year.”883
Honoré knew the city well. Family connections had brought him “to [New
Orleans] all the time as a kid. The 7th ward or the 9th ward.” The 7th and 9th wards were
among the most devastated areas of the city and had the highest death tolls.884 Asked

Alan Newhauser, “Shepard Smith Opens Up On Katrina, Blasts Ray Nagin,” U.S. News and World
Report, August 20, 2015.
880

“Nagin to Feds: ‘Get Off Your Asses’”, CNN, September 2, 2005.
http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/02/nagin.transcript/ Accessed May 15, 2016.
881

882

Ibid.

883
Jeff Duncan, “Three Star Celebrity”, New Orleans Times-Picayune, September 19, 2005. Instead of
Honoré, the persons of the year were philanthropist billionaires Bill and Melinda Gates and pop star Bono.

Russel Honoré, (Lieutenant General [retired], United States Army),Interview with the author, November
15, 2015.; Jeff Duncan, “Three Star Celebrity”, New Orleans Times-Picayune, September 19, 2005.
According to that day’s edition of the Times-Picayune, 21 days after Katrina’s landfall, some 490 drowned
or starved bodies at the Orleans Parish morgue came from the 7 th and 9th wards. In between the 1970s and
2005, Honoré rose through the Army’s ranks with CONUS and overseas assignments including command
of the 2nd Infantry Division in South Korea.
884

299

years later, “why were they [the people of the 7th and 9th ward] so poor?” Honoré
answered “Automation.”885 The general said,
Most of them were union workers, they had benefits. In the 1960s and
1970s when I went, it was a middle class neighborhood. I had family
members that were longshoremen, they bought a new car once every three
or four years. They were union workers that had benefits, all their kids
went to good schools. The other part of that community built ships. The
two events happened at the same time. Heavy lift cargo cranes and the
construction of ships in Korea. It killed building all the barges and ships
in New Orleans and moving cargo. All those jobs went away, they were
well paying. By the time Katrina came, they had none of them. What you
had left was a shadow of a community where every fourth house was
leaning over and ready to fall. The people who were left behind were a
vulnerable population; older, disabled, poor. In some cases, all three.
When the floodwaters hit it, it didn’t recover and there are no jobs there.
No doctors. No grocery stores. No good schools. A blighted area.886

Katrina’s victims were but a few to suffer through deindustrialization brought
about by the cargo container and globalized economics. Port cities, such as Philadelphia,
Baltimore, and Houston, all experienced urban decay following mass job losses during
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the last quarter of the twentieth century.887 Closed shipyards, steel mills, and automated
piers left millions unemployed and inadequate tax bases or social services to care for
abandoned populations. Historian Thomas Sugure described “postindustrial waterfront”
areas designed to lure tourists as a “showy redevelopment,” a facade to cover the
economic and social problems caused by deindustrialization.888 That is not to say that
there were no industrial jobs remaining in port areas or the maritime industry.
Consolidated remnants of the maritime industry still existed in concentrated areas, such
as military-industrial areas of Hampton Roads, Virginia, and the oil-centric coast of the
Gulf of Mexico.889 The reality, however, was that almost every maritime city in the
United States had vast stretches of real estate similar to the 9th ward and no hope of any
rescue from the rising tide of poverty.
The decision by the Department of Defense (DoD) to containerize and automate
contributed to the first stages of maritime labor’s automated decimation. The invention of
the cargo container in 1958 came shortly before Robert McNamara’s revolutionary
changes at the DoD. McNamara instilled an organizational culture favoring private
sector budgeting and quantitative measures for procurement. No longer were DoD
planners and budgeting officials about “more bang for the buck” for countering the
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Soviet Union as they were in the nuclear weapons-centric era during the Eisenhower
administration.890 The McNamara DoD focused on statistical modeling drawn from
manufacturing to justify purchasing weapons systems. The organizational process
introduced by McNamara and his team of statisticians and economists fundamentally
altered procurement at the DoD.891 By the mid-1960s and with hundreds of billions of
dollars at its disposal, the DoD became a prime economic trendsetter in the American
economy. Following the example of commercial shipping and seeking efficient, costeffective means for logistics, McNamara and his staff introduced containerization to
military logistics. With the DoD demanding containerized shipping from an increasingly
automated maritime industry, military procurement only accelerated the process of
containerization.892
Shortly thereafter in the late 1960s and 1970s, the DoD’s second stage of
embracing containerization combined with trends in privatization and deregulation as a
solution to labor problems. The Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations continued and
enhanced the DoD’s dependence on containers. From 1969 onward, Deputy Secretary of
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Defense David Packard and his successors implemented accounting regimens and
purchasing policies drawn directly from the private sector. Post-Vietnam era defense
spending cuts accelerated the amenability of political appointees and military officers to
automation of logistics.893 The 1970s also witnessed a steep decline in the maritime
labor caused by containerization as well as deregulation. Taking cues from conservative
economists and increasing popular support for deregulation, transportation firms lobbied
for removal of federal commercial regulations. Political candidates such as Ronald
Reagan and Edward Kennedy embraced the goals of the deregulation movement to
address the U.S. flagged shipping industry’s decline during energy and economic crises
of the late 1970s.894
Seeking to reform maritime policy and greatly expand defense spending, Ronald
Reagan coupled deregulation with a restoration of military and commercial maritime
primacy.895 Reagan’s administration restored U.S. maritime defense supremacy with the
“600 ship” navy plan and a renewal of Cold War buildups in other military sectors.
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Rapid expansion of defense budgets aimed at deterring the Soviet Union, however, failed
to include enough funds for preservation of the maritime labor base.896

Promised

reforms of the maritime industry instead deregulated or privatized federal responsibilities.
Maritime labor suffered under the weight of sweeping federal prosecutions for mafia
influence and racketeering. In spite of repeated episodes of military contractor abuses,
only labor unions suffered under the weight of Department of Justice pursuit.897 Defense
contractor abuses and inefficiencies in the budgeting process led to another call for
reforms by the mid 1980s. Led by David Packard, the reform movement at the DoD in
the mid and late 1980s resulted in further deregulation and privatization.898
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the final stage of military containerization fit
neatly within the legislative and defense agendas of the era. The DoD repeatedly
attempted to circumvent Jones Act requirements of carrying cargo on U.S. flagged
shipping. Furthermore, the DoD explored contracting of defense logistics to private
corporations during the term of Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney.899 The deeply
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ingrained privatization impulse at the DoD accelerated the use of private sector logistics
methods. DoD exercises preparing for a late Cold War conflict with the Soviet Union,
such as the Reforger operations, featured heavy reliance on containerization.900
Resultantly, the ordinal steps, which set the DoD down the path of automation in the late
1950s and early 1960s, resulted in the Gulf War sealift debacle of 1990. Insufficient
numbers of longshoremen, a lack of U.S. flagged shipping, and an overemphasis on
contingency planning with containerization caught the DoD unprepared.901
In spite of the overwhelming support provided by longshoremen in the summer
and autumn of 1990, the DoD failed to learn from this example. Defense planners and
military officers maintained that further containerization could handle DoD logistics
concerns.902 The “Unipolar Moment” of American victory in the Cold War seemly
confirmed that a liberal, capitalist, and global free trade zone was the way of the future.
Legislation during the Bush and Clinton administrations facilitated a deeper commitment
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to globalized trade and business networks. Free trade, automation technologies, and
rapid, efficient movement of consumer goods is credited by economists for GDP growth
since the 1990s.903 The cargo container coupled with free trade agreements, such as the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization
(WTO), accelerated that growth. Lower tariff barriers led to rapid GDP growth and
larger profits for shipping and manufacturing corporations following the invention of the
“box” and U.S. ratification of NAFTA and the WTO. Automation and globalization led
to at least 10 million industrial job losses in the United States between 1994 and 2016.904
The damage wrought by globalization and automation ironically accelerated the DoD’s
integration of its logistics into globalized business networks and containerization.
GDP growth from free trade and technological innovations, however, failed to
measure unemployment or underemployment in the first decade of the 2000s. When the
NAFTA authorization bill passed in late 1993, the Clinton administration promised
“education and programs” as a means of retraining displaced or unemployed workers.905
As in turned out in the twenty years since codified liberalized trade and containerization,
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retraining had little effect on levels of unemployment or underemployment. By 2012,
underemployment, or, occupation of a job beneath one’s qualifications or part time work
for college graduates peaked at 46 percent. The average since 1990 has been 33 percent
annually.906 For the plurality of the population, full employment or working in the trade
for which they were trained was long gone. The long decline for longshoremen and other
maritime laborers was a bellwether for the rest of the deindustrialized American
economy.
What little remains of the post-automation and post-trade liberalization domestic
maritime industry continues to undergo legislative and administrative assault. The
explosion aboard British Petroleum’s Deepwater Horizon provided an illustrative point.
The Marshall Islands-flagged rig ship exploded in early 2010, spilling nearly 5 million
barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico.907 Since the spill occurred in U.S. waters, the
Jones Act governed the methods of federal response. Conflicting media reports indicated
that the Coast Guard and other responding federal agencies failed to find sufficient U.S.
flagged ships capable of assisting the cleanup effort. 908

Using the disaster as an

opportunity to reduce complicating regulations, Senator John McCain suggested that the
United States do away with the Jones Act.909 According to McCain, “the best course of
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action is to permanently repeal the Jones Act in order to boost the economy, saving
consumers hundreds of millions of dollars.”910 McCain’s deregulatory appeal in 2010
failed to sway enough members of Congress or the general public to the latest assault on
U.S. flagged shipping. The repeal of the Jones Act failed in both the House and Senate,
but deregulation and privatization remained an alluring legislative cure for the maritime
industry’s woes.911
Similarly, recent developments in DoD plans for the future illustrate a deeper
commitment to automation and privatization. Economist Michael Hicks argued,
however, that it wasn’t factory workers in “Juarez or Beijing” who benefitted from
globalization but “the folks with master’s degrees in robotics in Palo Alto.”912 The sixty
year tradition of the DoD looking to the private sector continued well beyond embracing
containerization and automation for maritime logistics. The DoD heavily invested in
automated technologies during the first decade of the twenty-first century. Hoping to
enhance DoD operations and reduce costs, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter assembled an
advisory panel devoted to the capturing the zeitgeist of technological advances in
previous decades.913 Carter’s assembled the advisory panel of experts in computers and
robotics to attune the DoD on technological innovations and the rapid expansion of
automation to all sectors of the economy. Led by Alphabet and Google Chairman Eric
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Schmidt, Secretary Carter’s advisory panel designed his panel to “draw Silicon Valley’s
technology elite into efforts to spur defense-industry innovation.”914 Excited venture
capital firms suggested that the new initiative could draw the DoD and enormous,
globalized high technology firms closer. Moreover, these firms hoped Secretary Carter’s
drive would allow the Silicon Valley elites to have “lasting influence” beyond the
formation of the advisory panel. According to one analyst, “If it [the advisory panel]
survives and if it has the ear of the next secretary of defense, it could further shape the
DoD acquisition behavior and policies.”915 The future of DoD acquisition and
investment will be devoted to automation technologies.
Meanwhile, automation technologies overtook nearly all sectors of the economy
and job market in the first decades of the twenty-first century. Automation rapidly
conquered the transportation, manufacturing, and resource extraction industries. The
mining consortium Rio Tinto’s Western Australian operation provided a perfect
illustration of the automation’s potential for productivity, as well as mass displacement of
workers. Rio Tinto’s autonomous mining machines extracted iron ore, copper, and other
minerals and loaded the materials into driverless trucks.916 The trucks delivered the ores
to automated trains deep in the outback for delivery to docks along the western coast of
Australia. Computerized cranes loaded lightly manned ships delivered the materials to
mostly automated docks in China, Japan, and the United States.917 In the coming decades,
914
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however, even ships will be completely devoid of labor. In the mid-2010s, British
defense contractor and manufacturer Rolls-Royce planned to build completely
autonomous cargo ships. According to the company, the drone ships will be “safer,
cheaper, and less-polluting” for the $375 billion shipping industry that carries 90 percent
of world trade.”918 Technological changes have almost completely removed workers
from the major sectors of the economy and will continue to shape financial and policy
decisions in the coming century.
The inexorable connection between the rise of automation and globalization and
the decline of labor wrought tremendous change within the United States by the early
2010s. The herald of globalization, Thomas Friedman of The New York Times, offered
repeated cautionary tales to his readers throughout the early decades of the twenty-first
century. Weekly columns from Friedman since the mid-1990s addressed the rapidly
changing currents in employment due to globalization and, more recently, automation.
Friedman’s work discussed the effect of globalized trade, labor, and financial markets on
the general economy. According to Friedman, the vast majority workers outside of the
technology industry suffered ruinous ripple effects from automation and globalization.919
Friedman’s prediction of what witnesses and non-participants in automation and
globalization should prepare for was a warning. “Fasten your seat belts and put your seat

Issac Arnsdorf, “Rolls-Royce Drone Ships Challenge $375 Billion Industry: Freight,” Bloomberg
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backs and tray tables into a fixed and upright position.” 920 For those looking to ride out
the rough water of globalization, Friedman warned that the storm will not pass. Rather,
observers and participants should “get used to it.” 921
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